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Abstract
Security incidents detected by information technology-dependent organisations are escalat-
ing in both scale and complexity. As a result, security incident response has become a critical
mechanism for organisations in an effort to minimise the damage from security incidents. To
help organisations develop security incident response capabilities, several security incident
response approaches and best practice guidelines have been published in both industry and
academia. The final phase within many of these approaches and best practices is the ‘feed-
back’ or ‘follow-up’ phase. Within this phase, it is expected that an organisation will learn
from a security incident and use this information to improve its overall information secu-
rity posture. However, researchers have argued that many organisations tend to focus on
eradication and recovery instead of learning from a security incident.
An exploratory case study was undertaken in a Fortune 500 Organisation to investigate se-
curity incident learning in practice within organisations. At a high-level, the challenges and
problems identified from the case study suggests that security incident response could ben-
efit from improving the quality of data generated from and during security investigations.
Therefore, the objective of this research was to improve the quality of data in security inci-
dent response, so that organisations can develop deeper insights into security incident causes
and to assist with security incident learning.
A supplementary challenge identified was the need to minimise the time-cost associated
with any changes to organisational processes. Therefore, several lightweight measures were
created and implemented within the case study organisation. These measures were evaluated
in a series of longitudinal studies that collected both quantitative and qualitative data from
the case study organisation.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter introduces the research background, the motivation guiding this work, as well
as the thesis statement and research questions. The chapter is divided into five sections.
Section 1.1 presents background information that guided the research project, while Section
1.2 provides the motivation for examining incident learning and the quality of data within
security incident response. Section 1.3 defines the thesis statement and the research ques-
tions. Section 1.4 discusses the research contributions and Section 1.5 provides an overview
of each chapter in the thesis.
1.1 Background
Recent industrial reports [1, 2] have suggested that organisations are detecting an increasing
number of security attacks on their infrastructure. The 2015 PricewaterhouseCoopers In-
formation Security Breaches Survey [1], reported that 90% of large organisations and 74%
of small business in the United Kingdom had detected a security attack in the past twelve
months. The report goes on to state that 59% of respondents expect the number of security
attacks to increase in the next year [1]. This increase comes at a great financial cost. The
2014 Ponemon Cost of Cybercrime [2] report estimates that financial losses attributed to se-
curity attacks cost United States-based organisations an average of $12.7 million, an increase
of 9% since the previous year.
In an effort to reduce the likelihood and impact of security attacks, many organisations imple-
ment information security programs [3, 4]. The purpose of an information security program
is to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of application data, information
systems and computer networks, while ensuring that any legal and regulatory requirements
are also fulfilled [3]. A number of information security standards outline security controls,
which can be implemented within an organisation as part of an information security pro-
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gram. The objective of implementing these security controls is to prevent or mitigate further
security attacks [3]. However, information security programs and implemented security con-
trols cannot guarantee complete protection of an organisation’s assets. Consequently, many
information security standards also advocate the development of security incident response
capabilities. The purpose of these capabilities is to help organisations manage the investiga-
tion and recovery from security attacks which have become incidents [5, 6].
The objective of security incident response is to minimise the damage from a security in-
cident, and to allow an organisation to ultimately learn about the cause of the incident and
how it could be prevented in the future [7]. Several organisations, such as the National
Institute of Standards and Technology [8], the European Network and Information Security
Agency [9] and the International Organization for Standardization [10], have published guid-
ance on security incident investigation and recovery techniques. In addition to these industry
practices, numerous academic researchers have also developed several security incident ap-
proaches [7, 11, 12].
A typical security incident response process consists of six phases: preparation, which leads
to the detection of an incident, followed by its containment which, in turn, allows security
incident response teams to eradicate, recover and then, potentially, provide feedback infor-
mation into the preparation stage. The final phase within many security incident response
approaches is the ‘feedback’ or ‘follow-up’ phase [7, 8, 13]. It is within this phase where an
organisation attempts to learn from a security incident with the aim of improving its overall
information security posture [7, 8, 13]. Within security incident response, incident learn-
ing is usually accomplished through a series of formal reports, meetings and presentations
to management after the closure of an investigation [13]. Lessons learned from a security
investigation can include information about enhancements to existing security controls, the
identification of additional tools for investigation and analysing whether changes are required
to existing security incident response process and procedures [7, 14].
Incident learning has been used in several domains including aviation, safety and health-
care, with the aim of preventing similar incidents in the future [15]. In order to undertake
investigations within these industries, investigators require that any necessary data is made
available to examine the underlying causes of an incident [15]. Stephenson [16] argues that
this is also true within security incident response, where detailed data can help establish root
causes that have contributed to an incident. However, Stephenson [16] adds that in many or-
ganisations, obtaining detailed data about a security incident can be difficult because security
investigations are costly and often require great expertise to conduct. Similar problems have
also been noted in investigations within the transport safety domain where concerns were
raised about the quality of data derived from incident investigations [17].
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1.2 Motivation
Although security incident response best practices stress the importance of post-incident
learning, researchers have observed that many organisations find it difficult to learn from
security incidents [18–20]. A contributing factor to this problem is that many organisations
tend to focus on eradication and recovery and less on security incident learning [18–20].
As a result, there is the possibility, that similar to the transport safety domain, the quality of
data derived from security investigations may be unfit for in-depth security incident learning.
Without access to ‘good’ quality data, a security incident response team could find it difficult
to undertake a lessons learned meeting to engage in security incident learning.
An exploratory case study was undertaken within a Fortune 500 Organisation, with the aim
of investigating the quality of data within security incident response. The results from this
study identified that security incident response could benefit from improving the quality of
data generated from and during security incident investigations, which in turn would help
enhance post-incident learning. Although numerous practices and tools [21–24] have been
developed to help improve the quality of data in various processes, such as databases, very
little research has examined what practices and tools can improve the quality of data in
security incident response. Therefore, specific lightweight practices were proposed as one
approach to improving the quality of data in security incident response.
There are two specific characteristics of lightweight practices that make them a prime can-
didate to help enhance the quality of data within security incident response. Lightweight
practices and methodologies have been proposed in the software development literature as
approaches that strive for simplicity and that are easy to follow, with very few rules [25,26].
Time is a critical factor in security incident investigations [7, 18]. As a result, security inci-
dent handlers may not necessarily respond positively to data quality improvement practices,
which take time and effort to use during an investigation when eradication and recovery
is the focal point. Therefore, lightweight practices that are simple to use could fit into a
time-focused environment, such as security incident response. Lightweight practices and
methodologies are also people-orientated rather than process-orientated and attempt to work
with people’s nature, rather than against it [26]. With individuals considered to be one of
the key factors in the success or failure of security investigations [27, 28], this lightweight
practice characteristic, with its focus on people, lends itself strongly to security incident re-
sponse. Based on these motivations, this research investigated the efficacy of integrating a set
of lightweight practices into security incident response processes. Their use was observed to
investigate if the use of the practices helped to enhance the quality of data generated from
and during security incident investigations.
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1.3 Thesis Statement
Organisations need to strengthen the quality of data produced during security incident re-
sponse investigations in order to enhance learning from security incidents. Therefore, the
hypothesis is as follows:
The quality of data generated during a security incident investigation can be enhanced
through the application of specific lightweight measures.
The lightweight measures were:
• A process for categorising security incidents according to a well-defined taxonomy,
allowing a security incident response team to monitor trends in incident types.
• A security incident investigation record template that focused investigation efforts on
data that provided value to a security incident response team.
• A security incident investigation dashboard to enhance data quality transparency and
to help a security incident response team to identify where data quality needs to be
improved.
• The integration of retrospectives into a security incident response process as a method
of validating data that has been collected within security investigations and to collect
and enhance data that has been missed.
• The use of a root cause analysis framework to guide the security incident investigation
process and to generate higher quality data for subsequent lessons learned.
The following research questions concern the above hypothesis:
RQ1: What data is generated by a real-world security incident response team?
RQ2: What challenges and problems do a security incident response team face when at-
tempting to learn from information security incidents?
RQ3: What effect did the application of the described measures have on the data generated
by the security incident response process?
1.4 Research Contribution
The research presented in this thesis makes several contributions to the body of knowledge
that include:
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Exploratory Case Study of Security Incident Response in a Fortune 500 Organisation
The exploratory case study of the security incident response landscape in a Fortune 500 Or-
ganisation contributes to the understanding of the variety of challenges and problems that
can hinder security incident learning within an organisation. An in-depth analysis of the
organisation’s security investigation records from the perspective of accuracy, completeness
and consistency identified that the quality of data within security incident response is an area
which needs to be addressed to help security incident learning. The findings support and
enhance the results of previous studies of organisations through an analysis of the organisa-
tion’s security investigation records, documented processes and semi-structured interviews
with relevant practitioners. The case study results provided the initial body of data, which
later guided the research through the identification of challenges and problems with incident
learning within security incident response. Undertaking a case study with a real-world secu-
rity incident response team and investigating multiple data sources allowed the research to
be based on real problems encountered within industry.
Evaluation of a Security Incident Response Taxonomy and Investigation Record Tem-
plate
The experiment contributes to the body of knowledge in two ways. First, the experiment
evaluates the effect of employing a revised security investigation record that is used to col-
lect data that has value to a security incident response team with regards to incident learning.
Second, the experiment also evaluates the efficacy of a taxonomy of security incident types
with the purpose of removing ambiguity surrounding incident type identification. The ex-
periment also contributes to the body of knowledge with regards to identifying culture and
management challenges associated with collecting information of value by a security inci-
dent response team.
Evaluation of the Integration of Retrospectives into a Security Incident Response Pro-
cess
The experiment evaluates the effectiveness of using retrospectives as a method for validating
and enhancing data collected during security investigations. In addition, the experiment also
contributes to the understanding of how to design and integrate retrospectives into a security
incident response team. The results from the experiment also suggest that retrospectives
could be implemented in a ‘process culture’ organisation, in order to receive feedback from
a security incident response process. Furthermore, the experiment evaluates the use of meta-
retrospectives (a retrospective of retrospectives) as a method for tracking changes that have
been implemented back into an organisation following a security investigation.
Empirical Experiment involving Security Incident Response Dashboard
The experiment evaluates the effect of using dashboards to enhance data quality transparency
in security incident response. The experiment contributes to knowledge by examining how
1.5. Thesis Overview 6
dashboards can be used to identify where data in security incident investigation records needs
to be enhanced. The experiment also contributes to the knowledge of how to develop and
implement a security incident response dashboard within organisations. The lessons learned
from developing and implementing the dashboard provides insights into the integration of
security incident response dashboards within organisations. The results from the experiment
also highlight culture challenges with regardless to deploying security incident response
dashboards in a regulatory-intensive organisation.
Evaluation of a Root Cause Analysis Framework
The contribution of this experiment is threefold. First, the application of the framework to
historical investigation records investigates the extent to which a root cause analysis method
can help produce enhanced lessons learned when used within security incident response.
Second, the design and implementation of the root cause analysis framework contributes to
the knowledge by providing a method for conducting a root cause analysis within security
investigations. The lessons learned from the implementation of the framework contributes
to the knowledge by providing insights into the process and where problems lie, which can
be improved upon in future initiatives. Third, the experiment contributes to the knowledge
by providing an approach for enhancing data quality through a root cause analysis method
during a security investigation. Moreover, the results from the application of the framework
to ‘live’ investigations contributes to the body of knowledge by examining organisational
culture changes required for an effective root cause analysis.
1.5 Thesis Overview
The objective of this research was to investigate if the integration of lightweight practices into
security incident response can help improve data quality from a security incident response
process. A thesis chapter breakdown is provided detailing the various domains of research
conducted to achieve this objective.
Chapter two presents the research methods that were used in the construction of this thesis.
The research methods used included a review of the relevant literature, exploratory
and explanatory case studies within a Fortune 500 Organisation, interview surveys and
action research.
Chapter three examines the relevant literature concerning information security manage-
ment, security incident response processes and the challenges of undertaking security
incident learning within organisations. The chapter also reviews the term ‘data qual-
ity’ and examines how ‘data quality’ can affect security incident learning. The chapter
concludes by setting the scope for the remainder of the thesis.
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Chapter four presents an exploratory case study of the security incident response landscape
in a Fortune 500 Organisation. The case study identifies the challenges that hinder
security incident learning within an organisation. The chapter includes a discussion
of the organisation’s security incident response landscape, an analysis of its incident
response documentation, as well as the organisation’s information security incident
response database. The chapter also presents the results from interviews conducted
within the organisation. The results from the exploratory case study identified initial
challenges, which guided the rest of the research described in this thesis.
Chapter five presents an experiment to evaluate the use of a security incident taxonomy
and revised security investigation record template within the Fortune 500 Organisation.
The purpose of the experiment was to evaluate if the taxonomy and investigation record
template help to collect data, which has value to the security incident response team
within the organisation with regards to incident learning.
Chapter six presents an experiment to evaluate the integration of retrospectives into the For-
tune 500 Organisation’s security incident response process with the aim of validating
data generated during security investigations and enhancing data collection that was
missed during the initial investigation. The chapter also presents meta-retrospectives
as a method for tracking whether changes identified during lessons learned are in fact
implemented within an organisation.
Chapter seven presents an experiment to evaluate the use of a dashboard with the security
incident response team in the Fortune 500 Organisation. The purpose of the experi-
ment presented in this chapter was to determine if the dashboard helps to enhance data
quality transparency, i.e. identify security investigation records where data quality
needs to be improved.
Chapter eight presents an experiment to evaluate the use of a root cause analysis frame-
work, as a method for enhancing the quality of data during a security investigation.
The aim of this experiment was twofold. First, the experiment was used to evaluate if
using a root cause analysis can help to produce enhanced lessons learned derived from
a security investigation. Second, the experiment was used to demonstrate how a root
cause analysis can help enhance the quality of data captured from an investigation.
Chapter nine presents the conclusions to the research questions detailed in the introduction
and discusses further work.
8Chapter 2
Research Methodology
This chapter describes the research methods used in the construction of this thesis. These
methods included literature reviews, case studies and action research. The chapter is struc-
tured as follows. Section 2.1 provides the justification of the research approach and presents
the research methods used in this thesis. Sections 2.2 through 2.6 explain the use of literature
review, case study research, interviews, documents analysis, observation and action research
respectively, and their application to the research in this thesis. Section 2.7 summarises the
chapter.
2.1 Justification of Research Approach
Several researchers [29, 30] have argued that in order to understand the work of informa-
tion technology professionals it is necessary to study the tools used by these professionals,
as well as the surrounding social and cognitive processes. In the context of software en-
gineering, Easterbrook, et al. [29] has developed a taxonomy of methods for this purpose,
with each method suited to answering different forms of research questions. These meth-
ods include controlled experiments, case studies, survey research, ethnographies and action
research [29]. Oates [30] supplements these research methods by arguing that a literature
review is important in order to relate research findings to previous work. Oates [30] goes on
to present a detailed framework for conducting information system research that is derived
from a literature review and consists of six research strategies that include survey, design and
creation, experiment, case study, action research and ethnography.
The research methods proposed to investigate the tools, as well as the surrounding social
and cognitive processes within software engineering and information systems lend them-
selves strongly to security incident response research. Researchers within security incident
response [18, 27] have called for further research into the socio-organisational perspectives
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of security incident response, as well as the relationship between security incident response
teams and their wider organisations. Therefore, out of the research methods proposed above,
four have been used in the construction of the work described in this thesis: literature review,
case studies and action research.
The initial research described in the thesis was guided by a literature review. The purpose of
the literature review was twofold. First, the literature review was used to identify the high-
level research questions that the proposed research will look to address and helped to define
the conceptual framework. Second, the literature was used to relate the research findings
presented in this thesis to previous work. This allowed the author to discuss strengths and
weakness in previous work, identify key issues and challenges troubling the specific research
community, along with identifying theories that might explain the research findings [30].
The case study is a research method which involves an in-depth and detailed examination of
an organisation, a department, an information system, a specific team or project (‘the case’),
as well as its related contextual conditions [30]. In this research, the case study method was
used to investigate why security incident learning is a problem within organisations. The
case study research method was chosen over other research methods including the survey
approach and the controlled experiment. While the survey approach allows a researcher to
obtain a wide but shallow view of many instances of the case under investigation, the method
is unlikely to assist the researcher who wishes to obtain a richer context about a particular
problem [30,31]. In contrast, the case study method is better suited when a researcher wants
“to obtain a rich and detailed insight into the ‘life’ of a case including its complex rela-
tionships and processes” [30]. Moreover, during a controlled experiment researchers have
to separate a phenomenon from its context, in order to establish if research outcomes have
been caused by changing the independent variable [30]. While variables can be added and
removed during a controlled experiment, a researcher will find that they will have limited
control over variables during longer experiments [32]. This can make the controlled experi-
ment method unsuitable for studying an organisation because of the limited control over the
variables within an organisation. For example, business processes can change, employees
can leave the organisation and new employees can be hired. Therefore, the case study re-
search method is more appropriate for situations where researchers have little control over
events and where results produced from the study better reflect the real-world [30].
Although the case study approach was selected for use in this research, it must acknowledged
that several researchers have discussed the weakness of the approach in the literature. These
concerns include difficulties in generalising results [30–32]; difficulties in obtaining access
to people, documents and settings [30]; the presence of the researcher affecting how people
behave in their natural setting [30]; and case studies being labelled as being too long, difficult
to conduct and producing a massive amount of documentation [32].
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In addition to the case study method, ‘action research’ was used to investigate real-world
problems while simultaneously examining the experience of solving these problems within
a studied organisation [33]. The action research method was chosen for this research project
because it can be used to concentrate research efforts that are relevant to improving people
and organisations in the real-world [33]. The action research method was used in the research
process to guide the implementation and investigation of lightweight measures into security
incident response as a means of improving the quality of data. However, one of the biggest
criticisms of action research is that it can resemble consultancy [30]. As a result, researchers
need to ensure knowledge is either created or validated from the action research process [30].
The use of the literature review, case study and action research methods will be discussed in
more detail below.
2.2 Literature Review
The relevant literature was examined from a variety of sources including industry white-
papers and best practice documentation, journals, conference proceedings and relevant text-
books. The main body of relevant literature is discussed in Chapter three. However, relevant
literature is also discussed prior to each experimental chapter where appropriate.
Chapter three presents an overview of information security within organisations and intro-
duces security incident response and its position within information security. More specif-
ically, the chapter presents the theoretical foundations from the literature, including how
lessons learned are typically developed from security investigations and how incident learn-
ing from such investigations is a problem which has been identified in several organisations.
The chapter also introduces the concept of data quality and examines relevant literature con-
cerning data quality improvement processes.
Relevant literature is also discussed in Chapters six and seven. Within Chapter six, relevant
literature introduces retrospectives and discusses how they have been used in the software
development community. In Chapter seven relevant literature introduces dashboards and
provides an overview of previous research focused on developing dashboards within infor-
mation security.
2.3 Case Study
The case study is a research method that involves an in-depth and detailed examination of an
organisation, a department, an information system, a specific team or project (‘the case’), as
well as its related contextual conditions [30]. Yin defines case study research as:
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“an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the ‘case’)
in-depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries be-
tween phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident” [32].
Oates [30] adds that the objective of a case study is to “obtain a rich, detailed insight into the
‘life’ of the case and its complex relationships and processes”. Oates goes on to define three
types of case studies [30]:
• exploratory case studies, which define the questions or hypotheses to be used in
subsequent case studies;
• descriptive case studies, which can result in a detailed analysis of a particular phe-
nomenon and its context; and
• explanatory case studies, which try to explain why certain events have occurred as
they did or why particular outcomes were obtained.
Alternatively, Hancock and Algozzine define three stages in designing case studies [34]:
defining a ‘case’, selecting a case study design and choosing to use theory in the design.
Another prospective of a case study process is provided by Yin [35] as:
1. Case study design: objectives are defined and the case study is planned
2. Preparation for data collection: procedures and protocols for data collection are de-
fined
3. Collecting evidence: execution with data collection on the studied case
4. Analysis of collected data
5. Reporting
In the case study undertaken for this research, the first stage is where the initial negotiation
and agreement with a Fortune 500 organisation took place to determine their involvement
as the ‘case’. Therefore, the research described in this thesis involved a ‘special’ single
case study [30, 35, 36]. The Fortune 500 organisation is a multi-national organisation within
the financial services sector and therefore under a large amount of regulation, particularly
towards the reporting and investigation of information security incidents. This makes the
Fortune 500 organisation an ideal candidate to explore security incident learning challenges
within organisations. The organisation was selected based on previous academic collabora-
tive relationships with the author’s supervisor. The Fortune 500 organisation is representa-
tive of other organisations in the financial category in terms of interest in security incident
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response, regulatory obligations towards security incident reporting, size, bureaucracy and
resource constraints. The opportunity to undertake research with the Fortune 500 organ-
isation allowed the project to be based on real-world problems and to examine potential
solutions in a real-world environment. The Fortune 500 organisation case study can be con-
sidered a ‘special case’ in the sense that a unique chance arose to study security incident
learning in a large organisation [36].
An internship with the organisation was agreed and a confidentiality agreement was signed
that restricted disclosure of the name of the organisation. With this in mind, the names of any
organisational documents and processes discussed in this and other chapters have been al-
tered and the results of any data collected is presented anonymously. The research agreement
consisted of first examining the organisations security incident response practices towards
security incident learning, and then second making recommendations on how to strengthen
processes for security incident learning data. Although the organisation was supportive of
the research initiative, there was no guarantee that they would accept the recommendations
or implement the changes into the production environment. The final gatekeeper, who would
decide on the improvement initiatives was the organisation’s Head of Information Security
(hereafter referred to as the industrial sponsor). Once these issues had been agreed upon, the
project moved to its second stage.
An initial meeting took place where the author explain the theoretical perspective surround-
ing security incident learning challenges within organisations to the industrial sponsor. The
organisation, as part of the research project, agreed to allow the author access to individuals
and resources within the organisation to undertake the research described in the thesis. An
exploratory case study was then conducted at this time to acquire a more in-depth understand-
ing of the problem. An exploratory case study is used to define the questions or hypotheses to
be used in subsequent case studies [30]. The unit of analysis for this exploratory case study
was the organisation’s Information Security Incident Response (ISIR) team. This means that
the exploratory case study can be considered to be a holistic case study [35].
The objective of the exploratory case study was to define the research questions in the con-
text of why security incident learning is a problem within organisations. The results from
the exploratory case study were then used to define and guide the research questions and
hypotheses in the remainder of the research described in this thesis [30]. The case study
undertaken within the organisation can be classified as longitudinal study, because it was
conducted over a long period of time [30]. The exploratory case study was undertaken from
May 2013 to December 2013. Longitudinal studies are useful when attempting to examine
chronological timelines of events or changes in real-world organisations over time, as was
the case in the Fortune 500 organisation case study [35].
A variety of different data sources were used in the generation of data in the case study.
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Oates [30] defines data generation as the “means by which you produce empirical data or
evidence, which can be either quantitative or qualitative”. Three data generation methods
were used during the course of the exploratory case study, which are presented in Table
2.1 [30].
Generation Method Definition
Interview A particular kind of conversation between two people where,
at least at the beginning of the interview if not all the way
through, the researcher controls both the agenda and the pro-
ceedings and will ask most of the questions.
Documents that already exist prior to the research and documents that are
made solely for the purpose of the research task.
Observation Watching and paying attention to what people actually do,
rather than what they report they do.
Table 2.1: Data Generation Methods
The third stage implements the data generation methods into the organisation. As a result,
of using two or more data generation methods, ‘Method Triangulation’ was used during the
case study [30]. At the end of the exploratory case study time period, the data collected from
the three data generation methods were evaluated as part of the fourth stage. The results
from the exploratory case study are then reported in the final stage.
At this point it must be acknowledged that despite the advantages of the case study method,
there are concerns in the literature regarding its reliability and validity [37–39]. The research
presented in this thesis uses three different data generation methods (interview, documents
and observation), which Oates defines as “Method Triangulation” [30]. Furthermore, the
research in the thesis also uses three research strategies (literature review, case study and
action research), which Oates defines as “Strategy Triangulation” [30]. The implementation
of “Strategy Triangulation”, along with the use of multiple data generation methods, can help
validate or highlight differences in research findings and data collected, as well as helping to
enhance research validity and the reliability of collected data [30].
2.4 Interviews
Interviews were used during the course of this research to gather qualitative data about var-
ious aspects of the research project. Interviews were selected over questionnaires for two
reasons. First, they provide the interviewer with more control over the question being asked
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and second, interviews are better suited to keeping the interviewee focused and on track to
completion [30].
In total, three sets of interviews were undertaken, all of which were conducted within the
Fortune 500 Organisation. The interviews utilised a semi-structured interview approach,
which means that there were a set number of interview questions that were read to each
participant [30]. However, if the participant wished to talk about other issues related to
the interview question, this was allowed to go on to completion. When the participants
completed voicing their thoughts and answered the question that had been put forth, they
were directed to the next question. The instrument for all three interviews consisted of a
combination of open-ended and closed questions [40].
To mitigate researcher bias in terms of reliability and viability, the interview instruments
were validated by two security professionals [40]. An information security manager and
a senior security analyst validated the instruments by taking the interviews and providing
feedback. The feedback from these individuals ranged from simplifying open-ended ques-
tions to adding response options to closed questions. In all three cases, this validation was
only conducted once due to time constraints. At the start of the interviews, participants were
read a statement thanking them for participating, explaining the reason for the research and
reassuring respondent anonymity. The interviews were conducted in conference rooms and
participant’s desks within the organisation. All responses to the individual questions were
initially recorded by hand. The hand written results for all three sets of interviews were digi-
tally recorded soon after the interview were completed, typically within an hour. The results
were then examined by hand to identify trends, patterns, and anomalies.
The first set of interviews was undertaken as part of the exploratory case study within the
Fortune 500 Organisation. The purpose of these interviews was to obtain an in-depth un-
derstanding of how security incident response is perceived and undertaken within the or-
ganisation from the perspective of practitioners. The interviews were also used to explore
challenges to conducting security incident response within the organisation and examine
data gathering and incident learning from the overall security incident response process per-
spective. The survey instrument for the exploratory case study can be found in Appendix
A. The questions within the instrument were derived from themes identified in industrial
white-papers [41–43] and academic papers [18–20, 44] related to security incident learn-
ing challenges in organisations. These interviews were conducted between November and
December 2013. Initially, the interviews were conducted with three individuals identified
through the organisation’s security incident response process as the ‘Primary Incident Han-
dlers’. A further twelve individuals were then identified and interviewed based on answers
from the initial respondents’ interviews. All fifteen individuals are members of the organi-
sation’s information security unit and have at some point, been involved in the investigation
and handling of a security incident. The University of Glasgow, College of Science and
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Engineering Ethics Committee approved the interview instrument under approval number
CSE01330.
Two further sets of interviews were also undertaken during the explanatory case study. The
questions used in these two sets of interviews can be found in Appendix B and Appendix
C. These interviews were used to ascertain the impact of the lightweight measures imple-
mented within the organisation and to further explore certain phenomena identified from
the quantitative data analysis. As a result, the questions within these two instruments were
derived from themes that emerged from the quantitative data generated through the use of
the lightweight measures. The interviews were conducted with seven individuals. These
seven individuals were at the time of the interviews, identified as the organisation’s ‘security
incident response team’ and consisted of six ‘primary incident handlers’ and the security
incident response policy owner. Although the policy owner did not actively participate in or
use the implemented measures, their opinion was sought in their capacity as an information
security manager who is ultimately responsible for the security incident response process
within the organisation. These two sets of interviews were approved by the University of
Glasgow Ethics Committee under approval numbers 300140061 and 300140162.
2.5 Document and Observation Analysis
In order to acquire an understanding of the Fortune 500 organisation’s context during the
exploratory case study, the organisation’s internal documentation repository was examined.
The primary advantage of using document-based data is that it can be obtained quickly and
cheaply because documents already exist and are readily available in the organisation [30].
However, researchers need to evaluate documents to ensure that the author of the partic-
ular document has not introduced any bias and that the content of the document can be
trusted [30]. Obtaining access to the documentation repository was negotiated within the
confidentiality agreement discussed above, and involved the author examining the repository
from May 2013 to December 2013 to identify and analyse found documents [30] related to
security incident response processes.
The author was granted access to documentation that would normally be available to indi-
viduals within the organisation’s Information Security Incident Response team. Documents,
which were considered sensitive, confidential and only available to Management, were out-
side the scope of the analysis. The ‘found documents’ used in the case study were all signed-
off by management before they are stored in the documentation repository. In this sense, the
author considered the content of the ‘found documents’ to be authentic and trustworthy [30].
The documents were analysed using theme analysis, which is a qualitative technique that
allows a researcher to examine different topics covered in a variety of documents [30]. In
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this case, the topics examined were related to security incident response processes (such as
the tasks incident handlers are expected to undertake within the organisation) and learning
from security incidents.
Observation is a data generation method that can be used by researchers to investigate what
people really do, as opposed to what they report they do, when queried [30]. In the ex-
ploratory case study, observation was concentrated on individuals considered to be the Infor-
mation Security Incident Response team in the organisation. While the document analysis
was used to investigate how security incident response is expected to be undertaken within
the organisation, observation was used to explore if incident handlers deviate from this pro-
cess, i.e. how security incidents are really managed and handled in the organisation. This
involved the author shadowing the security incident handlers in an overt manner, when an
incident was reported to the team. Field notes were then documented on how the incident
was managed and handled by the specific individual(s). The author did not participate in the
management or handling of the security incident and therefore can be considered a complete
observer [30]. It must be noted that observations were limited to security incidents where
the author was present in the organisation, and in some cases the author could not observe
incident meetings for security incidents considered sensitive in nature.
2.6 Action Research
Davison, et al. [45] define Action Research (AR) as a research method, which attempts
to solve a real-world problem, while simultaneously studying the experience of solving
the problem. Baskerville adds that AR “assists in practical problem solving and expand-
ing scientific knowledge” [33]. The AR method was used to guide the implementation of
the lightweight measures in the Fortune 500 Organisation from February 2014 until March
2015. The implementation of these measures was guided using the AR cycle discussed by
Baskerville [33] which consists of five phases: diagnosing, action planning, action taking,
evaluating and specifying learning.
Diagnosing is concerned with the identification of the problems that are the underlying
causes of an organisation’s desire for change [33]. The exploratory case study provided
information describing the ‘diagnosis’ and helped to identify the initial challenges in secu-
rity incident learning within the organisation. These challenges, along with the exploratory
case study are discussed in Chapter four.
Baskerville [33] describes action planning as researchers and practitioners collaborating on
planning organisational actions that should relieve or improve the problems identified in
the diagnosis stage. Within this research project, the author held numerous meetings with
the industrial sponsor within the Fortune 500 Organisation. Initially, the meetings involved
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the author presenting the findings from the exploratory case study and highlighting poten-
tial enhancements identified within the organisation’s security incident response process.
The author then explored and identified opportunities to improve security incident response
within the organisation. Opportunities were identified based on available access to specific
resources under the management of the industrial sponsor. Several recommendations were
made to the organisation and some of these recommendations were accepted. These recom-
mendations involved the lightweight measures described in previous sections. The accepted
recommendations were implemented into the production environment. Chapters five through
eight, report on the individual recommendations implemented within the organisation. These
implemented changes were the ‘action taking’ phase in Baskerville’s AR cycle. In Chapter
five, two main modifications were recommended, a security incident classification taxonomy
and a revised security incident response investigation record template. Within Chapter six,
retrospectives and meta-retrospectives (a retrospective of retrospectives) were proposed and
integrated within the security incident response process, while in Chapter seven; a dashboard
was designed and implemented within the organisation. In Chapter eight, a framework was
designed and developed to assist and guide root cause analysis within the organisation’s secu-
rity incident response process. It must be noted that during the course of the research project,
organisational changes occurred in the security incident response team, and the Information
Security team within the organisation. Shortly after the implementation of the lightweight
measures, the Information Security team was restructured, which involved merging existing
teams into new units. The security incident response team was not affected by this recon-
structing, however the team was expanded on two occasions after the lightweight measures
were implemented. Two new employees joined the security incident response team at the
end of 2015.
In order to evaluate the implemented changes, quantitative and qualitative data analysis was
undertaken. Quantitative analysis involved analysing a variety of artefacts created during
the course of the case study, which included security investigation records, as well as data
and logs created from security incident response activities. In addition, qualitative data was
collected through semi-structured interviews. The use of both quantitative and qualitative
data helped to validate or highlight differences in findings and data collected [30].
The results from the quantitative and qualitative analysis provided the input into the activity
of specifying learning from the implemented recommendations [33]. This involved exam-
ining the results from the quantitative and qualitative analysis and identifying knowledge
which could be considered important to the security incident response and information secu-
rity communities for dealing with similar future research settings [33]. Figure 2.1 presents a
timeline of the research activities involved in the construction of this thesis. The timeline in-
cludes the implementation of the exploratory and explanatory case studies, the modifications
implemented within the organisation, as well as the various data generation methods used to
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01/05/2013
01/07/2015
01/07/2013
01/10/2013
01/01/2014
01/04/2014
01/07/2014
01/10/2014
01/01/2015
01/04/2015
May 2013 – Start of exploratory case study: document analysis and 
analysis of security incident response database
November/December 2013 - Exploratory case study: semi-structured 
interviews and conclusion of case study
January 2014 – Report findings to Industrial Sponsor and identify opportunities 
for improving security incident response. Start work on developing improvements
February 2014 – Implement Retrospectives and Meta-Retrospectives, which are 
executed by the author within the organization and data is collected through their 
execution
February 2014 – Implement security incident response categorization 
taxonomy and investigation record template and data is collected 
through their usage within the organization
April 2014 – Implement security incident response dashboard and 
data is collected through usage by individuals within the 
organization. Author also executes dashboard on a near-daily 
basis
March 2015 – Stop executing retrospectives and meta-retrospectives. Conduct semi-structured 
interviews evaluating retrospectives and meta-retrospectives. Data analysis begins collected 
data. Analysis continues into April 2015.
April 2015 – Collect security investigation records from 24th February 
2014 to 1
st
 April 2015. Collect dashboard data from usage by security 
incident response team. Conduct semi-structured interviews evaluating 
taxonomy, investigation records template and dashboard within the 
organization. Data analysis begins using collected data and continues 
into May 2015. Write-up begins
May 2015 – Write-up continues until thesis is submitted. 
Figure 2.1: Timeline of Industrial Research Project
collect data in the studied organisation.
2.7 Summary
This chapter presented the research methods that were used in the construction of this the-
sis. The research methods used included a review of the relevant literature, explanatory and
explanatory case studies within a Fortune 500 Organisation, interview surveys and action
research.
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Chapter 3
Literature Review
This chapter presents a review of the relevant literature and provides the theoretical back-
ground that the thesis draws upon. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 defines
information security and introduces background security concepts such as security threats,
vulnerabilities and risk management. Section 3.2 first examines the evolution of informa-
tion security management within organisations from the 1980’s to the present time, then
introduces the concept of Information Security Management Systems (ISMS) and presents
an overview of information security standards. Section 3.3 introduces information security
incident management and examines the various definitions of the term ‘security incident’
available in the literature. The section also presents and reviews the phases within a typical
security incident response process and then reviews how security incident response is under-
taken in various organisations. Section 3.4 presents related work on post-incident learning,
which includes an analysis of the literature to identify how post-incident learning is under-
taken in organisations, as well as methods for learning from security incidents. Section 3.5
introduces the concepts of data, information, knowledge and wisdom in context of this re-
search. The section also defines the term ‘data quality’ and speculates on the extent to which
data quality could be a problem within security incident response investigations. Section 3.6
introduces organisational culture presents an overview of different types of organisational
culture. Furthermore, the concept of organisational learning is discussed, as well as previ-
ous work on organisational learning in the security incident response domain. Section 3.7
summarises the theoretical motivations, which have guided the remainder of the research
described in this thesis.
3.1 Information Security Fundamentals
The widespread use of electronic data processing, along with the emergence of business
conducted through the Internet has fuelled the need for methods to protect business informa-
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tion and information systems. As a result, many organisations have recognised the impor-
tance of implementing effective information security programs [46,47]. Information security
concerns the protection of information and information systems from unauthorised access,
modification or destruction. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) state
that:
“information security involves the application and management of appropri-
ate security measures that involves consideration of a wide range of threats, with
the aim of ensuring sustained business success and continuity, and minimising
impacts of information security incidents” [48].
The ISO go on to define three properties of secure information: confidentiality, integrity
and availability. Confidentiality refers to “the protection of sensitive information from au-
thorised disclosure” [3]. Integrity is defined as “the accuracy, completeness, and validity
of information in accordance with business values” [3]. Availability relates to “information
being available when required by the business process now and in the future” [3]. Collec-
tively, confidentiality, integrity and availability are referred to as the CIA Triad [49]. In
summary, an organisation’s information security objectives should be to protect the confi-
dentiality, integrity and availability of business information and information systems through
the implementation of countermeasures, while minimising damages from threats that exploit
vulnerabilities [3, 50]. Workman, et al. [51] define a lapse within information security as a
failure of one of the three properties of secure information in the CIA Triad.
An information security lapse can result from a potential vulnerability being exploited by a
threat. A vulnerability is defined as “a weakness in the security system that might be ex-
ploited to cause loss or harm” [52]. For example, a vulnerability can be viewed in terms of
a mistake or error in software code that can allow an attacker to gain access to an affected
information system or computer network [53]. Other examples of vulnerabilities include
unpatched applications or operating systems, unrestricted wireless access points, open ports
on a firewall and unenforced password policies [54]. Industry vendors such as Cisco [55],
Microsoft [56] and Symantec [57] regularly publish notices and advisories highlighting po-
tential security vulnerabilities for a variety of information systems, applications and network
devices.
A security threat refers to “any potential danger that is associated with the exploitation of a
vulnerability” [54]. Alternatively, Pfleeger and Pfleeger define a threat as “a set of circum-
stances that has the potential to cause loss or harm” [52]. Security threats can be unexpected
and have the potential to cause undesired effects that can negatively impact information or
an information system. There can be many threats to information or an information system,
including human-initiated threats and computer-initiated threats [52].
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An organisation can minimise the impact of potential security threats exploiting vulnerabil-
ities by implementing a suitable security countermeasure or control [54]. A security coun-
termeasure is defined as “a control, measure, technique or procedure that is put in place to
prevent a threat agent from exploiting a vulnerability” [54]. Examples of security counter-
measures include strong password management, firewalls, access control mechanisms, en-
cryption, and security-awareness education [54]. The relationship between threats, controls
and vulnerabilities can be summarised as “a threat is blocked by control of a vulnerabil-
ity” [52].
While organisations implement security countermeasures with the aim of minimising the
impact of security threats exploiting vulnerabilities, there is still the possibility that a threat
could damage, destroy, or disclose information or information systems. This possibility is
known as information security risk [58]. Information security risk is defined as “the poten-
tial that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group of assets and thereby
cause harm to the organisation” [59]. Managing risk is considered an important element to
sustaining a secure environment [54]. Organisations can assess and measure their security
risk through a risk assessment [54]. A risk assessment enables an organisation to identify
threats and vulnerabilities that have the potential to negatively impact their business opera-
tions [54]. There are several tools and methods available for conducting a risk assessment.
These include the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Guide for Conducting
Risk Assessments [60], the Facilitated Risk Analysis Process (FRAP) [61], and the Opera-
tionally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) approach [62]. An
organisation can use the outcomes from a risk assessment to decide how it will allocate re-
sources to implement security controls that will reduce the likelihood and/or the potential
impact of the threats being realised [54]. A risk assessment is normally integrated into a
wider information security management program.
3.2 Information Security Management
In an effort to help organisations fulfil information security requirements, the process of im-
plementing security has been formalised through information security management [63]. The
purpose of information security management is to implement appropriate countermeasures
in order to minimise the impact that security-related threats and vulnerabilities might have on
an organisation. Several researchers have examined the changing role of information secu-
rity management within organisations in the past few decades [64–67]. Von Solms’ analysis
separated the evolution of information security management within organisations into three
‘waves’ [66]. Von Solms argues that first generation information security management prac-
tices existed up until the early 1980’s and can be characterised as the ‘Technical Wave’,
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which focused on technical information security approaches [66]. Information security man-
agement during this wave was concerned with mainframes and organisations attempted to
solve security problems through the built-in functions of the mainframe operating system.
This was usually accomplished using access control lists, user-ids and through the use of
passwords on the mainframes themselves [66].
Von Solms called the second generation of information security management, which lasted
from the early 1980’s to the mid 1990’s, the ‘Management Wave’. During this period, senior
management within organisations realised that information security was no longer just a
technical issue, but also required the development of security policies and procedures, as
well as involving managers and executives in the security-decision making process [66].
The third generation, referred to as the ‘Institutional Wave’, began in the mid 1990’s and
continued into the 2000’s [66]. This wave is characterised by the demand for information
security standardisation and certification within organisations [66]. Therefore, it is during
this period that many organisations looked to implement information security best practices
and standards such as the International Organization for Standardization and the International
Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) 17799/27002 standards [66].
Von Solms expands and updates his earlier work by arguing that a fourth wave emerged at
the turn of the millennium called the ‘Information Security Governance Wave’ [67]. Von
Solms explains that the forces behind this wave include the emergence of information se-
curity corporate governance, as well as growing legal and regulatory security requirements
dictating the security of information and information systems [67]. Corporate governance is
the “set of policies and internal controls by which organisations, irrespective of size or form,
are directed and managed” [68]. As a result, information security governance can be viewed
as a subsection of an organisation’s general corporate governance program.
3.2.1 Information Security Management Systems (ISMS)
Humphreys [69] argues that within many organisations, it is ultimately the Board of Directors
who are responsible for the protection of an organisation’s information assets. It is this group
of individuals who need to ensure that an appropriate risk assessment process is in place and
that an effective system of security controls are implemented to mitigate identified threats.
A growing list of legal and regulatory requirements means that a failure to comply can result
in large financial penalties and possibly regulatory repercussions for an organisation [70].
Therefore, to help the Board of Directors fulfil these legal and regulatory commitments in
a manner where due diligence can also be performed, many organisations are turning to
Information Security Management Systems (ISMSs) [70].
An Information Security Management System (ISMS) is defined as “the policies, procedures,
guidelines, and associated resources and activities, collectively managed by an organisation,
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in the pursuit of protecting its information assets” [48]. The primary objective of an ISMS
is to implement, review and improve an organisation’s information security so that it can
achieve its business goals. [48, 71]. Similarly, Eloff and Eloff define an ISMS as “used for
establishing and maintaining a secure information environment” [72].
Two main approaches have been identified in the literature which define how an organisation
can structure an effective and efficient ISMS, the ISO/IEC 27001 standard [5] and the Euro-
pean Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) ISMS Framework [73].
The predecessor to the ISO/IEC 27001 standard, the British Standard (BS) 7799-2:2002 [74]
introduced the four-step management Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle as a method for de-
signing, implementing and reviewing an ISMS. The use of the PDCA cycle has been subse-
quently described in ISO/IEC security standards, which have since superseded 7799-2:2002.
Within the PDCA cycle, the Plan phase is concerned with designing the ISMS, assessing
information security risks and then selecting the appropriate security controls. Security con-
trols identified in the plan phase are then implemented during the Do phase. The objective
of the Check phase is to review and evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the ISMS.
In the Act phase, any changes identified during the check phase are implemented to improve
the performance of the ISMS. It is however, worth noting that the latest version of ISO/IEC
27001 [5], which was published in 2013, no longer emphasises the PDCA cycle. Instead,
organisations are free to use other improvement processes such as Six Sigma’s Define, Mea-
sure, Analyse, Improve and Control (DMAIC) as a method to continuously evaluate and
improve their ISMS [5, 75].
Alternatively, ENISA describes an approach for implementing an ISMS using the ISMS
Framework [73]. Similarly to the ISO/IEC standard, the ENISA approach consists of six
steps [73]: (i) definition of security policy, (ii) definition of ISMS scope, (iii) risk assess-
ment, (iv) risk management, (v) selection of appropriate controls, and (vi) statement of ap-
plicability. At the heart of the ENISA ISMS Framework are steps three and four, the risk
assessment and management actions [73]. It is the activities, which take place within these
steps, where the objectives of the ISMS are transformed into the implementation of con-
trols that aim to prevent threats and vulnerabilities [73]. Regardless of the approach taken
to implement and maintain an ISMS, organisations look to implement appropriate informa-
tion security controls to mitigate identified risks. These security controls are selected and
derived from existing information security standards or guidelines with the aim of meeting
industry-specific requirements.
3.2.2 Information Security Standards and Guidelines
Often referred to as “voluntary standards, frameworks or sets of best practices” [76], sev-
eral information security standards and guidelines have been developed and published by
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internationally recognised organisations. The target of a standard may be an organisation, a
product or a service, while the criteria within the standard are likely to be primarily objective
as opposed to subjective [77]. A standard will typically state what an organisation ‘must’ do,
rather than ‘may’ or ‘might’ do with regards to implementing security controls [77]. An in-
formation security standard is further defined as “guidance to organisations on how to design,
implement, and maintain policies, processes, and technologies to manage risks to its sensi-
tive information assets” [54]. Security standards can be readily audited against, and security
controls that do not conform to a standard should be easily identifiable. Several information
security standards exist including the ISO/IEC 27002 standard [6], the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) Federal Information Processing Standards Publica-
tions [78] and ‘Special Publications’ [79], and the Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standard (PCI-DSS) [80]. The following subsections review these information security stan-
dards.
The ISO/IEC 27002 Standard
ISO/IEC 27002 is an international information security standard which was last updated
in 2013. The standard provides recommendations with regards to initiating, implementing
and maintaining secure systems. Unlike ISO/IEC 27001, which is a formal specification,
ISO/IEC 27002 is an advisory document, which recommends information security controls
that can be implemented within the process of establishing and maintaining an ISMS [6].
ISO/IEC 27002 consists of fourteen security domains that cover security control information
on areas such as security policies, asset management, human resource security, business con-
tinuity management and operations security [6]. The standard also addresses requirements
concerned with developing procedures that define security incident response planning and
preparation, the handling of forensic evidence and learning from security incidents. ISO/IEC
27002 is considered to be a standard that can be applied to all types and sizes of organisa-
tions, irrespective to the security threats and risks they face [6]. This supports Siponen and
Willison’s [81] argument that such standards do not pay enough attention to different organ-
isations’ security requirements. In practice, the broad range of security controls covered in
the standard can also provide an organisation with some flexibility to adopt only the security
controls that they require. However, this can complicate compliance testing for certification
because an organisation may implement specific security controls and not the entire standard.
The Federal Information Processing Standards and Special Publications
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) have developed a range of in-
formation security publications in response to the United States (U.S.) Congress enacting
3.2. Information Security Management 25
the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) [82] as part of the
E-Government Act of 2002 [83]. FISMA dictates that U.S. federal agencies identify, de-
velop, document, and implement an agency-wide information security program [84]. To
assist federal agencies implement information security programs and audit methods, NIST
have created the Federal Information Processing Standards Publications (FIPS PUBS) [78]
and ‘Special Publications’ [79].
FIPS PUBS are issued by NIST in accordance with FISMA and are mandatory security re-
quirements for U.S. federal agencies [84]. FISMA requires that all federal agencies comply
with the requirements within these standards [84]. These publications contain information
on everything from baseline security requirements for information systems, to local area
network security, cryptography and encryption requirements, as well as data transfer re-
quirements [78]. In addition to FIPS PUBS, NIST have also created a range of information
security publications, which are published as recommendations and guidance documents and
are to referred to as ‘Special Publications’ [79]. Federal agencies are also required to follow
any NIST Special Publication referred to within a FIPS PUB [85]. For example, to apply
FIPS PUB 200 [86], agencies first need to classify and determine the security category of
their information systems as required by FIPS PUB 199 [87]. Agencies can then select suit-
able security controls from NIST Special Publication 800-53 [85] to satisfy their minimum
security requirements as required within FIPS PUBS 200 [86].
Although NIST has based these ‘Special Publications’ on principles for securing federal gov-
ernment information systems, other organisations can also use these publications to establish
a minimum security-control baseline within their specific environments [88]. This is because
these ‘Special Publications’ cover a wide range of information security topics including wire-
less security, access controls, media sanitisation, contingency planning, encryption and key
management, electronic mail security, mobile device security and server security [86].
The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard
The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS) [80] was developed by a
number of major credit card companies. PCI-DSS was created to assist the adoption of
consistent data security controls for organisations around the world that manage, handle
and store payment card processing information [80]. The current version of the PCI-DSS
(Version 3.1) was released in April 2015 and changes are made to the standard every three
years [89]. The PCI-DSS identifies twelve security requirements, which are organised into
six groups called ‘control objectives’. These six control objective groups include building
and maintaining a secure network; protecting card-holder data; maintaining a vulnerability
management program; implementing strong access control measures; regularly monitoring
and testing networks; and maintaining an information security policy [90]. While PCI-DSS
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is not legally binding within the European Union, the laws of some States in the U.S. ei-
ther directly refer to PCI-DSS or make equivalent provisions. For example, the State of
Washington has incorporated the standard into state law, which specifically states that com-
pliant organisations are shielded from liability in the event of a data breach or a security
incident [91].
3.2.3 Information Security Standards in Practice
Information security standards and guidelines can play an important part in managing and
certifying organisational information security [92]. Siponen and Willison [81] state that or-
ganisations which adopt security standards can “demonstrate their commitment to secure
business practices; apply for security certification, accreditation, or a security-maturity clas-
sification attesting to their compliance to a set of rules and practices” [81]. Effectively, in-
formation security standards and guidelines provide a baseline for an organisation’s overall
information security management strategy.
Several case studies have been used to examine how organisations implement information
security standards and guidelines, as well as evaluating the impact of these publications on an
organisation’s wider security posture [81,93,94]. Wiander [93] analysed the implementation
of the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard in four separate organisations using semi-structured
interviews. The results from the study showed that individuals perceived that the implemen-
tation of the standard increased the overall understanding of information security within the
studied organisations [93]. However, interviewees also reported that they had experienced
difficulties in implementing the standard, with the readability of the standard being the main
problem [93]. While Wiander [93] has reported that the implementation of information se-
curity standards has increased the overall understanding of information security within an
organisation, Siponen has been more critical of their use. Siponen [94] argues that the foun-
dations of information security standards and guidelines are not universally validated and
are simply based on personal experience. Therefore, these information security management
standards and guidelines should not be treated as ‘gold standards’, but rather a library of
material on information security management for organisations [94].
Separately, Siponen and Willison [81] evaluated four information security standards (British
Standard 7799, ISO/IEC 17799, the Generally Accepted Information Security Principles,
and the Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model) and argued that these
standards did not pay enough attention to the differences between organisations because
their information security requirements could be very different. For example, a smaller or-
ganisation could lack the demand for a dedicated security incident management team and
place more emphasis on anti-virus solutions and firewalls, while a larger organisation could
place equal emphasis on all aspects of information security.
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3.3 Information Security Incident Management
Security policies and controls alone will not guarantee total protection of organisation data
or information systems. After policies or controls from published security standards have
been implemented, vulnerabilities are likely to remain within an organisation. Vulnerabili-
ties can also emerge from previously unknown threats and make any implemented security
controls ineffective. As a result, successful security attacks can still affect an organisation.
In some cases, these attacks can go on to become information security ‘incidents’, which
can have adverse effects on an organisation’s business operations. It is therefore useful for
an organisation to develop and implement plans and procedures for managing security inci-
dents when they do occur within their organisational landscape. While some of the above
security standards include procedures for handling security incidents, there are also numer-
ous other specific security incident response approaches, which can be used to manage and
handle security incidents within organisations.
3.3.1 Definition of Security Incident in the Literature
An analysis of the literature has highlighted numerous definitions for the term ‘information
security incident’. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) define an in-
formation security incident as a “single or a series of unwanted or unexpected information
security events that have a significant probability of compromising business operations and
threatening information security” [48]. An information security event within this context is
“an identified occurrence of a system, service or network state indicating a possible breach
of information security policy or failure of controls, or a previously unknown situation that
may be security relevant” [48].
Alternatively, Cichonski, et al. [8] describe a security incident from the perspective of vio-
lating security policies. They define a security incident as “a violation or imminent threat
of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security prac-
tices” [8]. Ahmad, et al. [18] add that “an information security incident occurs when there is
a direct or indirect attack on the confidentiality, integrity and availability of an information
system”. Howard and Longstaff [95] take a different approach to defining a security incident
as part of their computer security taxonomy. They describe a security incident as “a group
of attacks that can be distinguished from other attacks because of the distinctiveness of the
attackers, attacks, objectives, sites, and timing” [95].
Information security incidents can also be defined in terms of regulatory impact. For ex-
ample, within the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 [96], a secu-
rity incident is defined as “the attempted or successful unauthorised access, use, disclosure,
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modification, or destruction of information or interference with system operations in an in-
formation system” [97]. Article 13a of the European Union’s Telecommunications Directive
(2009/140/EC) take an alternative view on defining a security incident from a telecommu-
nication’s perspective. For the purpose of Article 13a, The European Union Agency for
Network and Information Security (ENISA) have defined a security incident as “a breach
of security or a loss of integrity that could have an impact on the operation of electronic
telecommunications networks and services” [98]. Within the United Kingdom (UK), the In-
formation Commissioner’s Office (ICO) defines a security incident in terms of its impact on
data loss. The ICO define a security incident as “a breach of security leading to the acciden-
tal or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal
data transmitted, stored or otherwise protected in connection with the provision of a public
electronic communications service” [99].
With various definitions available in the literature, there is a risk that an organisation could
consume valuable resources on security incidents that may not be considered incidents within
their distinct landscape. For example, a ‘security incident’ in a telecommunications company
may not be an ‘incident’ in a financial services organisation and vice versa. This situation
is further complicated by the applicability of multiple definitions within specific domains.
An organisation in the UK which implements the ISO/IEC 27001/27002 security standard,
would be inclined to follow the ISO/IEC definition of the term ‘security incident’. How-
ever, the same organisation is also likely to process and store personal customer data and is
likely to also need to take into consideration the ICO’s definition of the same term. In this
scenario, an organisation’s security incident response team could be faced with a situation
where a security problem is not an incident according to the ISO/IEC definition, but is an
incident when examined using the ICO’s definition. The wide range of definitions that de-
scribe a security incident means that organisations need to define the term within the context
of their business operations. Regardless of the definition(s) used in a specific organisation,
security incident response capabilities are increasingly becoming a regulatory requirement
in a variety of industries [82, 96, 100–102].
3.3.2 Motivation for Security Incident Response Capabilities
Increased regulatory pressure has been applied to organisations in a variety of industries,
mandating security incident handling requirements, including post-incident learning [82,96,
100–102]. For example, within the healthcare industry, the introduction of the ‘Security
Rule’ [100] to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [96] dictates
organisations implement administrative, physical, and technical safeguards to protect patient
information. Section 164.308 of the Security Rule specifically requires organisations to
3.3. Information Security Incident Management 29
“identify and respond to suspected or known security incidents; mitigate, to the
extent practicable, harmful effects of security incidents that are known to the
covered entity or business associate; and document security incidents and their
outcomes” [100].
Further regulations from the Department of Health and Human Services mandates that organ-
isations “implement policies and procedures to prevent, detect, contain, and correct security
violations” [97]. As noted above, HIPAA security incident response requirements place a
strong emphasis on documenting security incidents and the outcomes from any investiga-
tion [97]. It is anticipated that this documented information can then be used to help produce
lessons learned at a later stage. This documented information can come from information
within an investigation record, as well as digital evidence collected throughout the investiga-
tion itself. Digital evidence is defined as “any digital data that contain reliable information
that supports or refutes a hypothesis about the incident” [103]. The collection and documen-
tation of digital evidence and other investigation information such as conversations between
security incident handlers can help create a more efficient and less error-prone approach to
handling a security incident. However, the collection of digital evidence and investigation
information can be affected by an organisation’s inclination to focus on the eradication and
recovery from an incident instead of collecting digital evidence [18, 20]. Similar to HIPAA,
the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 [82], the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act of 1999 [101], the European Union’s Article 13a (as part of a regulatory framework
for electronic communications) in the European Union [98], and Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 [102] all require organisations to have policies and procedures to detect, report and
respond to security incidents.
These laws not only mandate that organisations have procedures to manage and handle secu-
rity incidents but also include requirements with regards to reporting specific security inci-
dents to relevant authorities. In the United States (U.S.), federal law requires governmental
agencies to report the outcomes of security incidents to the U.S. Computer Emergency Readi-
ness Team [8]. Meanwhile in the European Union (E.U.), Article 13a of the European Com-
mission’s Telecommunications Directive (2009/140/EC) requires network service providers
to report ‘significant’ security breaches and losses of integrity to national authorities [104].
The proposed E.U. Network and Information Security Directive [105], extends these report-
ing obligations to ‘market operators’ who are responsible for critical national infrastructures,
across the energy, banking, health, transport, financial services and food sectors [106].
The British Government has extended these security incident reporting requirements to in-
clude the sharing of lessons learned [107]. Through the Cyber-security Information Sharing
Partnership, organisations are encouraged to disseminate and exchange information about
lessons learned from security incidents with other organisations in the same industry [107].
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Organisations need to define how security incident response teams will respond and manage
information security incidents in order to meet these legal and regulatory requirements. To
help organisations define these requirements, several security incident response approaches
have been proposed in the literature.
3.3.3 Security Incident Response Processes
Numerous security incident response processes and best practice guidelines have been pub-
lished in industry [8–10,13,108] and academia [7,11,12,109,110] describing how organisa-
tions can investigate and manage security incidents. These processes are typically described
in terms of a number of successive phases. The structure and phases contained in various
security incident response approaches are summarised in Table 3.1.
The table shows that there are a number of differences in the phases presented in these ap-
proaches. These differences suggest that there is currently no single de-facto approach that
can truly be classified as an industry-standard for handling security incidents [7]. For exam-
ple, three of the approaches (CERT/CC Incident Response, Good Practice Guide for Incident
Management and the Security Incident Tasks), do not include a ‘follow-up’ phase as part of
their approach. In contrast, some approaches contain phases that are not present in others.
For example, the Incident Response Process [11] is the only approach with an ‘data col-
lection’ phase, while the CERT/CC Incident Response [108] process is the only approach
with a ‘protection’ phase. However, the table also shows that there are some consistencies
with the approaches as well. For example, five out of the ten approaches contain similar
phases: preparation, detection, containment, eradication, recovery and follow-up. For the
purpose of this research, these five phases are considered to be part of a typical security inci-
dent response approach, as shown in Figure 3.1. Numerous tasks and activities are typically
undertaken in each of these five phases.
Preparation Identification Containment Eradication Recovery Follow-up
Figure 3.1: Typical Security Incident Response Cycle
Preparation Phase
The preparation phase is concerned with the creation of a security incident team and pro-
viding this team with the necessary tools and resources to manage and handle security in-
cidents. Management within an organisation can play an important role in the creation of a
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security incident response team through providing support to the team, communicating team
objectives and purpose to the wider organisation, as well as assisting in the recruitment of
staff [111]. Management can also help ensure that a team has access to any tools and re-
sources that they may require including an incident record tracking system, any tools for use
during the investigation or analysis, as well as copies of operating systems and applications
to help with restoration.
Detection Phase
This phase is also referred to as the ‘identification’ phase and is associated with the identifi-
cation, detection or reporting of security incidents within an organisation. There are several
approaches an organisation can take to identify and detect a security incident. These can
include monitoring intrusion detection systems and other network monitoring appliances for
anomalies, as well as monitoring third-party news websites for information about security in-
cidents, which may have affected other organisations [9]. Security incidents can also become
known to a security incident response team through a security incident reporting system [15].
A security incident reporting system provides a secure mechanism for employees within an
organisation to report security incidents directly to the security incident response team [15].
A security incident response team also needs to determine if the reported event constitutes a
security incident.
Containment Phase
The primary objective of this phase is that actions are taken by a security incident response
team before a security incident overwhelms resources, increases damage, or spreads to other
networks or systems within an organisation [7]. Examples of containment strategies can
include shutting down a system, disconnecting a computer host from a network and disabling
a user account [8]. While these strategies can help to contain the spread of a security incident,
they can also lead to the destruction of digital evidence. Therefore, an important task within
this phase is to also collect any digital evidence with regards to an incident prior to the
commencement of these containment strategies [8].
Eradication Phase
After a security incident has been contained, the next phase involves a security incident
response team implementing a solution to prevent the incident from escalating any further.
Examples of eradication solutions can include disabling services or firewall ports that may
have been exploited and deleting malware that has been installed on compromised hosts [8].
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Recovery Phase
Within the recovery phase, a security incident response team, together with other technical
personnel, will look to restore affected systems and users to normal business operation [7].
This can be achieved in numerous ways including rebuilding systems, replacing compro-
mised data, changing passwords and installing patches to affected hardware and software [7].
Follow-up Phase
The primary aim of the follow-up/post-incident phase is to establish lessons learned and
disseminate these, as appropriate, to relevant stakeholders within an organisation and pos-
sibly to external regulators. Lessons learned are defined “as knowledge or understanding
gained by experience” [112]. In general, these lessons should be used to improve an organ-
isation’s information security management and security incident response processes in the
longer term. The experiences during an investigation may be positive, such as an activity
or task within the security investigation lifecycle that worked well, or negative, such as a
failed security control [112]. The main activities that can evolve from this phase include
the completion of investigation reports, dissemination of lessons learned as well as imple-
menting improvements to information security management and security incident response
processes.
While seven out of the ten studied security incident response approaches contain a follow-up
phase, researchers have argued that many organisations do not pay enough attention to this
phase and instead, tend to focus on eradication and recovery [18, 19, 44]. One explanation
of this problem is that security incident response processes, which are linear in nature, could
experience a similar problem as another linear approach, the Waterfall model in software
engineering. In the Waterfall model, when a project begins to run out of time and money,
testing usually the last phase in the approach, is either cut short or not performed [113]. As a
result, the quality of software is reduced and risks can be introduced into a project. The same
problem appears to be prevalent within security incident response, where resources appear
to be exhausted during the eradication and recovery phases. Hence, very little resources may
be left to execute the follow-up phase. Reduced activity within this phase can translate into
less incident learning taking place for a particular security incident.
3.3.4 Security Incident Response Practices in Organisations
While some parts of the literature have focused on developing various processes for imple-
menting security incident response capabilities within organisations, other researchers have
identified and discussed several problems with these processes through case studies within
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organisations. Hove, et al [114] argue that many organisations find it difficult to implement
established security incident response processes. This is evident in an analysis of empirical
case studies conducted in various organisations.
Tan, et al. [20] explored the factors that have influenced information security managers to
not conduct investigations following a security incident. Tan, et al. [20] reported that their
studied organisation had no clear definition for the term ‘security incident’. As a result,
incident handlers did not realise what security problems were actually ‘incidents’ and were
slow to react to real security incidents. Tan, et al. [20] also observed that incident handlers
were not encouraged to view security investigations as means of improving the organisation’s
overall security. Instead, the main focus of investigations was to ‘restore and recover’ normal
business operations. Furthermore, Tan, et al. [20] found that participants were unaware of the
benefits of collecting digital evidence. Management within the organisation noted that they
would only decide to prosecute after the problem was fixed. As a result, evidence that would
assist in the prosecution of any offenders, may either be contaminated or destroyed [20].
Werlinger, et al. [27] conducted an exploratory study to investigate the security incident
activities of practitioners in various organisations. The purpose of the study was to examine
and analyse the tasks, skills, strategies and tools that practitioners use to diagnose security
incidents [27]. Practitioners argued the importance of integrating the input from several
monitoring tools in order to gain a proper overview of the security incidents occurring within
an organisation. However, Werlinger, et al. [27] concluded that current security incident
response practices and tools do not appropriately support the highly collaborative nature of
investigations and that practitioners were often required to write custom tools in order to
perform specific investigative tasks.
Casey [28] outlines a case study of a network attack, which required the victim organisation
to cooperate with law enforcement agencies to apprehend the attacker. Casey argues that
many organisations may not be fully exploiting their digital forensic capabilities and are
likely to be undermining the value of forensic evidence [28]. Casey adds that organisations
should consider integrating evidence handling into their incident response capabilities and
educating system administrators about the need to report and investigate even the most trivial
of incidents. This suggests that even with a moderate amount of preparation, the victim
organisation could have been better prepared to prosecute the identified attacker. This is
evident in the methods used in the preservation and collection of evidence after the attack.
Although the studied organisation developed guidelines defining digital evidence collection,
one individual collected file listings instead of files themselves. Furthermore, the individual
did not keep a log of his actions and could not determine which files were obtained from
which system. As a result, the evidence gathered from seven systems involved in the attack
could not be included in the criminal case that followed [28].
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Hove, et al. [114] studied three large organisations with the purpose of investigating the plans
and procedures for handling security incidents within the studied organisations. Two of the
studied organisations had a dedicated security incident response team, while the third organ-
isation did not, but used the services of an external security incident response team when
the need arose. Hove, et al. [114] identified differing purposes for responding to security
incidents within the organisations. One of the studied organisations argued that although
it is important to restore affected systems, it was equally important to ensure the incident
was properly investigated to avoid a similar attack occurring in the future. One the other
hand, one of the other studied organisations preferred to apply a temporary solution to the
incident so that they can resume normal business operation and minimise the impact of the
incident. Hove, et al. [114] concluded that although the organisations have plans and proce-
dures in place, based on industry best practices, many other procedures were missing from
the studied organisations. For example, in two of the organisations security incident report-
ing procedures were not established, while the respondents in another organisation indicated
that they did not have enough staff to respond to incidents efficiently [114]. Other issues
identified by the participants in the case study included difficulties in collecting incident in-
formation from multiple sources, as well as deciding how much information to distribute
about a particular incident [114].
Line, et al. [115] examined how six electricity distribution service operators within the power
industry planned and prepared for information security incidents. The case study revealed
that many of the surveyed organisations had little or no documentation regarding the inves-
tigation of security incidents [115]. In addition, personnel within the studied organisations
confirmed a lack of incident response training and that responsibilities for security incidents
were not adequately established within their specific organisations. Furthermore, Line, et
al. [115] reported that the majority of their studied organisations did not have a clear defini-
tion for a security incident. In a separate case study, Line [116] added that none of the sur-
veyed distribution service operators had established a security incident response team. Line
also noted there appeared to be lack of cooperation between information technology and
power automation staff with regards to security incidents within their organisations [116].
Metzger et al. [117] presented the experiences of the security incident response team at the
Leibniz Supercomputing Centre (LRZ-CSIRT) in Germany, where a holistic approach based
on ISO/IEC 27001 had been developed for security incident response. Metzger et al. [117]
explained that LRZ-CERT’s approach to security incident response included a combina-
tion of strong incident reporting capabilities, automatic response and analysis, as well as a
process-oriented approach for intervention. However, Metzger et al. also noted several chal-
lenges within LRZ-CSIRT including a lack of sufficient personnel to operate forensic tools
and evidence collection. Metzger et al. also noted that some individuals were not reporting
security incidents because they were not sure what to report as ‘incidents’ [117].
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Orderlokken [118] studied Norwegian public and private organisations to examine how these
organisations performed security incident response. Orderlokken reported that public organ-
isations were found to have inferior incident reporting and training compared to their private
counterparts [118]. Orderlokken added that only half of the studied organisations were fol-
lowing standards for information security. The case study also revealed that less than half
of the studied public organisations recorded statistics of the number of incidents, which im-
pacted their organisation. When statistical information was recorded, Orderlokken reported
that this was often inaccurate due to a lack of implemented process, a lack of training and
weak definitions of security incidents [118].
Moller [119] examined the organisational and technical challenges of the German Computer
Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) while extending their incident response services
to include grid environments. Moller argues that it is important that a CSIRT ensures that its
services are known to its constituency and that system administrators within the constituency
trust a CSIRT with their confidential data [119].
Several themes emerge from the case studies concerning post-incident learning which in-
clude current incident response processes not reflecting the concurrent lifecycle of real-world
security incident handling, current processes not providing enough insight into the causes of
an incident and current processes not maximising the benefits of digital forensic capabili-
ties. As a result, post-incident learning could be a challenge in these studied organisations.
For example, Casey [28] and Tan, et al. [20] have highlighted that organisations may not be
maximising corporate forensic capabilities. A lack of forensic readiness could affect both
an organisation’s ability to take subsequent legal action and also limit the amount of post-
incident learning. Without access to detailed information including forensic data, a security
incident response team could find it difficult to learn from a security incident. The next
section will be used to explore the follow-up phase, including the activities involved in this
phase, as well discussing post-incident learning challenges within organisations.
3.4 Post-Incident Learning
Incident learning can be defined as “the collection of organisational capabilities that enable
an organisation to extract useful information from incidents of all kinds and to use this infor-
mation to improve organisational performance over time” [120]. While information security
incidents are unwanted events, they do at the same time present an opportunity for an organ-
isation to learn more about the risks and vulnerabilities which can exist in an organisation’s
systems and processes [121]. Researchers have argued that organisations do not pay enough
attention to incident learning [18, 19, 44]. These researchers go on to claim that organisa-
tions are more concerned with eradication and recovery and in some cases, have failed to
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learn from security incidents [18, 19, 44].
3.4.1 Post-Incident Learning in Organisations
Several researchers have examined security post-incident learning within organisations [18–
20, 122, 123]. In a study involving the petroleum industry, Jaatun, et al. [122] explained
that while learning from security incidents was considered important, organisations found it
difficult to implement in practice. Jaatun, et al. [122] go on to argue that organisations must
be prepared for incident learning and this includes obtaining managerial commitment and
the willingness to commit resources to facilitate learning from security incidents. This is a
view that is shared by Tan, et al. [20], who also noted that their studied organisation were
not prepared to gather data or learn from security incidents.
Ahmad, et al. [18] reported that within their studied organisation, ‘high-impact’ security inci-
dents are reviewed within 24 hours of the system services being restored, with a post-incident
report being produced at the end of the review. However, the studied organisation does not
have a structured process for reviewing ‘low-impact’ security incidents [18]. Nonetheless,
Ahmad, et al. [18] noted that, although the organisation in their study closely followed in-
dustry best practices, the organisation’s inclination was to focus on containment, eradication,
and recovery. As a result, the security incident response team and organisation as a whole
did not fully exploit their ability to learn from security incidents [18].
Rollason-Reese [123] presented a case study that analysed the lessons learned by a security
incident response team within a public university in the United States. The team responds
to a diverse range of incidents and uses a five-step response process that comprises of: alert,
analysis, response, recovery and maintenance. Rollason-Reese highlights several important
lessons within his study. These include educating university personnel on the importance of
reporting potential security threats; organisations developing their own definition of ‘security
incident’; and the importance of the incident record as a means of documenting activities,
decisions and evidence gathered during an investigation [123].
While the above researchers have argued that organisations need to do more to effectively
learn from a security incident, Shedden, et al. [44] argue that current best practices and
approaches do not provide enough guidance and support as to how this can be achieved.
Shedden, et al. [19] state that “researchers and practitioners must accept that informal activ-
ities will occur below the surface in security incident response” and hence, security incident
response approaches should be less formal and cater for informal learning approaches. Shed-
den, et al. [19] reported that within their studied organisation, incident handlers were under-
taking informal learning through conversation and observation. While Shedden, et al. [19]
propose that security incident learning should be informal within organisations, very few
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informal tools have been proposed in the literature to help organisations undertake security
incident learning.
3.4.2 Methods for Conducting Post-Incident Learning
Best practice approaches such as NIST 800-61 [8] and SANS [13] suggest that security inci-
dent response teams hold lessons learned meetings at the conclusion of investigations. The
purpose of these meetings is that a security incident response team explores various ways
of improving both their own security incident response process, as well as the wider or-
ganisational security posture [8, 13]. This can involve establishing what has transpired in a
recently concluded investigation and what can be done better in future investigations [8,13].
The output of these meetings typically includes an executive summary that includes the cost
of the investigation, its impact and where possible, the investigation results [8, 13]. The
ISO/IEC 27035 standard [10] adds that post-incident meetings are also used to identify new
and review existing security controls, discuss whether further forensic analysis is required, as
well as communicating investigation results from the meeting to a trusted community [10].
Ideally, the objective of any lessons learned is that they can be used to improve the prepa-
ration for future incidents, be used for leverage for increased security budgets, improve ed-
ucation awareness programs, as well as strengthening security within the wider organisa-
tion [8, 10, 13, 124].
The majority of the security incident response approaches identified in the literature place a
strong emphasis on identifying the technical causes of a security incident during the devel-
opment of any lessons learned [7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 109]. However, recently researchers [18–20]
have argued that organisations need to look beyond the immediate technical causes of an in-
cident and start to examine the underlying root causes. Ahmad, et al. [18] add that often, the
root cause of a security problem may not necessarily be a technical problem. A root cause
is defined as “the most basic cause that can be reasonably identified and that management
has control to fix” [125]. Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is a method of problem solving used
for identifying the root causes of faults or problems [15]. RCA has been used in several
industries such as health and safety, aviation and medical care in assisting in the prevention
of future incidents [15].
Although there have been increased calls for the use of RCA within security incident re-
sponse, relatively little work has examined the effectiveness of these tools and methods for
conducting a RCA within this domain. However, Johnson [126] has discussed and demon-
strated how Violation and Vulnerability (V2) diagrams can be used to assist RCA using an
incident at Allfirst Bank as an example case study. Similarly, Stephenson [127] has also
proposed an RCA approach which uses coloured Petri nets to model attacks of security pro-
cesses within an organisation, and presents an example of how a worm or virus infection
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has spread through an organisation’s network structure. Although these two methods have
been identified in the literature, their scope and applicability to security incident response
investigations within organisations has not been established. When lessons learned are cre-
ated at the conclusion of an investigation, irrespective of them containing a root cause, this
information typically needs to be disseminated back into the wider organisation [18].
3.4.3 Dissemination of Post-Incident Learning
The work of a security incident response team is usually completed by the issuance of a
report, detailing the investigation findings and any lessons learned [18]. This information
can then be distributed within an organisation or reported to external regulatory bodies. Sev-
eral security incident response approaches [8, 10, 13] also propose that any lessons learned
are disseminated to the wider organisation. However, very little research has focused on
effective methods for sharing and exchanging lessons learned in the aftermath of security in-
vestigations. Traditionally, lessons learned can be circulated and exchanged through a series
of formal reports, executive summaries and informal meetings [7, 13, 18]. Communicative
notes from post-incident meetings can then be disseminated to relevant individuals within an
organisation [13]. These notes can contain responses to incidents, disagreements over inci-
dent handling procedures, suggestions and enhancements to security controls, policies and
incident response procedures [13].
There are limitations to the use of these approaches for the dissemination of lessons learned
within security incident response [128, 129]. As many of the approaches consist of text
reports, He [14] argues that a long incident report can discourage readers from determining
the key insights into a particular incident. He [14] adds that any causal factors identified
during an investigation may not be clear in the linear format of a text report. In an effort
to address these concerns, He, et al. [129] developed a Generic Security Template (GST)
using graphical Goal Structuring Notation to present and disseminate lessons learned in a
graphical structured manner. Through a series of experiments, He [14] has demonstrated
how the GST can be used to present lessons learned from security investigations within the
health-care industry. The intention of the experiments were to present security objectives,
issues and recommendations that are embedded within the pages of text report in a graphical
manner.
3.5 Data, Information, Knowledge, Wisdom
The terms ‘data’, ‘information’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘wisdom’ are often grouped together in
a popular model called the Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom (DIKW) hierarchy [130].
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The DIKW hierarchy is often discussed or used to define the terms data, information and
knowledge within the domains of information management and information systems [130].
Ackoff offers the following definitions of the terms as used in the DIKW hierarchy [131]:
• Data are the “symbols that represent properties of objects, events and their environ-
ment.”
• Information “consists of processed data, the processing directed at increasing its use-
fulness. Information systems generate, store, retrieve, and process data.”
• Knowledge is “know-how, and is what makes possible the transformation of informa-
tion into instructions.”
• Wisdom is the “ability to increase effectiveness.”
Rowley [130] further explored the definitions of the above terms and identified a range of
ambiguous and/or conflicting definitions. Rowley summarised from her analysis that the
assumption from the DIKW hierarchy is that data can be used to create information, which
in turn, can then be used to create knowledge and knowledge can be used to create wisdom
[130].
While Ackoff and Rowley have provided generic definitions for the terms ‘data’, ‘informa-
tion’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘wisdom’, their application to security incident response has not been
well discussed in the literature. However, Knapp [132] has attempted to discussed the terms
in the context of Service Desk incidents. Knapp states that data are the raw facts about
an incident, which are not organised or structured in a meaningful way, for example which
workstation is affected, its manufacturer and model number [132]. Knapp explains that data
becomes information in an incident when it has been organised and is capable of answering
questions such as “who?, what?, when? and where?”. For example, in an incident informa-
tion, is who owns the workstation, where it is located and when it was installed [132]. With
regards to knowledge, Knapp explains that this is “the application of information along with
people’s experiences, ideas and judgements”, for example knowledge in an incident would
include how to resolve the problem affecting the incident [132]. Finally, Knapp states that
wisdom is the “judicious application of knowledge” and provides an example of how incident
handlers can use data, information and knowledge to make ‘wise’ decisions when they face
a particular incident [132].
Baskarada and Koronios [133] state that in terms of the DIKW hierarchy, many researchers
use the terms data quality and information quality interchangeably, when it comes to dis-
cussing the quality dimension of the two elements. As this research is concerned with the
quality of data in security incident response, the next section will provide an overview of
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data quality along with a working definition of ‘good quality’ data within security incident
response.
3.5.1 Data Quality
Klein and Rossin [134] argue that there is no single definition for the term ‘data quality’. An
analysis of the literature indicates that a consensus on the definition of ‘data quality’ has not
yet emerged and this is perceptible in the following definitions:
• “the degree to which data meets the expectations of data consumers, based on their
intended uses of the data” [135].
• “is the measure of the agreement between the data views presented by an information
system and that same data in the real world” [136].
• “data that are fit for use by data consumers” [137].
• “fitness (to the purpose) of use” [138, 139]
The quality of data is therefore directly related to the perceived purpose of the data and that
high-quality data meets the expectations of the intended users to a greater degree than that
of low-quality data [135]. One factor in how well it meets the expectations of the data user
is how those users perceive the data to represent what it purports to represent [135]. Within
information security and particularly security incident response, there is very little refer-
ence to the term ‘data quality’. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis a definition of data
quality within security incident response is derived from the concepts discussed above. The
proposed definition of ‘good’ quality data within security incident response is data that is
derived from a security incident response investigation that is fit to facilitate security incident
learning within an organisation.
The concept of data quality can also be further defined in terms of a set of dimensions, which
are considered to be quality properties or characteristics of data [140]. Wang et al. [141]
define a data quality dimensions as “a set of data quality attributes that most data con-
sumers react to in a fairly consistent way”. In 1996, Wand and Wang [142] noted there
was no general agreement on data quality dimensions. Wand and Wang [142] defined a data
quality classification, of which they define four dimensions: completeness, unambiguous-
ness, meaningfulness and correctness. Levitin and Redman [143] present and discuss a list
of six ‘quality dimensions’ from the perspective of database data. These six ‘quality di-
mensions’ include content, scope, level of detail, composition, consistency, and reaction to
change [143]. Alternatively, Ballou and Pazer [144] divide data quality into four dimensions:
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accuracy, timeliness, completeness and consistency. The accuracy dimension is concerned
with the difference between the correct data value and the value actually used. Timeliness
focuses on data that is in error because it is out-dated and differs from the original value.
Completeness is concerned with ensuring that no data is missing, while consistency implies
that some form of data representation standard exists throughout the data values [144]. How-
ever, like the definition of data quality, researchers have yet to agree on a standard for data
quality dimensions.
Several practices have been developed for improving the quality of ‘poor data’, one set of
practices include a three-step process which involves data profiling, data cleansing and data
defect prevention [21]. Data profiling involves analysing the data and looking for anomalies
within records in a file or database [21]. After the extent of ‘dirty data’ is known, data
cleansing is undertaken where incorrect, corrupt or inaccurate data is replaced, modified, or
deleted. The final stage is to determine how to prevent ‘dirty data’ in the future and this
done using a process called data defect prevention [21]. This process typically involves the
owners of any systems/processes implementing procedures to prevent ‘dirty data’ from being
produced when data is actually created [21]. Numerous tools [22–24] have been developed
to help organisations implement these practices. However, very little research has examined
if these practices and tools can be extended and used to monitor and improve the quality of
data in security incident response investigations. A lack of evaluated practices and tools for
improving the quality of data in security incident response means that it can be difficult to
measure if the lessons learned derived from a security investigation are correct, if there are
possible quality issues within the investigation data.
3.5.2 Data Quality within Security Incident Response
Incident learning and the dissemination of information has been used in a variety of indus-
tries in the prevention of future incidents [15]. Johnson [15] notes that investigators in these
domains rely on necessary data being made available to help identify underlying root causes.
Stephenson [16] argues this is also true for security incident response investigations, where
detailed data is necessary to help a security incident response team to analyse root causes.
However, Stephenson [16] states that obtaining this detailed security data can be difficult
within many organisations. Regardless of the methods used for incident learning and the
dissemination of lessons learned, if organisations are more focused on eradication and re-
covery, then there is the potential that poor quality data is emerging from security incident
response processes. Without enriched quality data, a security incident response team could
find it difficult to undertake a lessons learned meeting or perform a root cause analysis.
There have been documented concerns with regards to the quality of data used in investiga-
tions within the transportation safety domain [17]. A report [17] published by the United
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States Bureau of Transportation highlights concerns with the reliability and accuracy of inci-
dent information in this domain. The data quality issues can be summarised in the following
quotes [17]:
• “there needs to be better information and it needs to be of a higher quality”
• “there needs to be better data on results”
• “accuracy is a challenge because of budgetary problems and different interests”
• “it is difficult to get accurate, undiluted information on human error and performance”
While these concerns have been raised in the safety domain, the problem of poor quality
data could provide one explanation as to the problems encountered by organisations when
attempting to learn from information security incidents.
3.6 Organisational Culture and Learning
Organisational culture is a widely used term and several different people have attempted to
explain the concept [145]. Watson [146] states that the concept of organisational culture was
derived from a metaphor of the organisation as ‘something cultivated’. Researchers have
suggested that organisational culture is a concept of basic assumptions, in an organisation,
developed around their handling of employees, promoted values or statements of belief that
have worked well in the past to be considered valid in the specific organisation [147–149].
Culture can provide an organisation with a sense of identity and determines rituals, beliefs,
meanings, values, norms and language, effectively the way in which ‘things are done around
here’ [150]. Schein argues that “the most intriguing aspect of culture as a concept is that
it points us to phenomena that are below the surface, that are powerful in their impact but
invisible and to a considerable degree unconscious” [151]. Schein goes on to use an anal-
ogy that culture is to a group, what personality or character is to an individual in the sense
that an individual’s personality and character guides and constrains their behaviour, culture
guides and contains the behaviour of members of a team or an organisation [151]. Schein
emphasises [152] the invisible levels of corporate culture including underlying values, as-
sumptions, beliefs, attitudes and feelings, while Deal and Kennedy [150] emphasise the more
visible levels of culture, such as heroes, rites, rituals, legends and ceremonies. There have
been suggestions in the literature that often change strategies will focus on changing visible
culture levels [147]. This is a view which is shared by Deal and Kennedy [150], who state
that it is the visible culture attributes that will shape the behaviour of employees within an
organisation.
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3.6.1 Types of Organisational Culture
O’Donnell and Boyle [147] argue that there is not just one single type of organisational
culture and that different organisations can have distinctive cultures. Furthermore, a sin-
gle organisation can have more than one type of culture [147]. Hence, numerous stud-
ies [150, 153–155] have been undertaken examining the culture and norms that take can
shape an organisation. Hofstede [153] undertook an initial study of IBM, a large multina-
tional organisation where employees in 64 countries were studied in order to identify na-
tional cultures. Hofstede [153] explained that this was necessary because there are national
and regional cultural groupings that can affect the behaviour and culture within organisa-
tions. The results from the IBM study allowed Hofstede to identify four dimensions of
culture: power distance, intolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity, individualism versus
collectivism and masculinity versus femininity [153]. In a later study, Hofstede,et al [154]
examined the culture within 20 organisational units located in 10 different companies in Den-
mark and the Netherlands. One of the results from the study was a six-dimensional model to
identify cultures within organisations, which is presented in Table 3.2 [154, 155].
In their book, Deal and Kennedy [150] propose an alternative organisation cultural model
which focuses on how quickly employees within an organisation receive feedback, the way
its employees are rewarded, and the level of risks taken within the organisation itself. The
model is based on four types of culture within an organisation [150]:
• Work-hard, play-hard – in a work-hard, play-hard organisational culture, employees
will take few risks but any feedback on their performance is almost immediate.
• Tough-guy macho culture – in this type of organisation, there exists an ‘all-or-nothing’
culture where individualism prevails and employees will work hard to become stars
within the organisation. Teamwork is not valued in this type of organisation.
• Process culture – in this type of culture, feedback is slow and the risks taken by em-
ployees are low. Stress can arise within these types of organisation because of internal
politics, bureaucracy and problems with systems currently used in the organisation.
• Bet-the-company culture – in these types of organisations, decisions are high risk and
employees will have to wait for a long period of time before knowing if their actions
actually paid off.
Cameron and Quinn [156] argue that a major feature in a successful organisation is that it
will have a distinctive, readily identifiable organisational culture. This is an opinion that is
shared by various several researchers [157–159] in the organisational culture domain, who
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recognised that organisational culture can have an effect on the performance of the organi-
sation, as well as its long-term effectiveness. Egan, et al [160] state that in order for an any
organisation to remain competitive, its employees need to adapt and learn to handle changes
in their organisational environment. As a result, Egan, et al [160] suggest that embedding
a learning culture can help an organisation ensure that knowledge is shared between both
individuals and teams to improve the organisation as a whole. However, Handy states that
installing a learning culture in a classic bureaucratic organisation, which are usually process-
orientated (such as the studied organisation) can be a difficult challenge [161].
3.6.2 Organisational Learning
Organisational learning is “the process of forming and applying collective knowledge to
problems and needs” [162]. Alternatively, Huber defines “organisational learning as a pro-
cess where organisations aim to incorporate and disseminate valuable experience and knowl-
edge across its communities of practice over time” [163]. Organisational learning can take
place through a variety of ways including through direct experience, through interpreting
the experiences of others and by encoding knowledge and information into organisational
memory [164]. The objectives of organisational learning is to correct errors, reduce the time
it takes for employees to undertake corrective actions and to help make strategic decisions
within the organisation itself [165]. An organisation which becomes skilled at creating, or-
ganising, storing, retrieving and transferring knowledge learnt within the organisation and
then modifying behaviours in order to reflect the new insights gained is known as a ‘learning
organisation’ [166].
Organisational learning theories are concerned with how organisations adapt their behaviour
and learn in their specific environment [167]. The origins of organisational learning theory
can be traced back to research undertaken by Argyris and Schon [165]. Argyris and Schon
argued that there are two types of learning that can take place within an organisation: single-
loop learning and double-loop learning [165]. Single-loop learning is an approach that is
used in most organisations on a daily basis, and works on the principle that employees will
detect and correct errors and deviations from policies, procedures or expected norms. [18,
165]. In contrast, double-loop learning involves employees questioning the very principles
such as the policies and procedures the organisation itself functions on and examines if these
are the cause of the error or deviation [18, 165].
Argote [168] agues that “understanding how groups or teams learn to work effectively to-
gether provides micro foundations for understanding organizational learning because groups
are the building blocks of most organizations”. Argote goes on to state that teams can learn
and develop knowledge in several different ways including eliciting or sharing information
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that a team member already possesses or generating new information through collaboration
and interaction [168].
Gill [162] presents an similar approach for describing organisational learning by arguing
that an organisation can learn through different levels including individual learning, team
learning and whole organization learning. Individual learning can occur when individual
employees acquire knowledge, develops their skills and adopts new attitudes and beliefs that
will help the organisation to improve [162]. Team learning occurs when members of a group
of employees discover together how to contribute and improve the performance of the group.
Effectively, the employees within the group learn from each other and apply that knowledge
to improving the purpose of the group [162]. In contrast to individual learning, any knowl-
edge which is gained through learning resides with the team as a whole and not any single
individual within the team [169]. Whole organisation learning is concerned with the process
whereby employees and teams can learn, grow and change as result of experiences they have
encountered with the organisation [162, 169]. Gill argues that one of the most important
conditions for ‘whole organisation learning’ to occur is that managers eliminate boundaries
and allow a free flow of information across the whole organisation [162]. While Gill pro-
posed these three levels of learning, there is very little work in the literature examining how
these levels of learning would be affect security incident response learning nor how it would
influence learning in an information security team. Cooke [120] has discussed barriers that
need to be overcome with regards to safety-critical organisations becoming “learning or-
ganisation”, but this was not discussed from a security incident perspective. In Cooke’s
discussion he argues that the culture within these organisation need to change so that people
are dealt with fairly, incidents are openly discussed, and corrective actions are implemented
in a cross-functional team environment [120].
3.6.3 Organisational Learning and Security Incident Response
Researchers [18, 44, 122, 170] have argued that even though many incident response ap-
proaches include a ‘post-mortem’ or ‘follow-up’ phase, there is little evidence to suggest that
many organisations actively engage in organisational learning or look how to improve their
incident response processes. Melara et al. [171] enhanced Cooke’s ‘Incident Learning Sys-
tem’ [120] to take into consideration an insider threat attack on an organisation. By analysing
pre-cursor ‘events’ as well as ‘incidents’ in-depth using double-loop learning, Melara et al.
reported that a serious insider threat attack could have been averted using organisational
learning [171].
Baskerville, et al. [170] have stated that organisations need to modify their behaviour as to the
purpose of security incident response. Baskerville, et al. [170] argue that traditional security
incident response approaches focus on detecting losses and reacting quickly, efficiently, and
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effectively in recovering from security incidents. Instead, Baskerville, et al. have proposed
that the focus of security incident response is shifted to developing organisational learning
in order to prevent and deter security incidents [170].
Shedden, et al. add that “if organisations were to appropriately learn from and manage their
security incident response capability, they would be able to leverage opportunities to learn
from incidents to their best advantage and realise the benefits of a robust process and fortified
security strategy” [44]. Shedden, et al. analysed the literature on security incident response
and organisational learning literature and suggested that organisations could look to integrate
double-loop learning into their security incident response process [44]. The proposition from
Shedden, et al. is that double loop learning would help organisations learn more appropri-
ately and that any learning would focus on underlying issues in security and organisational
structures and not just quick short-term changes to prevent incident recurrence.
To help assist organisations with security incident response in the petroleum industry, Jaatun
[122] incorporated organisational learning theories in their Incident Response Management
(IRMA) method. IRMA’s incident learning included both single-loop and double-loop learn-
ing. Single-loop learning was included so that any response was based on “the difference be-
tween expected and obtained outcomes”, while double-loop learning was focused on ques-
tioning and changing “governing variables related to technology, organisation and human
factors that lead to the outcome” [122]. While the literature has indicated that there is a
gap in how local learning (single-loop learning) from security incident response teams can
be translated into double-loop learning with the wider organisation, very little research has
examined how this can actually be achieved.
3.7 Research Context
The emergence of information security governance, along with a growing list of legal and
regulatory information security requirements has resulted in many organisations adopting
Information Security Management Systems (ISMSs) and information security standards. An
important component in the implementation of these security standards is the assessment and
improvement of new or existing security controls to improve the overall information security
environment within an organisation.
While activities such as risk assessments and the implementation of information security
controls can help prevent security incidents, no information security solution is a guarantee
against successful attacks. As a result, an organisation needs to develop plans and procedures
to not only manage the eradication and recovery of a security incident, but to also define how
lessons learned will be derived from a security investigation. To help organisations minimise
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the effects of a security incident along with managing an organisation’s return to an accept-
able security posture, numerous security incident response approaches have been published
by various organisations. However, researchers have identified several problems with these
approaches and have stated that many organisations do not find it easy to implement them.
As security incidents increasingly impact organisations, it is imperative that organisations
have the ability to investigate, report and, ultimately, improve overall security efforts based
on previous security incidents. Although security incidents are unwanted problems for an or-
ganisation, they do present an opportunity to improve upon existing or identify new security
controls based on the lessons learned derived from a security incident investigation.
Incident learning is typically undertaken in the follow-up phase in a security incident re-
sponse process. Within this phase, it is recommended that a security incident response team
are recommended to conduct lessons learned meetings, where the primary objective should
be to improve security incident handling procedures and security controls. There have also
been calls for organisations to look beyond the immediate causes of security incidents and
examine the underlying root causes. However, previous case studies in organisations have
identified that many organisations tend to focus efforts more on eradication and recovery
and are not exploiting their ability to learn from security incidents. This imbalanced focus
can result in the loss of opportunities to investigate why a potential security incident has not
been prevented by existing security controls, or what further security controls improvements
could prevent similar future incidents. Researchers add that many organisations are simply
not prepared to learn from security incidents.
With many organisations focusing more on eradication and recovery, there is the potential
that poor quality data could be emerging from the security incident response processes used
within these organisations. In the safety domain, a report has cited poor quality data as one
factor hindering incident investigations in the transport safety sector. There could be a similar
problem in the security incident response domain. Organisations are coming under increased
legal and regulatory pressure to share lessons learned from security incidents within industry
communities. Therefore, it is becoming increasingly important that research examines how
incident learning can be improved within the security incident response domain and whether
poor quality data is a factor, which is hindering security incident learning.
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Chapter 4
Security Incident Response in
Practice: An Exploratory Case Study
Chapter three outlined several security incident response processes used within organisations
and established that researchers have reported that organisations focus more on eradication
and recovery than security incident learning. The next step was to investigate how an organ-
isation performs security incident response and to examine the challenges that emerge when
a security incident response team attempts to produce lessons learned. This chapter reports
on an exploratory case study of the challenges a security incident response team in a Fortune
500 Organisation faces with regards to lessons learned development.
The chapter is divided into the following sections. Section 4.1 outlines the objectives of the
case study in greater detail. Section 4.2 presents an analysis of the organisation’s internal
documentation repository, with a specific focus on documents related to security incident
response processes. Section 4.3 presents an analysis of the organisation’s security incident
response database. Section 4.4 presents the results of a survey conducted with practitioners
who have been involved in the management and handling of security incidents within the
organisation. Section 4.5 introduces initial problems identified from the case study, which
limit the organisation’s ability to learn from security incidents and Section 4.6 summarises
the chapter.
4.1 Exploratory Case Study Objectives
As part of the industrial research project, the author undertook an exploratory case study
within a Fortune 500 Organisation. The purpose of the exploratory case study was to identify
and explore the challenges that a security incident response team face when attempting to
undertake security incident learning. The research objectives of the exploratory case study
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were to:
1. Investigate the documented security incident response processes within the Fortune
500 Organisation, which define how security incident response should be undertaken
within the organisation.
2. Compare observed security incident response in practice with documented processes.
3. Examine how the organisation’s security incident response team attempt to learn from
security incidents.
4. Identify what challenges the security incident response team encounter when attempt-
ing to learn from security incidents within the organisation.
In order to answer these research objectives, the case study involved two stages of data gath-
ering [30]. The first stage involved analysing relevant documentation and the organisation’s
security incident response database. This was done in order to determine how management
expect security incident response to be undertaken within the Fortune 500 organisation. The
second stage involved undertaking semi-structured interviews with practitioners within the
organisation, who have been involved in various stages of an investigation or management
of a security incident. This was done to attain an understanding of the security incident pro-
cesses and incident learning challenges from the practitioner’s perspective. Finally, results
from the document analysis and case study were related to the available case study literature
in order to validate findings and support generalisation.
In previous case studies [18, 19, 44], which have been used to investigate security incident
response learning challenges, researchers have used interviews as the primary method of data
collection and documentary evidence to support their findings. However, to the extent of the
author’s knowledge, this is the first case study that has analysed multiple in-depth data points
(i.e. relevant documentation, an organisation’s security incident response database, as well
as semi-structured interviews) in order to understand security incident learning challenges
in an organisation. Hence, it can be difficult to compare the findings from the Fortune 500
Organisation case study with those from previous work.
4.2 Security Incident Response Document Analysis
In order to acquire an understanding of the Fortune 500 organisation’s context, the organ-
isation’s internal documentation repository was analysed to identify documentation related
to security incident response processes. Security incident response within the organisation
is managed by the Information Technology Service Incident Response (ITSIR) team and the
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Information Security Incident Response (ISIR) team. These two incident response teams
have very different objectives, goals and approaches to handling incidents.
ITSIR focuses on incidents that impact availability and accessibility, while ISIR specifically
investigates information security incidents, including those, which have a regulatory impact
which have been identified within the organisation. The organisation has developed a range
of documentation, which governs how these incident response teams achieve these objec-
tives. This documentation includes the Information Technology Service Incident Response
Process, the Incident Review Process and the Information Security Incident Response Pro-
cess. These will be discussed in the following subsections.
4.2.1 IT Service Incident Response Process
The Information Technology Service Incident Response (ITSIR) team is a dedicated team
residing in the Operations and Information Technology Services unit. The team works full-
time in an incident response capacity. The size of the team can quickly expand to dozens
of incident handlers, engaging anyone in the organisation from their normal role in order
to remedy an incident. The ITSIR team’s goal is to ensure the continuous availability and
accessibility of any service that is provided by the organisation. There are three components
that interact in the identification, escalation and investigation of such incidents. These com-
ponents include Helpdesk Services, the ITSIR Management Process and the Incident Review
Process.
Incidents that affect the availability of information resources are reported through the or-
ganisation’s Helpdesk. A Helpdesk incident tracking system is used to monitor and log the
progress of such incidents. If the Helpdesk can provide a solution, the incident is logged in
the tracking system as a ‘Service Event’. However, if the Helpdesk cannot find a solution,
the ‘Service Event’ ticket is logged and then assigned to the ITSIR team as a ‘Service Inci-
dent’. The incident is then classified by the level of service impact, which determines how
long before the ITSIR team must provide a solution. There are four levels of classification:
critical, high, medium and low. Incidents classified as ‘critical’ must be responded to imme-
diately and service must be restored within two hours. Incidents classified as ‘low’ can be
responded to within 24 hours, while service must be restored within 12 weeks.
The ITSIR Management process is then initiated, which involves holding an incident meet-
ing where key roles and actions are assigned to resolve the issue. Depending on the service
issue, a technical meeting can also take place. The purpose of this meeting is to diagnose the
root cause of the incident and to make a technical recommendation for service restoration. In
the event that the root cause diagnosis is determined to contain a security threat to the organ-
isation, the ITSIR Manager will then appoint an information security manager from within
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the organisation to the role of Security Coordinator. This coordinator is then responsible for
creating and implementing mitigation strategies to minimise risk to the organisation; com-
piling a threat review report and defining how the incident could affect the confidentiality
and integrity of the organisation’s information resources. Incident meetings are then held
periodically until a solution is found and normal service availability is restored.
4.2.2 IT Service Incident Response Review Process
In the event that a service incident has been classified by the ITSIR team as either ‘critical’
or ‘high priority’, the team initiates the Incident Review Process. This is a formal post-
incident process, which facilitates the identification and assignment of actions required to
prevent the re-occurrence of the service incident. A number of meetings take place, where
a review coordinator invites business units that are affected by the incident to be involved in
the review process. The purpose of the meetings is to confirm the root cause of the incident,
establish the business impact and to identify rectifying actions in an attempt to mitigate the
risk of the incident reoccurring.
Individuals in the affected business units are assigned rectifying actions to complete and are
expected to fulfil their actions and update an incident record in the incident review tracking
system. When all actions are completed, the review record is then sent to senior management
who will either approve the review for closure or reject the proposed actions. If the actions
are accepted, the review process is then closed and all affected business units are notified of
the closure through the incident review tracking system. If the actions are not accepted, the
issues around the rejection are raised during monthly meetings with Operations and Informa-
tion Technology Services senior management. New remedy actions to close the review are
proposed, discussed and documented in the meeting minutes. Once all the remedy actions
set out in these meetings are accepted, the incident is then considered closed.
4.2.3 Information Security Incident Response Process
The organisation’s Information Security unit is responsible for implementing everyday oper-
ational security, enforcing security controls during the development process and investigating
information security incidents. The Information Security Incident Response (ISIR) team is
an ad-hoc team of individuals who are a part of the Information Security unit. This team fa-
cilitates the identification and assignment of actions required to prevent the recurrence of an
issue, which have been determined to be a ‘security incident’. The ISIR team follows a cus-
tomised security incident response approach. The approach, as shown in 4.1 is comprised
of four phases: incident detection and reporting; recording, classification and assignment;
investigation and resolution; and incident closure.
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Figure 4.1: The Security Incident Response Process
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The incident detection and reporting phase is concerned with the reporting of an ‘incident’
to the ISIR team. This can typically come from one of the following sources: a direct request
from senior management within the organisation; a request from a member or management
of the Information Security unit; a request from the Legal Services unit; or a request from the
Human Resources department within the organisation. During the recording, classification
and assignment phase, the ISIR team will determine if a security incident has really occurred.
However, the term ‘security incident’ is not defined in the documented process.
If the ‘incident’ is security-related, an investigation record is created in the Information Se-
curity Incident Response database. An incident handler together with senior management
of the Information Security unit will agree on the problem statement. Depending on the
impact of the security incident, different stakeholders could be involved in the subsequent
management and investigation. For example, security incidents that are determined to have
an impact on availability or accessibility are referred to the Information Technology Service
Incident Response (ITSIR) team and the ITSIR Management Process is invoked. Likewise,
if the security incident is determined to have a regulatory impact, a governance process is
invoked together with the organisation’s risk unit, although the incident is still managed by
the ISIR team.
The third phase of the process (investigation and resolution), identifies the evidence and
information that is required to conduct an investigation. At this point, the ISIR team holds
an incident meeting where the root cause is supposed to be established and remedy actions
associated with the incident are assigned to individuals. These individuals are expected to
fulfil their actions and update the incident handler upon their completion. The final phase,
incident closure, involves two stages. First, relevant stakeholders are notified that all assigned
actions have been completed and the security investigation record is updated to reflect the
closure of the incident. The second stage requires that the incident handler stores any findings
and lessons learned acquired from the investigation in the ISIR database. At this point, the
security incident is closed.
As noted in the discussion above, the organisation has several documented processes and
procedures highlighting how security incident response should be conducted within the or-
ganisation. However, researchers [172–174] have observed that a common trend is that em-
ployees do not comply with their organisations’ information security policies and procedures.
As a result, actions actually undertaken are often very different to what is stated within doc-
umented processes [172–174]. Therefore, the next step in the case study was to investigate
if security investigations are managed and handled as per documented processes within the
organisation. This involved analysing the organisation’s Information Security Incident Re-
sponse (ISIR) database and undertaking semi-structured interviews with relevant individuals
who are a part of the ad-hoc security incident response team.
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4.3 Security Incident Response Database Analysis
The purpose of the database analysis was twofold. First, the analysis was used to identify
the type of security threats that the ISIR team need to investigate within the organisation.
Second, the analysis was used to investigate the content of the security investigation records.
This was done in order to determine what information is actually recorded about security
investigations conducted by the ISIR team and if this information follows the documented
process requirements. The results from this analysis are discussed below.
4.3.1 Security Investigation Record Structure
The Information Security Incident Response (ISIR) database is hosted on a IBM Lotus Notes
server within the organisation. Within this database, individual security investigation records
are stored as separate documents. Each document includes a copy of the security investiga-
tion record template, as shown in Figure 4.2. The investigation record template consists of
three parts, shown as parts A - C in Figure 4.2. The labels have been added to the record
template to aid with the discussion below.
 
This is a Strictly Confidential Incident Report. 
(A) Date and Time the Incident was reported. 
Date:  
Time:  
Duration:  
  
(B) Contact details of the person handling the incident report. 
Name:  
Job Title:  
Department:  
Location:  
Telephone:  
Mobile:  
Email:  
Fax:  
  
(C) Details about the incident itself. 
Date:  
Time:  
Incident type:  
Incident location:  
Initial Impact assessment:  
Incident cause:  
Investigation record: 
 
 
 
Cost of incident:  
Conclusion:  
Post Incident Lessons Learned:  
Preventative actions to be taken:  
  
Figure 4.2: The Security Incident Response Record Template
Section A of the template prompts incident handlers to record information concerning the
date and time the security incident was reported. In addition, there is a third field in this sec-
tion called ‘Duration’, which is used to document how long a particular security investigation
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took to complete. Section B of the template concerns contact details about the individual
who is managing and handling the investigation within the ISIR team. Information which
is recorded includes the incident handler’s name and job title; the name of their department
and its location; their telephone and mobile phone numbers; email address and fax number.
Section C within the template provides fields where incident handlers are expected to docu-
ment information about the investigation itself. Although no confirmation is provided in the
record template or within the ISIR process, the ‘Date’ and ‘Time’ fields within this section
appear to be used to document the date and time the investigation was started. The purpose of
the ‘Incident Type’ and ‘Incident Location’ fields is to document the type of investigation and
its location in the organisation. The ‘Initial Impact assessment’ and ‘Incident Cause’ fields
are used to document any initial assessment of how the incident has affected the organisation
and what caused the incident to occur. However, the ISIR process does not elaborate on what
information should be documented in these fields, nor is any categorisation taxonomy pro-
vided. The ‘Investigation Record’ field provides a space for the ISIR team to document and
record investigation events as and when they occur. At the conclusion of an investigation, the
incident handlers can complete the remaining fields at the bottom of Section C. The ‘Cost of
Incident’ field can be used to record the resources expended on an investigation, while the
‘Conclusion’ field provides a space for the incident handler to document concluding remarks
from the investigation. The final two fields ‘Post Incident Lessons Learned’ and ‘Preventive
Actions to be Taken’ are used to document and record any lessons learned identified from
the investigation, as well as any actions which need to be taken post-incident.
As of August 2013, a total of 188 security investigations were recorded in the ISIR database.
These investigation records were documented in the database from November of 2003 to
August of 2013. The security investigation records stored in the database were then analysed
from three perspectives, 1) analysis of security incidents, 2) categorisation analysis, 3) com-
pletion of individual fields within the records and completion of the investigation records.
4.3.2 Analysis of Security Incidents
Initial observations from the analysis of the Information Security Incident Response (ISIR)
database demonstrated that no consistent categorisation taxonomy was applied to the inves-
tigation records in the database. As a result, similar security investigations that could have
been categorised under a single common category, were in fact categorised under several
different ‘categories’. Based on the above observations, a categorisation taxonomy was ap-
plied to the security investigation records within the database. This taxonomy is based on a
combination and expansion of concepts proposed by Lindqvist and Jonsson [175], as well as
Schieber and Reid [176]. The taxonomy was validated by an information security manager
within the organisation. This taxonomy consists of:
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• Denial of Service - an attack or an attempt to make an information system or network
resource unavailable to its intended users within the organisation.
• Digital Forensics and E-Discovery - any digital forensics work or E-discovery re-
quests to the ISIR team.
• Compromised Information Asset - an attempted or successful compromisation of an
information system, network device, application or user account.
• Unlawful Activity & Regulatory Incidents - computer-related incidents of a criminal
nature, likely involving law enforcement or having a regulatory impact.
• Malware - malicious software typically affecting one or more information systems,
network devices or applications.
• Email Incidents - spoofed email, spam, and other security-related email investiga-
tions.
• Policy, Process or Procedure Violation - an investigation involving a violation of one
or more the organisation’s information security policies, processes or procedures.
• Masquerading - an investigation focusing on an attacker who pretended to be an em-
ployee or authorised user of a system in order to gain system access, information or
greater access privileges.
The author read the 188 investigation records and one category from the taxonomy above was
applied, based on the content of the investigation record. Table 4.1 presents a breakdown of
the security investigations in the ISIR database based on the proposed taxonomy. Several
observations can be drawn from this table. The analysis of the ISIR database shows that the
number of security incident investigations within the organisation is increasing. From 2011
to 2013, the number security investigations handled by the ISIR team increased more than
threefold. The ISIR team handled 17 security investigations in 2011 and had already handled
56 investigations in the first eight months of 2013. More specifically, during the same period
of time, there was also a large increase in the number of digital forensic investigations and
E-discovery requests being recorded in the database. This category accounted for the largest
number (41%) of investigations recorded by the ISIR team. The increase in digital forensic
investigations and E-discovery requests is not unexpected as many of the organisations busi-
ness transactions are undertaken digitally and are processed and stored within information
systems.
Furthermore, the number of investigations classified as ‘masquerading’, dropped to zero dur-
ing the period 2007-2013, while 19 investigations categorised as ‘masquerading’ occurred
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Incident Type/Year 20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Denial of Service Incidents 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0
Digital Forensics and E-Discovery 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 27 46
Compromised Information Assets 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 0 3 4 2
Unlawful Activity & Reg. Incidents 1 2 3 1 1 0 0 0 3 3 4
Malware 0 3 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
Email Incidents 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Policy, Process, Procedure Violation 0 0 0 3 5 3 8 4 4 12 3
Masquerading 0 1 1 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1 6 5 26 7 4 14 5 17 47 56
Table 4.1: Analysis of Security Incident Response Database
during the period 2004-2006. There were 17 such investigations in 2006 alone. Exploratory
conversations with individuals within the ISIR team identified that many of these investiga-
tions involved examining spoofed websites on the World Wide Web which were found to be
mimicking several of the organisation’s customer services. Since 2006, the responsibility to
investigate this specific type of security problem has been delegated to another team within
the organisation and therefore, such investigations are no longer documented in the database.
4.3.3 Security Investigation Record Analysis
In addition to analysing the security incidents handled by the ISIR team within the organ-
isation, the 188 security investigation records in the database were also analysed from the
perspective of the quantity and quality of information documented within the records.
Categorisation Analysis
No formal security incident response categorisation taxonomy exists within the organisa-
tion. However, the use of the word ‘incident’ in many of the investigation records strongly
suggests that the majority of the records stored in database are considered to be ‘security in-
cidents’. Exploratory consultations with practitioners within the organisation suggested that
a large number of the investigation records which were classified as ‘security incidents’ were
not all ‘incidents’, but a combination of ‘security incidents and security events’. In this con-
text, the practitioners suggested that ‘security events’ are security investigations which do
not require regulatory reporting and therefore are ‘less important’ within the organisation.
The practitioners went on to argue that the ISIR database does not provide a true indica-
tion of the number of actual ‘incidents’ which are affecting the organisation, whose number
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are much lower than those reported in the database. The European Union Agency for Net-
work and Information Security (ENISA) [177] and the British Government [178] have both
provided guidelines outlining how information security incidents should be reported to re-
spective legislators and regulators. The lack of a formal incident response categorisation
taxonomy could mean that the Fortune 500 organisation may find it difficult to fulfil its
regulatory obligations towards ‘real’ security incident reporting. While this particular infor-
mation in the investigation record could appear trivial, it is this piece information which is
used in the organisation to determine which investigations need to be reported as ‘security in-
cidents’ and which do not require to be reported. Furthermore, recording and documenting a
security investigation type using a security incident response categorisation taxonomy means
that management within the organisation can compile accurate statistics on previous investi-
gations and access the severity or impact of incidents when they occur [175]. An interesting
observation from the analysis of the organisation’s documentation, as well as the expectation
from management is that incident handlers are required to document and record ‘Incident
Type’ information, yet no formal security incident response categorisation taxonomy was
provided to the incident handlers.
An analysis of the ‘Incident Type’ field within the investigation record template was also
undertaken. This analysis examined what category information was actually documented
within the investigation records in the database. The results of this analysis showed that
similar investigations are often classified under several different categories in the database.
For example, the following ‘categories’ have all been used to categorise investigation records
where potential data loss has been an issue: potential data exposure, potential data leakage,
potential security breach, exposure of live data, email to the wrong person, and loss of data.
This observation reiterates the lack of a consistent security incident response categorisation
taxonomy within the organisation.
Completion of Individual Fields within Investigation Records
The analysis of the investigation records was extended to examine the extent of information,
which was documented in the 22 fields in the record template used by the ISIR team. This
analysis involved reading the 188 investigation records and identifying what information was
being record and what information was not being recorded, as per the organisation’s process
requirements. Table 4.2 presents the results of this analysis.
The results show that only one field, the ‘Investigation Record’ field, was completed in all
188 investigation records. This field describes the actions taken during the investigation. A
further seven out of the 22 fields were completed in at least 94% of the analysed investigation
records. In contrast, the ‘Duration’ and ‘Cost of Incident’ fields were found to be incomplete
in 87% of the investigation records. Information in the ‘Duration’ field was recorded in only
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Field Name Number of Records (% of Overall)
Date 181 (96%)
Time 176 (94%)
Duration 24 (13%) )
Name 186 (99%)
Job Title 185 (98%)
Department 184 (98%)
Location 180 (96%)
Telephone 180 (96%)
Mobile 62 (33%)
Email 164 (87%)
Fax 39 (21%)
Date 178 (95%)
Time 167 (89%)
Incident Type 145 (77%)
Incident Location 97 (52%)
Initial Impact Assessment 68 (36%)
Incident Cause 155 (82%)
Investigation Record 188 (100%)
Cost of Incident 25 (13%)
Conclusion 54 (29%)
Post-Incident Lessons Learned 50 (27%)
Preventive Actions To Be Taken 28 (15%)
Table 4.2: Analysis of Fields within Security Incident Response Database
24 records, while information in the ‘Cost of the Incident’ field was only documented in 25
investigation records. From the perspective of the documentation of lessons learned, 50 in-
vestigation records (27%) contained information within the ‘Post-Incident Lessons Learned’
field, while only 28 investigation records (15%) contained information within the ‘Preventive
Actions to be taken’ field. This finding shows that in nearly three quarters of the analysed
records, no lessons learned were documented, even though this is a documented requirement
in the ISIR process.
An additional observation from the analysis of the investigation records was that the ISIR
team was only documenting contact information for the incident handler assigned to the
investigation. Information about individuals who are reporting a security incident is not doc-
umented, nor is it required according to the ISIR process. As a result, very little information
about the individuals who have reported security incidents is actually documented in the
investigation records.
There is also a level of ambiguity within the investigation record, with regards to specific
information that is required to be documented. For example, the ‘Date’ field is first used
in Section A of the record template. Therefore, it can be assumed that this ‘date’ field is
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concerned with the date and time the security incident was reported to the team. However, a
‘Date’ field is also present in Section C, which is concerned with details about the incident
itself. Further examination of the ISIR process document revealed that the documented pro-
cess does not specify what ‘date’ information should be documented within Section C. There
are several potential uses of this field including the date the investigation record was opened,
the date the incident was first identified or discovered, or the date the first mitigating actions
were undertaken. This means that some ambiguity could arise between incident handlers if
any analysis of this information is undertaken as part of the lessons learned aspect of the
investigation.
The results show that there is also a problem with incomplete and inconsistent investiga-
tion records within the ISIR database. Only 1 out of the 188 investigation records analysed
from the database was considered to be ‘complete’ from the perspective of all 22 fields.
This means that within 187 investigation records, one or more fields within the record tem-
plate were missing information. 15 records were missing information between one and three
fields; 41 records were missing information between four and six fields and 117 records were
missing information between seven and ten fields. Furthermore, 14 records were missing in-
formation in eleven or more fields. This finding suggests that the incident handlers are not
completing the entire investigation record during the investigation of security incidents.
If we consider Ballou and Pazer’s data quality dimensions of [144], the results from the
investigation record analysis can also be discussed from an accuracy, completeness and con-
sistency perspective. From the accuracy perspective, analysis of the ‘date field’ in Section A
from the record template revealed that some of the information in this field is inaccurate and
does not represent the actual information the field is supposed to represent. The problem is
further inflated because the documented process does not specify what information should
actually be recorded in the template.
With regards to completeness, the analysis of all the investigation records has shown that
only 1 out of the 188 records were ‘complete’ from the perspective of all 22 fields. However,
one could argue that not all the missing information is important or will be used for incident
learning at a later stage. Abandoning some of the information collection requirements (e.g.
fax number field) could mean that the incident handlers focus on gathering only relevant
information which will help them learn better about a particular incident. While this could
be true for some of the fields, it is worth noting that when these fields were included in the
record template, this was may have been done to fulfil potential regulatory requirements. As
a result, even though this information may not help the security incident response team learn
from an incident, the additional information could be needed for regulatory purposes.
Challenges with the consistency dimension is evident in the analysis of the ‘Incident Type’
field within the investigation record template. Over the past decade, security incident han-
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dlers in the organisation have been inconsistent with the names they have used to label par-
ticular types of investigations. For example, several different label names have been given
for an investigation where potential data loss has been an issue. As a result, incidents of the
same type have been categorised using a variety of different names. This can make analysing
metrics, and identifying trends and incident type patterns particularly difficult within the or-
ganisation. In summary, the accuracy, completeness and consistency challenges identified
through the analysis of the investigation records suggests that the quality of data within the
records could be one factor hindering incident learning within the Fortune 500 organisation.
4.3.4 Security Incident Response Metric Analysis
As a security incident response team matures, it can be beneficial for an organisation to
assess how well they are conducting their security incident response operations [179]. West-
Brown, et al. [108] and Wiik, et al. [180] argue that metrics provide an accurate way of
quantifying the performance of security incident response teams. West-Brown, et al. [108]
define two metrics as examples, response time and total time to resolve. West-Brown, et
al. [108] defined response time as the period of time from the first report of a security in-
cident to the implementation of the first mitigating actions. They define the total time to
resolve an incident as the time from first reporting and initiation of an investigation to clo-
sure. These two metrics were calculated as part of the case study analysis using information
in the investigation records within the ISIR database.
52 out of the 188 investigation records contained information to calculate a response time. In
the remaining 136 records, although a reporting date and time was documented in the record,
no information was available regarding the date and time of the first mitigating actions. The
calculated minimum response time was two minutes and the maximum response time was
325 minutes in the 52 records considered. The mean average response time was 56.30 min-
utes. Figure 4.3 presents the percentage of security investigations which were responded to
over a given period of time. The figure shows that the ISIR team documented taking mitigat-
ing actions within 30 minutes for approximately 60% of the recorded security investigations
and within two hours for 90% of the investigations.
62 of the investigation records contain data concerning the total time to resolution. The
remaining 126 records had information missing relating to the closure of the investigation.
Out of the 62 investigation records, the minimum time to resolve an investigation was half
a day and the maximum time was 130 days. Therefore, the mean average documented time
to resolve an investigation was just under 12 days. Figure 4.4 presents the percentage of
investigations that were resolved from the first reporting to closure over a given period of
time.
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Figure 4.3: Cumulative Response Time Analysis for 52 records
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Figure 4.4: Cumulative Total Time to Resolve for 62 records
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The results of this metric calculation show that the ISIR team documented information about
resolving 20% of the investigations in half a day and 80% of the analysed investigations
are resolved within 20 days. The results also show that a small percentage (1.6%) of the
investigations took longer than three months (120 days) to complete.
Although West-Brown, et al [108] note that such metric information is useful to analyse
the historical performance of a security incident response team, there are no published rec-
ommended times to evaluate such teams. However, for the purpose of this case study, the
missing data that could have been used in the calculation of the metrics highlight a poten-
tial issue with the quality of data within the investigation records. The metric calculations
have highlighted how much information is actually missing from the investigation records,
which could have been used in the above calculations. This problem then raises the ques-
tion as to whether the calculated metrics actually provide a reliable measurement of security
incident response performance within the organisation, if so much information is actually
missing from the investigation records. Further, given the variability in recording informa-
tion needed to calculate metrics, it is not clear whether the data that was available provides
an accurate measure of the organisation’s performance.
4.4 Security Incident Response Interview Analysis
In addition to analysing the organisation’s Information Security Incident Response (ISIR)
process and database, in-depth semi-structured interviews were also conducted within the
organisation. The interviews were conducted between November and December 2013 and
involved a variety of individuals who have in the past, been involved in or supervised se-
curity incident investigations in the organisation. The objective of the interviews was to
examine how security incident response is perceived and undertaken within the organisation
by practitioners. The interviews were also used to explore any challenges to conducting se-
curity incident response within the organisation and also examine data gathering and incident
learning.
4.4.1 Interviewee Demographics
15 semi-structured interviews were conducted within the organisation during the exploratory
case study. The interview sample consisted of individuals in a variety of information security
roles and who have a diverse range of work experience within a technical role. The initial
interview questions were used to establish the interviewee’s current role in the organisation
and quantify his/her number of years of experience in information technology.
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The answers from these questions revealed that the interviewees have a maximum of 39 and
a minimum of 2 years experience within an information technology role. The mean average
experience of the interviewees was thirteen and a half (13 1⁄2) years. The individuals identified
themselves as information security managers, senior security analysts or security analysts
who assume various roles within the organisation. The following subsections present an
analysis of the results from the interviews. These results examine the individual’s perception
of the ISIR process and security incident response in general, data gathering within the ISIR
process, challenges to conducting security incident response within the organisation, incident
learning and dissemination.
4.4.2 Security Incident Response Process
In order to comprehend the challenges faced by the ISIR team, initial questions focused on
examining the practitioner’s perspective on the ISIR process. Some of the findings from
these questions confirmed initial results presented in previous sections. The findings are
discussed below.
The interviewees confirmed that the organisation uses a customised linear document-centric
security incident response approach which consists of four phases 1) incident detection and
reporting; 2) recording, classification and assignment; 3) investigation and resolution; and 4)
incident closure. The results from this question conclusively established that such a process
does exist within the organisation, with twelve individuals stating “Yes” responses and three
individuals stating “Do Not Know” responses. Although twelve individuals indicated that
the organisation has a security incident response process, only five people could recall the
process itself. This suggests that immediate mental recollection of the details in the docu-
mented process was limited to a few individuals. These individuals included two information
security managers, one senior security analyst and two security analysts.
Five out of the twelve individuals, who indicated that a documented security incident re-
sponse process exists within the organisation, suggested that the process is not always fol-
lowed. When queried as to the reasons for deviating from the process, answers included time
constraints, a lack of staff to run the entire process, a lack of support for handling specific
security investigations and a rigid, document-centric approach to processing a security in-
vestigation, which contains too many steps and is considered to be inappropriate for certain
types of investigations.
The general indication from the participants is that the documented ISIR process provides
structure to the ISIR team. The documentation offers insight into how the ISIR team can
resolve security investigations and provides clarity on the escalation path to other business
units and senior management within the Information Security team. However, the results also
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revealed that the current ISIR process is not dynamic when considering quick resolution, and
lacks detail regarding the level of information that is required for individual security investi-
gations. The two findings identified above could provide one explanation as to why investi-
gation records are not always completed. If the documented process is not always followed
and lacks detail regarding the level of information required within investigation records, then
security incident handlers may not capture enough information to produce lessons learned at
a later stage in the process.
4.4.3 Perception of Security Incident Response
Interviewees were queried as to what the term ‘security incident’ meant to them. A wide
variety of answers were received, which included “a breach of security policy”, “a degrada-
tion or circumvention of security controls”, “data loss”, “financial losses” and “a threat to
service availability”. The variety of answers received from this query indicates that there is
a lack of consensus on how a security incident is viewed within the organisation. This can
also indicate that the organisation does not have a unified definition for the term ‘security
incident’. This result supports the initial observations that not all the investigation records
in the database are true ‘security incidents’ and that no documented definition for the term
‘security incident’ exists within the ISIR process.
Although all the participants have been involved at some stage in the management of a secu-
rity investigation, when asked specifically if the organisation has a security incident response
team, thirteen out of the fifteen respondents indicated that there is no dedicated team. Actu-
ally, the participants indicated that the organisation’s ISIR team can be best described as an
ad-hoc security incident response team, where individuals are brought together to investigate
particular incidents.
Interviewees were then asked which phases of the security incident response process they
have been actively involved in within the organisation. The results of this inquiry are sum-
marised in Table 4.3. The phases provided to the respondents were derived from the litera-
ture [7, 8, 11] and individuals were allowed to identify their participation in more than one
phase.
The table indicates that the majority of participants reported that they were involved in the
identification, eradication, investigation, and recovery phases of security incident response.
The lack of perceived involvement in the preparation and follow-up phases reflects Shedden,
et al. [44] and Jaikumar’s [181] contention that security incident response teams are viewed
as ‘fire-fighters’ within organisations, whose role it is to detect, eradicate and recover the
organisation from security incidents.
When the participants were queried about improving the documented ISIR process, ten out
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Phase Name No. of Participants
Preparation 5
Identification 9
Containment 7
Eradication 9
Investigation 13
Recovery 10
Follow-up 4
Table 4.3: Security Incident Response Involvement
of the fifteen individuals indicated that the process could be improved, while five individ-
uals provided “Do Not Know” answers. The ten individuals provided numerous potential
enhancements to the process including the process should contain more information on how
to handle specific security incidents, the process needs to be more available to a wider au-
dience, lessons learned could be more detailed, and previous security incidents need to be
evaluated to determine how best to handle future incidents.
4.4.4 Data Gathering within the Process
When asked if the organisation collected information during a security investigation, the ma-
jority of the answers returned were positive. Fourteen out of the fifteen individuals indicated
that information about security investigations is collected and stored during the response life-
cycle. One individual indicated that he/she did not know if the practice took place. The re-
spondents indicated that security information collection was usually assigned and performed
by the Primary Incident Handler (PIH). This individual is given the responsibility to collect
and record this information within the ISIR team.
The information typically recorded during a security investigation includes investigation
meeting notes, actions to be taken for remediation, copies of any logs and emails associ-
ated with the investigation, as well as communication between the PIH and management.
The security information documented is usually tailored to specific investigations and there
does not appear to be a uniform approach to capturing specific information. Based on the in-
dividuals answers, it appears the general practice is to capture information which is required
to help with the eradication and recovery, but which may not necessarily facilitate incident
learning at a later stage. For example, individuals noted that meeting minutes, email trails
and the documentation of actions for remediation can be found in nearly all the investigation
records.
The interviews confirmed that the above information was not the only information being
collected about an investigation. The ISIR team also gathers forensic data from various
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sources. This forensic data can include logs, emails, hard disk drive images, and physical
memory dumps. This type of information can be used as evidence in legal proceedings, if
the need arises [182].
Harris [54] states that if forensic evidence is going to be used in subsequent legal action,
then an organisation needs to have documented procedures to ensure standardisation when
this information is gathered and collected. In the interview, when individuals were asked if
there was a process to collect this information, only five individuals indicated that there was
such a process within the organisation. One individual indicated that no such process exists
and nine ‘did not know’ if such a process existed within the organisation. Documented pro-
cesses do exist within the organisation, which describe methods for acquiring data from hard
drives, the storage of information in a secure location, as well as an E-Discovery process.
However, the results again indicate that recollection of these processes was limited to only a
few participants.
Casey [182] argues that if an organisation is going to collect security or forensic data for
use in possible legal action, then a chain of custody process should be considered. The
five respondents who provided positive answers to the existence of a security data collection
process were then queried if the chain of custody practice was performed. Two individuals
specified that this practice exists and was done for all incidents. However, two other indi-
viduals noted that a chain of custody process does exist but was not performed all the time.
There was one ‘Do Not Know’ answer. The organisation does have a defined chain of cus-
tody process, which specifies how an incident handler acquires and stores forensic data to
show a continuous chain of custody. The two individuals who noted that the chain of custody
was not performed consistently suggested that further guidance was required as to when this
should be undertaken.
The respondents indicated that the organisation uses two databases to store information re-
lated to security investigations. One database is used to record intrusion detection system
alerts and events, while the ISIR database is used to record all other security investiga-
tion that involve information security. However, the respondents indicated that access to
these databases was limited to only a subset of individuals within the information security
unit. These individuals includes managers and information security analysts who manage
the organisation’s response to a security incident. The participants indicated that there are
opportunities for process improvements with regards to data gathering and documentation.
The enhancements proposed by the individuals included: making the ISIR database more
searchable, providing additional guidance to the incident handlers with regard to what infor-
mation to record, as well as implementing a ‘lightweight’ security investigation record. In
this context, the individual used the term ‘lightweight’ to refer to less fields to complete and
capturing more relevant information in the investigation record.
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4.4.5 Challenges to Conducting Security Incident Response
One of the goals of the interviews was to establish the challenges faced by a security inci-
dent response team within an organisation with regards to security incident response. The
responses from the interviews highlighted three main challenges for the organisation’s ISIR
team. First, the process for employee reporting and escalation of security incidents needs
to be clearly defined, established, implemented and, periodically, refined as processes and
technology evolve. Second, the establishment of comprehensive data access for ISIR team
members to perform investigations. Third, resolving conflict between the security incident
response team and the business units responsible for the availability of customer-facing as-
sets.
The respondents were asked how security incidents are reported within the organisation.
Three individuals stated that there is a documented process for reporting security incidents,
six indicated that no such process exists within the organisation, and six provided a ‘Do
Not Know’ answer. The respondent’s answers suggest that the majority of security incidents
are reported informally either verbally or via email, usually to a known contact within the
information security unit. The respondents generally agreed that the reporting of security
incidents could be improved within the organisation. The respondent’s main concern with
the current approach is that when certain members of the information security team were
unavailable, reported incidents can take longer to reach the ISIR team. Other potential im-
provements proposed include an incident reporting hotline and a dedicated email address for
reporting security incidents directly to the ISIR team.
Ten out of the fifteen respondents indicated that the ISIR team often has difficulties conduct-
ing in-depth security investigations due to a lack of access to security data. There were a
variety of answers describing the obstacles preventing detailed investigations including lim-
ited physical access to security data, short data retention times, logs not containing enough
detailed information and limited support from third-parties involved in security investiga-
tions.
The respondents also indicated that conflicts arise between the security incident response
team and various other stakeholders within the organisation. From time-to-time, reported se-
curity incidents which affect the availability of customer-facing assets can lead to a disagree-
ment over returning the asset back to the production environment and performing a more
complete security investigation. This conflict originates from the fact that the organisation
relies on the continuous availability of both customer-facing and back-office applications.
The respondents also stated that conflicts occur when there is a lack of physical access to
systems and applications to extract security data for security investigations. However, the
majority of respondents indicated that any conflicts are resolved at a management level.
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4.4.6 Incident Learning and Dissemination
Researchers [18, 20, 120] have suggested that many organisations are not maximising their
post-incident learning potential and tend to focus on only improving technical processes in an
attempt to prevent reoccurrence. When the interviewees were asked if the organisation per-
forms any ‘post-incident’ activities, ten out of the fifteen respondents indicated that depend-
ing on the type of security investigation, several activities can take place. These activities are
in line with the findings of previous researchers [18, 20, 120], which include implementing
security controls to prevent reoccurrence, producing reports for management and education
awareness through policy reiteration. There were four ‘Do Not Know’ answers and one
individual stated that no ‘post-incident’ activities took place within the organisation.
In order to investigate the extent to which further learning was taking place during the organ-
isation’s ISIR process, the respondents were queried to determine if a root cause analysis was
performed post-incident. Seven out of the ten respondents indicated that this was the case
within the organisation. The three remaining respondents indicated that they have not been
involved in incidents where a root cause analysis was required. One respondent indicated
that a root cause analysis should be done for each incident, but they have been involved in
incidents where this activity was not performed.
All ten respondents who indicated that the organisation performs ‘post-incident’ activities
suggested that there is the potential to enhance and extend these post-incident activities in
order to focus on improving the effectiveness of internal policies, procedures, controls and
training. A number of recurring themes were mentioned as potential enhancements. These
included a deeper analysis during security investigations, improving methods and data to
assist in the development of lessons learned, implementing security controls focused more on
preventing incident reoccurrence, as well as, increasing the dissemination of lessons learned.
Cooke [120] argued that the work of a security incident response team is usually completed
by the issuance of a report, detailing the investigation findings and any lessons learned.
Cooke adds that this information can be distributed within an organisation or reported to
external regulatory bodies [120]. When the interviewees were asked if any post-incident
information was distributed or disseminated to any groups or departments within the organ-
isation, six out of the fifteen respondents said ‘Yes’. Two individuals said that post-incident
information was not distributed or disseminated within the organisation and seven individu-
als ‘did not know’ if this took place.
The six respondents indicated that there are two methods for disseminating post-incident in-
formation within the organisation. First, through an electronic announcement on the organi-
sation’s Intranet and second through a monthly pack of statistics prepared for management.
However, when queried if a process exists for distributing this information, the respondents
were unanimous that there is no formal process for distributing this information within the
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organisation. The respondents did indicate that the decision to distribute incident informa-
tion is held with the operational security information security manager, who will decide what
information is disseminated and to whom.
The respondents were also asked if any post-incident information was distributed or dissem-
inated outside of the organisation, for example to regulatory bodies. Nine out of the fifteen
respondents indicated that post-incident information was distributed or disseminated outside
of the organisation. One individual suggested that this did not take place and five individ-
uals noted they ‘Do Not Know’ if the practice was taking place. When asked if there was
a process in place to govern this practice, all nine respondents indicated that they ‘did not
know’ if such a process existed. One respondent did note that if such actions were required,
the Regulatory Compliance Unit would disclose the security occurrence to the relevant reg-
ulators.
4.5 Initial Challenges Identified from Case Study
The exploratory case study has established that the organisation’s Information Security In-
cident Response (ISIR) process dictates that security incident handlers document and store
investigation findings, including lessons learned at the closure of an investigation. However,
the analysis of the security investigation records in the ISIR database has revealed that less
than 30% of the examined records actually contained lessons learned. Numerous challenges
and problems, which have been identified during the exploratory case study, could explain
this finding. These challenges and problems can be summarised as a lack of consistent and
defined security incident response taxonomy, access to enriched security data, absence of
organisational learning from security investigation records, and a lack of tools and methods
to conduct more comprehensive incident learning.
4.5.1 Lack of Consistent Security Incident Taxonomy
The responses from the semi-structured interviews have indicated that the ISIR team dissem-
inates security incident response-related information through electronic announcements on
the local Intranet and by producing a monthly pack of statistics for management. However,
the results from the analysis of the ISIR database showed that no consistent security incident
response taxonomy was being applied within the organisation. As a result, multiple category
types of security investigations are being used to describe similar investigations. Lindqvist
and Jonsson [175] argue that without a consistent security incident response taxonomy, an
organisation cannot compile accurate statistics on previous investigations or have a ‘grading’
system for analysing the severity or impact of incidents when they occur.
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With no defined security incident response taxonomy within the organisation, nearly all of
the analysed security investigation records in the ISIR database were categorised as ‘security
incidents’. Practitioners within the organisation have suggested that many of these ‘security
incidents’ are not true incidents. Coupled with a lack of a consistent view on how a security
incident is viewed within the organisation, this can result in complications with regards to
the regulatory reporting of information security incidents [104, 183].
4.5.2 Access to Enriched Security Data
The final phase of many security incident response approaches focuses on post-incident ac-
tivities. Two objectives from these post-incident activities include a security incident re-
sponse team learning from a security incident along with the integration of any lessons
learned back into the wider organisation’s security posture [8, 184, 185]. Therefore, security
incident investigations can provide information that can be instrumental in avoiding a recur-
rence of a security incident. However, a security incident response team cannot establish
‘lessons learned’ from a security incident without access to detailed incident security data.
Access to detailed incident security data is a problem, which has been identified throughout
the exploratory case study.
In the analysis of the security investigation records in the ISIR database, only one out of the
188 analysed records were considered ‘complete’. This means that 187 records were missing
information from one or more fields from the record template. Extended analysis showed
that 117 records were missing information from between seven and ten fields from within
the record template. Further evidence of this problem was evident in the analysis of the
documented lessons learned in the examined record. The analysis of the investigation records
showed that lessons learned were only documented in 27% of the examined records, while
only 15% of the records contained actions to be taken after the closure of an investigation.
The interviews with individuals within the organisation provided some insight on why these
fields were missing information. The answers from the interviews showed a lack of perceived
involvement in the preparation and follow-up phases. This suggests that the ISIR team are
viewed as ‘fire-fighters’ within the organisation, whose role it is to detect, eradicate and
recover the organisation from security incidents. Individuals within the interview survey
further supported this argument by indicating that the general practice within the team is
to capture information which is required to help with the eradication and recovery from a
security incident. As a result, because security incident learning is not considered to be
a priority, incident handlers do not capture information which can help facilitate incident
learning at a later stage.
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4.5.3 Absence of Organisational Learning from Security Inves-
tigations
Line et, al. [121] argue that while information security incidents are unwanted situations
within an organisation, at the same time, they present an opportunity to learn about the risks
and vulnerabilities which can exist within an organisation’s systems and processes. How-
ever, researchers have argued that organisations do not pay enough attention to organisational
learning from information security incidents [18, 19, 44]. These researchers have gone on to
state that organisational learning concepts such as double-loop learning are critical to en-
sure that organisations learn appropriately so that underlying security and incident response
structures are modified to prevent incident recurrence [18, 19, 44].
The data collected within the studied organisation has revealed that the Information Tech-
nology Service Incident Response (ITSIR) team includes an incident review as part of the
follow-up activities for any critical or high-impact incident. During this review process, a
root cause analysis is performed, which is used to determine actions to prevent a reoccur-
rence. Furthermore, Information Security Incident Response (ISIR) documentation directs
security incident handlers to store any findings and lessons learned achieved throughout the
investigation for future reference. In the security incident response interviews, individuals
identified that a range of post-incident activities take place including producing reports for
management, education awareness and security control implementation. The responses from
the interviewees indicated that a root cause analysis was usually undertaken within the secu-
rity incident response team. However, these findings support the results from previous work
that organisations do not pay enough attention to organisational learning concepts [18,19,44].
An observation from the case study is that the security incident response team do not appear
to utilise any of the organisational learning models or processes identified in the literature.
While the organisation’s security incident response team acknowledge that a variety of post-
incident tasks take place, many of these tasks can be categorised as information dissemina-
tion and not organisational learning. In order for organisational learning to take place, the
security incident response team (and by contrast the wider information security team) should
be focusing on double-loop learning [165]. Double-loop learning would involve the secu-
rity incident response team questioning and challenging the underlying rules, principles and
knowledge of the organisation [165]. While the interviewed individuals have suggested that
a root cause analysis is undertaken in the organisation, a double-loop response would begin
with the root cause analysis and then be followed by an investigation into the process or
policy which resulted in the security incident to occur [18]. In the health and safety domain,
Cooke [120] proposes the implementation of a Incident Learning System as part of imple-
menting continuous improvements. However minimal work has examined this solution in a
security incident response context.
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4.5.4 Lack of Tools and Methods for Deeper Incident Learning
Both the ITSIR and ISIR documented processes recommend that their respective incident re-
sponse teams undertake Root Cause Analysis (RCA) as part of their post-incident activities.
This finding suggests that the organisation is not only focused on the technical issues related
to security incidents, but is also concerned with examining the organisational and human
factors which may have contributed to the incident [122].
However, the results from the interviews within the organisation established that there is
potentially a lack of agreement as to when to undertake a RCA or how to actually perform
a RCA within the ISIR team. Furthermore, when individuals were queried as to how post-
incident activities can be improved within the organisation, these individuals have called for
a more detailed analysis of security incidents, as well as improved methods and data to assist
in the development of lessons learns, including RCA.
The results from the case study support previous findings [122, 126] that security incident
response teams need further support and clarity surrounding the benefits of RCA, when to
undertake and how to perform a RCA within their specific organisations. Stephenson [127]
argues that there are not many structured approaches for conducting a RCA of security inci-
dents. This is an opinion which is shared by Johnson [126] who adds that there are relatively
few established tools and techniques to support the RCA of security incidents. The case
study findings, combined with the literature, supports the needs to empirically investigate
tools and methods for conducting a RCA of information security incidents. However, ensur-
ing that the correct tools and methods are available may not sufficient for an effective RCA.
Several researchers [15, 186, 187] have indicated that there are several factors which can in-
fluence how effective an RCA can be within an organisation. The quality of a RCA is highly
dependent on the accuracy of the input data as well as the capability of the investigative team
to appropriately use this data [15, 186]. Furthermore, researchers have argued that in some
RCAs, only one source of error is emphasised, and once this has been found, an investiga-
tive team will discontinue its analysis [186]. Johnson also argues that the investigator has
an important part to play in the RCA and their knowledge of the incident and surrounding
environment can play an important part in a ‘good’ RCA [15]. RCAs can be time consum-
ing and therefore organisations need to support investigators with adequate resources and
management involvement to ensure that the investigator will be able to carry out the task
effectively [187].
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4.6 Summary
This chapter described an exploratory case study of the security incident response landscape
in a Fortune 500 Organisation. The case study has identified that the studied organisation has
implemented a customised security incident response process which consists of four phases:
incident detection and reporting; recording, classification and assignment; investigation and
resolution; and incident closure. However, analysis of the relevant investigation records and
results from the survey interviews has shown that security investigations within the organisa-
tion can vary from the documented process for a variety of reasons including time constraints
and a lack of staff to run the entire process.
Evidence of this variation can also be seen in the analysis of the security investigation records
in the Information Security Incident Response (ISIR) database. The results from the analysis
of the ISIR database revealed that less than 30% of the investigation records in the database
contained lessons learned. This result differs from the organisation’s requirements within the
ISIR process, which mandates that a root cause analysis is undertaken and lessons learned
are documented within investigation records. Furthermore, the interviewees also indicated
that detailed root cause analysis are not always performed within the organisation. Several
potential explanations emerged from the case study results and interview surveys which po-
tentially explain these findings. These include, a lack of discrimination between low impact
security ’events’ and significant security incidents which justify further analysis; limited ac-
cess to detailed security incident data; capturing information which helps eradication and
recovery and which does not necessarily help facilitate incident learning; and a lack of tools
and methods to assist in the development of lessons learns.
At a high-level, these challenges suggest that improving the quality of data generated from
the organisation’s security response investigations needs to be addressed. The results from
the case study suggests that the data currently generated from the organisation’s security
incident response process does not appear to help facilitate incident learning either during or
after the closure of an investigation. Therefore, alternative solutions are required to enhance
the quality of data generated by the ISIR process to not only assist in the eradication and
recovery of a security incidents, but also assist with incident learning at a later stage.
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Chapter 5
Enhancing Data Collection from
Security Investigations
Chapter four presented the results from an exploratory case study of a Fortune 500 Organi-
sation which identified several opportunities to enhance the quality of data within the organ-
isation’s security incident response process. This chapter describes an experiment to address
two of these opportunities through the introduction of a revised security investigation record
template and a well-defined security incident categorisation taxonomy. The experiment con-
tribution is twofold. First, the experiment evaluates the effect of employing a revised security
investigation record template that is used to collect data that has value to a security incident
response team with regards to incident learning. Second, the experiment evaluates the ef-
ficacy of a taxonomy of security incident types with the purpose of removing ambiguity
surrounding incident type identification.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 reviews the data quality challenges identi-
fied in the exploratory case study that are relevant to this experiment. Section 5.2 describes
the alterations proposed to the organisation as enhancements to their existing security in-
cident response process. These alterations included a revised security investigation record
template and a well-defined security incident categorisation taxonomy. Section 5.3 discusses
how the alterations were implemented within the organisation. Section 5.4 presents the re-
sults from the quantitative and qualitative analysis undertaken within the organisation to
determine the impact of the alterations on the organisation’s security incident response pro-
cess. Section 5.5 discusses the implications of the results and Section 5.6 summarises the
chapter.
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5.1 Review of Data Generation Challenges
The results from the exploratory case study of the Fortune 500 Organisation presented in
Chapter four identified that there were several opportunities to enhance the quality of data
within the organisation’s security incident response process. An analysis of the organisa-
tion’s Information Security Incident Response database (hereafter refereed to as the security
incident response database) showed that only 1 out of the 188 investigation records in the
database contained information in all 22 fields in the investigation record template. Further-
more, the results from interviews conducted within the organisation showed that there does
not appear to be a uniform approach to capturing specific information within the organisa-
tion’s security incident response process. When expanded upon, interviewees indicated that
the general practice is to capture information, which helps eradication and recovery from a
security incident, but does not necessarily facilitate incident learning at a later stage.
Further examination of the security incident response database showed that at the time of
the case study, all the analysed investigation records, which were assigned a category clas-
sification, were all classified as ‘security incidents’. However, exploratory consultations
with security professionals within the organisation revealed that many of these investigation
records were not ‘security incidents’ but a combination of ‘security incidents’ and ‘security
events’. These professionals went on to argue that the current state of the database did not
provide a true reflection of the number of actual ‘incidents’ affecting the organisation, which
in fact, were a lot lower than those reported in the database.
The results from the exploratory case study also showed that no consistent security incident
taxonomy (i.e. identifying specific types of security incidents) was being applied to security
investigation records within the organisation. Although some form of classification was
being applied, at the time of the study, no pre-defined taxonomy was available to help guide
the security incident response team with regards to security incident classification. As a
result, security incident handlers generate different category titles, often for the same type
of incident. The consequence is that the security incident response team find it difficult to
identify trends regarding the number of security incidents occurring within the organisation.
5.2 Proposed Changes
Based on the data quality challenges described above, two alterations to the Fortune 500
Organisation’s security incident response process were proposed: 1) the introduction of a
well-defined security incident taxonomy to remove ambiguity with regards to incident clas-
sification and to allow the security incident response team to monitor incident types; and 2) a
revised security investigation record template to help focus investigation efforts on data that
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provides value to the security incident response team. These two alterations are discussed in
more detail below.
5.2.1 Security Incident Taxonomy
The objective of the security incident taxonomy was twofold. First, the taxonomy was pro-
jected to improve the consistency of the classification of security investigations. Second, it
was anticipated that the taxonomy would help the organisation’s security incident response
team to monitor security incident trends within the organisation. At a high-level, the tax-
onomy consists of two main categories: ‘security events’ and ‘security incidents’, and sub-
categories beneath each main category. Effectively, the sub-categories define different types
of ‘security events’ and ‘security incidents’.
In order to define what the terms ‘security events’ and ‘security incidents’ would mean within
context of the taxonomy, customised definitions were proposed to the organisation. The
definitions were developed using an analysis of the relevant literature, along with feedback
from one of the organisation’s information security managers. The proposed definitions were
as follows:
An information security event is an identifiable anomaly, alert, report or request, which
involves a change in the security state of any information system and/or computer network
which warrants attention from the Information Security team.
An information security incident is a single or series of adverse events, which has resulted
in one or more of the following:
• a violation of an information security policy or policies;
• has resulted in the loss of confidentiality regarding customer or organisational data;
• has resulted in the loss of integrity regarding any information system, computer net-
work, customer or organisational data;
• has resulted in the loss, disruption or denial of service availability;
• has resulted in financial losses due to a change in the security state of any information
system and/or computer network.
In addition to defining the two main categories, different sub-categories were also developed
and proposed to the organisation. These sub-categories are used together with the ‘security
event’ and ‘security incident’ categories. A specific sub-category is mutually exclusive to
one of the two main categories. The sub-categories were developed using input from industry
white-papers to identify current best-practice, as well as the results from the analysis of the
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Event Type Definition
Audit Any event which involves a systematic evaluation of the se-
curity of any organisational information system, device or
computer network
Customer Dispute Any event which has resulted from a dispute involving a
customer
Data Subject Access
Request
Any event which has resulted from a data subject access
request within the organisation
Data Loss Event Any event which involves the disclosure or loss of customer
or organisational information
E-Disclosure Any event where digital information stored within the or-
ganisation is requested as part of litigation support
Equipment Theft/Loss Any event where an organisation device or system has been
lost or stolen
Human Resources In-
vestigation
Any event involving a Human Resources investigation
Internal Usage Investi-
gation
Any event involving an investigation of internal usage of
resources
Policies, Process or
Procedure Event
Any event resulting from a violation of the organisation’s
acceptable usage policies, processes or procedures
Regulatory Investiga-
tion
Any event involving a regulatory investigation
Security Assistance Any event where security assistance is required from the
security incident response team
Table 5.1: Proposed Security Event Categories
organisation’s security incident response database. Feedback was also received from the
same information security manager used in the category definitions. The sub-categories
proposed to the organisation consisted of eleven types of ‘security events’ and seven types of
‘security incidents’. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 summarise the ‘security event’ and ‘security incident’
sub-categories proposed to the organisation, along with the definition of each sub-category.
Several observations can be made with regards to the feedback and final decision made by
the information security manager involved in the above proposals. The first of these ob-
servations is that the proposal to provide a taxonomy based on ‘security events’ and ‘secu-
rity incidents’ is consistent with recommendations from the literature. Several best practice
guidelines [8,9,185] have proposed organising a security incident response taxonomy based
on security events and security incidents. However, none of these guidelines have evaluated
the effectiveness of this approach in a real-world security incident response environment.
A second observation from the information security manager’s feedback is the use of mutu-
ally exclusive sub-categories within the proposed taxonomy. On the one hand, the advantage
of using a security incident taxonomy with mutually exclusive sub-categories is that an or-
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Incident Type Definition
Data Exposure Any incident involving the disclosure or loss of customer or
organisational information
Fraudulent Activity Any incident relating to fraudulent activities involving cus-
tomer or organisational information
Malware Incidents Any incident where a virus, worm, Trojan horse, root-kit,
key-logger, spyware, rogue security software or any other
malicious software affects any organisational system, de-
vice, network or data
Policies, Process or
Procedure Incident
Any incident resulting from a violation of the organisation’s
acceptable usage policies, processes or procedures
Service Outage Any incident which has resulted in the unavailability of any
organisational information system, application or computer
network
Unauthorised Access to
Information
Any incident where access to customer or organisational in-
formation was gained by an unauthorised individual, infor-
mation system or computer network
Unauthorised Modifi-
cation of Information
Any incident where customer or organisational information
has been destroyed, corrupted or modified without authori-
sation
Table 5.2: Proposed Security Incident Categories
ganisation can compile accurate statistics on previous investigations [175]. However on the
other hand, limiting a taxonomy to only mutually exclusive sub-categories can also be seen
as a potential weakness. Information security incidents are becoming increasingly complex
and will often include more than one attack vector [1]. Furthermore, multiple systems or
parts of an organisation could be affected in a different way by a single security incident.
Limiting a security incident taxonomy to mutually exclusive sub-categories has limited the
depth of statistics that can be compiled on the type of security investigations in the organ-
isation. For example, if a security investigation has identified that malware was sending
customer information outside of the organisation, in the current taxonomy this would have
to be classified as either a ‘malware incident’ or a ‘data exposure’ incident. Using more than
one sub-category means that the organisation has the ability to compile more in-depth statis-
tics on numerous attack for a particular type of incident, something which is not possible
using mutually exclusive sub-categorises.
A third observation from the information security manager’s feedback was the decision to
limit the taxonomy to particular types of security investigations. Numerous additional cate-
gories could have been added to the taxonomy including ‘configuration vulnerability’, ‘theft
of resources’ or ‘physical attack’. Furthermore, no ‘Other’ option was added to the taxon-
omy, which means that all security investigations undertaken within the organisation would
have to be classified using one of the eleven security event types or one of the seven secu-
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rity incident types. This means there is the potential that a security incident handler could
have to use a ‘best fit approach’ for classifying a security investigation, which does not fit
completely into the description of the propose categorises.
5.2.2 Security Investigation Record Template
In addition to a well-defined taxonomy, a revised security investigation record template was
also proposed to the organisation. The objective of the proposed investigation record tem-
plate was to focus investigation efforts and data collection on information that provides value
to the security incident response team. The investigation record template was developed after
collecting requirements from both the security incident response team and one of the infor-
mation security managers within the organisation. The information security manager made
the final decision, as to which fields ‘represent value’ to the security incident response team
and was therefore included in the investigation record template. This is the same manager
who provided feedback during the development of the taxonomy.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 
(A) Reporting and Contact Information 
Date Reported:  
Time Reported:  
Reported To:  
Reported By:  
Date of Discovery:  
  
Contact Name:  
Job Title:  
Telephone:  
Department:  
Business Unit:  
Line Manager  
  
(B) Investigation Details 
Incident Handler:  
Status (open/closed):  
Date Opened:  
Time Opened:  
Location:  
Investigation record: Individuals Referenced in Incident Record 
Record of Events 
Date Closed:  
Time Closed:  
Actions To Be Taken:  
Lessons Learned: 
What caused the incident? 
Who caused the incident? 
How many records (if any) were involved? 
What present controls should have prevented the incident? 
What additional controls could have prevented the incident? 
How many working hours 
spend on investigation? 
 
  
Figure 5.1: Proposed Security Investigation Record
The investigation record template, as presented in Figure 5.1, consists of 26 fields within
two sections: Section A - Reporting and Contact Information and Section B - Investigation
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Details. Labels have been added to the record template to aid the discussion below. Section
A provides fields to document information about the initial report of the security problem
(either a ‘security event’ or a ‘security incident’) to the security incident response team. This
information includes the date and time the problem was reported; to whom the problem was
reported to; the name of the individual who is reporting the problem; and the date that the
problem was first discovered. The bottom half of Section A, contains fields to document the
contact details of the individual with knowledge about the problem under investigation. The
purpose of these fields is to assist the security incident response team and management to
quickly identify whom to contact about further information regarding the specific investiga-
tion.
Section B of the investigation record template, contains fields for the documentation of infor-
mation related specifically to the security investigation itself, which includes the documen-
tation of ‘Lessons Learned’. The purpose of the ‘Incident Handler’ field is to provide for ac-
countability to the investigation record. Information documented within this field allows the
security incident response team and management to know who is responsible for the record
and potentially, the security investigation. The ‘Date Opened’ and ‘Time Opened’ fields are
used to record the date and time the security investigation record was first opened. Simi-
larly, the ‘Status’ and ‘Location’ fields are used to document whether the record is currently
‘Open’ or ‘Closed’ as well as the location of the security problem within the organisation’s
infrastructure. The ‘Investigation Record’ field is used to document the actions undertaken
during a specific investigation. The ‘Date Closed’ and ‘Time Closed’ fields are used to doc-
ument the date and time the investigation record was completed and closed within the team.
In order to encourage security incident learning, the five ‘Lessons Learned’ fields prompt
the incident handler to document security lessons through a series of five questions. The five
questions, which are posed to the incident handler as part of the ‘Lessons Learned’ field are:
• What caused the incident?
• Who caused the incident?
• How many records (if any) were involved?
• What present controls should have prevented the incident?
• What additional controls could have prevented the incident?
The purpose of the last field within the record (How Many Working Hours Spent on Inves-
tigation?) is to provide the incident handlers with an opportunity to identify and document
how long the incident handler dedicated to the investigation. A detailed summary and de-
scription of each field in the investigation record template is presented in Appendix D. The
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security incident taxonomy and revised investigation record template recommendations were
made to the organisation and were accepted and implemented into the organisation’s security
incident response process.
5.3 Implementation of Recommendations
The recommendations were implemented through modification of the organisation’s Infor-
mation Security Incident Response (ISIR) process document and the security investigation
record template stored in the security incident response database. This document defines
how security incident response is undertaken within the organisation, while the database is
used to store investigation records which describe security investigations managed by the
security incident response team. Within the ISIR process document, a new sub-section was
added to the Introduction section of the document. This sub-section was used to define the
terms ‘security event’ and ‘security incident’, as they are presented in Section 5.2.1. In order
to implement the security incident taxonomy into the ISIR process, changes were required
to define how security investigations are initially identified and classified within the secu-
rity incident response team. These changes involved modifying the ISIR process diagram
in the process document. This process diagram defines how security incident investigations
are undertaken within the organisation. Figure 5.2 presents the new process diagram with
the changes made to the process shown in yellow. Labels have been added to the process to
assist with the discussion below. An overview of the activities within the individual phases
of the modified ISIR process diagram is discussed below.
Step 1. Event Reported – this step covers the reporting of a ‘security event’ to the secu-
rity incident response team. The modification to the ISIR process means that initially, all
security problems are identified as ‘security events’ within the team until further informa-
tion is known. The reporting of a ‘security event’ can come from several sources including
directly from Senior Management or the Information Security team’s management struc-
ture; a request from the Legal Services business unit; a request from the Human Resources
department; or any organisational employee.
Step 2. Document Record Title and Assign Reference Number – a new investigation
record is then created using the template and assigned a reference number using a pre-defined
format YYYY-XX Record Title. YYYY, refers to the year that the record was initiated, while
XX is the number assigned to a security investigation within the organisation. Record Title
refers to a free-text field used to describe the investigation in one or two words. For example,
‘E-Discovery Request - Grispos’, describes an E-Discovery request concerning an individual
called ‘Grispos’.
At this stage of the investigation, the following information must be documented within an
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1. Event
2. Assign record 
title and 
investigation 
number
3. Agree incident 
handler and 
problem 
statement
4. Is this a security 
incident?
5. Designate 
record as ‘Event’ 
and assign 
classification
6. Designate 
record as 
‘Incident’ and 
assign 
classification
7. Does Incident 
affect customers?
9. Does Incident 
affect Service?
11. Does Incident 
have Regulatory 
impact?
13. Investigation
14. Close Record
8. Notify 
Customer Service 
unit
10. Notify IT 
Service unit
12. Notify 
Regulatory unit
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
Figure 5.2: Modifications to Security Incident Response Process
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investigation record: the date and time of the initial reporting; the name of the individual to
whom the event was reported to; the name of the individual who has reported the event; and
the date when the event was discovered or detected within the organisation. In addition, the
following information about the individual submitting the event report must also be docu-
mented: contact name; job title; telephone; department name; business unit; and the name
of the individual’s line manager. The security incident response team should also document
the following information about the ‘security event’ as the investigation progresses: incident
handler name; the date the investigation record was opened; the time the investigation record
was opened; the location of the event; and the investigation record status (Open/Closed).
While this information is collected for problems defined as ‘security events’, if a particu-
lar ‘event’ becomes an ‘incident’, then this information is used for the investigation of the
particular ‘security incident’.
Step 3. Agree incident handler and record problem statement – the security incident
response team identifies who the Primary Incident Handler (PIH) will be for the investiga-
tion. This is the individual who will coordinate the organisation’s response to the particular
security problem. This information can change during the course of the investigation.
Step 4. Is this a Security Incident? – during this stage of the process, the PIH or the
security incident response team assesses whether the reported ‘security event’ is a ‘security
incident’ using the definitions within the documented process. If the ‘security event’ is not
an ‘incident’, the process continues to Step 5. If the ‘security event’ is an ‘incident’, the
process continues to Step 6.
Step 5. Update the investigation record (Event) – within this step of the process, the PIH
reflects within the investigation record, that the investigation is a ‘security event’. The PIH
is then required to assign an event sub-category to the particular investigation record. For a
‘security event’, the next stage in the process is Step 13.
Step 6. Update the investigation record (Incident) – the PIH updates the security investi-
gation record template to reflect that the investigation is a ‘security incident’. The PIH is then
required to assign one of the incident sub-categories to the particular investigation record.
Steps 7 – 12. Who does the incident affect? – during these steps the PIH, together with the
security incident response team, are prompted to make three decisions. These decisions de-
termine if the ‘security incident’ affects any specific part of the organisation. If the incident
affects any customers, the security incident response team must notify the Customer Service
team, if the incident affects the availability of service, then the Information Technology Ser-
vice team must be informed. Likewise, if the ‘security incident’ has regulatory implications,
then the security incident response team must inform the relevant regulatory business unit.
Step 13. Security Investigation – this stage involves the PIH investigating and resolving
the ‘security incident’ or handling the ‘security event’ to completion.
5.4. Data Collection and Analysis 87
Step 14. Close Investigation Record – this phase is invoked when no further actions are
required from the investigation discussed in Step 13. The PIH is then required to document
the following information within the record: the date and the time that the investigation
record was closed; any actions which need to be taken after the closure of the investigation
record; document any lessons learned by answering the five questions within the template;
and document the number of hours taken to resolve/handle the ‘security event’ or ‘incident’.
The security investigation record template presented in Figure 5.1 was implemented within
the organisation’s security incident response database. From the date of implementation, all
security investigations within the organisation used the revised security investigation record
template.
In order for the security incident response team to use the security incident taxonomy, the
categories and sub-categories were implemented as two lists within the Lotus Notes docu-
ment. These two lists are an application-specific feature within the Lotus Notes database
and were used to display to the incident handlers the categories and sub-categories from the
taxonomy. The incident handlers then selected, based on their preference, which category
and sub-category they wanted to assign to a specific investigation. The changes to both the
ISIR process document and the security investigation record template were implemented in
February 2014. No further changes were made to either the ISIR process document or the
security investigation record template from February 2014.
5.4 Data Collection and Analysis
One of the goals of this experiment was to reduce ambiguity with regards to the classifica-
tion of security investigations and to assist security incident handlers document information
which provides value to the security incident response team. In order to evaluate if the pro-
posed recommendations discussed in Section 5.3 fulfilled these objectives, quantitative and
qualitative data are collected from the security incident response database, as well as the
individuals involved in the experiment.
Quantitative data was collected through an analysis of the relevant security investigation
records within the security incident response database. All the investigation records from
February 2014 to March 2015 were captured for review. The data analysis aspect of this
experiment was carried out in April 2015. At the time of the analysis, there were a total
of 371 security investigation records within the security incident response database. 42 of
these records were considered ‘open’ and were excluded from the analysis. These records
were excluded because the specific investigations documented within the records were con-
sidered to be ‘on-going’. Therefore, not all the fields within these particular investigation
records would have been completed at the time of the analysis. A further five investigation
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records were designated by management to be ‘highly-sensitive’ and their content was only
accessible by the information security manager. As a result, 324 investigation records were
then analysed from the security incident response database. It must be noted that 59 of these
records were documented in April 2014 as part of one large ‘multi-record’ investigation.
This is the result of the organisation detecting a security problem and then opening multiple
investigation records for different individuals affected by this problem. The 324 investiga-
tion records were analysed from four different aspects. The results from both the qualitative
and quantitative analysis will be presented together under each specific aspect.
The first aspect, focused on analysing the investigation records from the perspective of iden-
tifying what specific ‘security event’ and ‘security incident’ investigations were undertaken
within the organisation during the experiment. This was done in order to determine what
types of investigations were actually handled by the security incident response team. The
second aspect focuses on examining the actual category and sub-category assigned to the
investigation records. The aim of this analysis was to first evaluate if the security incident
taxonomy was being used and second, how accurately the taxonomy was being applied to
the investigation records. The third aspect of the analysis focuses on the security investiga-
tion record template. The purpose of this analysis is to determine first, if the 26 fields within
the investigation record template were being used and second, to examine if the information
documented in these fields can be considered ‘actionable information’. In this context, ‘ac-
tionable information’ is “information (that can be) used to take actions that mitigate against
future threats, or help address existing compromises” [188]. The fourth aspect of the analysis
was to examine if the data generated from the revised security investigation record template
can be used to enhance the metric information calculated in the exploratory case study, as
discussed in Section 4.3.4.
In addition to analysing the security incident response database, qualitative data was also
collected through follow-up interviews with individuals within the organisation. The purpose
of the interviews was twofold. First, the interviews were used to gather the practitioners’
perspective on the alterations introduced into the organisation and second, to further explore
specific phenomena identified from the results of the quantitative data analysis.
5.4.1 Analysis of Security Events and Incidents
The 324 investigation records were read by the author to determine the type of security
investigations documented in the security incident response database from February 2014 to
March 2015. Table 5.3 presents a breakdown of the security investigations in the security
incident response database based on the sub-categories discussed in Section 5.2.1. Note
that only the sub-category types with one or more investigation records in the database are
presented in the table.
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Security Investigation Type Feb 2014 – Mar 2015
Data Loss Event 59
Data Subject Access Request 14
E-Disclosure 20
Equipment Theft/Loss 5
Human Resources Investigation 2
Internal Usage Investigation 3
Policies, Process or Procedure Event 67
Regulatory Investigation 2
Security Assistance 83
Data Exposure 63
Fraudulent Activity 4
Policies, Process or Procedure Incident 2
Total 324
Table 5.3: Analysis of Database: Feb. 2014 – Mar. 2015
The analysis of the security incident response database shows that not all the sub-categories
proposed to the organisation, as part of the security incident taxonomy, were used during the
experiment. The security incident response team used nine out of the eleven ‘security event’
sub-categories and three out of the seven ‘security incident’ sub-categories. This means
that six out of the eighteen sub-categories were not used during the experiment. These in-
cluded the ‘Audit’ and ‘Customer Dispute’ event sub-categories and the ‘Malware Incidents’,
‘Service Outage’, Unauthorised Access to Information’ and ‘Unauthorised Modification of
Information’ incident sub-categories.
The analysis of the security incident response database revealed that the number of security
investigations undertaken within the organisation during the experiment has increased dra-
matically. Section 4.3.2 was used to analyse the number of investigations documented in
the security incident response database from November 2003 to August 2013. 47 investi-
gations were undertaken in 2012 and 56 investigations were undertaken in 2013. However,
from February 2014 to March 2015, the security incident response team undertook over 300
security investigations. In fact during the first three months of 2015, 61 investigations were
recorded in the security incident response database. This already exceeds the number of
investigations throughout both 2012 and 2013.
The analysis also shows that the most common type of security investigation now handled
by the security incident response team are ‘Security Assistance’ and ‘Policies, Process or
Procedure Events’. These two types of investigations accounted for 46% of the total number
of security investigations documented in the database from February 2014 to March 2015.
The results from the exploratory case study showed that there were on average five ‘Poli-
cies, Process or Procedure Violations’ investigations a year since 2006. However, the new
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analysis from the database shows that now 67 ‘Policies, Process or Procedure Events’ and
two ‘Policies, Process or Procedure Incidents’ investigations were recorded in the database,
over thirteen times more investigations. While there has been an increase in the number
of ‘Policies, Process or Procedure’ investigations, the results from the analysis have also
shown a decrease in the number of E-Discovery requests, when compared to the exploratory
case study. Within the exploratory case study, 27 investigations were classified as ‘Digital
Forensics and E-Discovery’ in 2012 and 46 such investigations in 2013. However, only 20
investigations classified as ‘E-Disclosure’ were found in the database for the period February
2014 to March 2015.
5.4.2 Category and Subcategory Assignment Analysis
The security incident taxonomy required incident handlers to decide if a particular inves-
tigation was a ‘security event’ or a ‘security incident’ and then to choose a sub-category
based on this selection. This section presents the results of an analysis to evaluate if first,
the taxonomy was used within the organisation and second, how accurately the taxonomy
was applied to the 324 investigation records. The results of this analysis showed that all 324
(100%) of the examined investigation records contained both a category and sub-category
classification.
As all 324 investigation records contained both a category and sub-category classification,
this prompted further analysis into the investigation records. The purpose of the extended
analysis was to examine if the correct category and sub-category classification was being
applied to the investigation records. This analysis involved examining the 324 investigation
records to first identify the assigned category and sub-category and then using the informa-
tion in the investigation record to determine the scope and focus of the investigation. Based
on the information in the investigation record, the category and sub-category assigned within
the record were then compared with the definitions and/or categories within the documented
process. If the information from the record did not match with the definitions and/or cate-
gories in the documented process then this record was considered to be ‘miscategorised’.
For example, consider an investigation record that describes how the organisation’s data loss
prevention system audited an email, which was successfully sent to a third-party containing
unencrypted customer data. If this investigation record were classified as an ‘Event - Data
Loss Event’, it would be considered an example of a ‘miscategorised’ investigation record.
Since there has been a loss of confidentiality and integrity regarding customer data, according
to the definition of the term ‘security incident’ in the organisation, this investigation should
have been classified as an ‘incident’ rather than an ‘event’.
25 (7.7%) out of the 324 investigation records were ‘miscategorised’, either from the per-
spective of an incorrect category, an incorrect sub-category or both. 22 out of the 25 inves-
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tigation records were found to have an incorrect category. That is, 22 investigation records
were categorised as a ‘security event’ by their respective incident handlers. However, the
investigation record appeared to describe what has been defined as a ‘security incident’ in
the organisation’s documented process.
In addition, three investigation records were found to have an incorrect sub-category, all of
which involved ‘security events’. One record was categorised as an ‘E-Disclosure’ event,
yet the record was found to describe an investigation involving the Human Resources de-
partment. As a result, a more appropriate category may have been ‘Human Resources Inves-
tigation’ and not ‘E-Disclosure’. The remaining two investigation records were categorised
as ‘Security Assistance’. However, the information documented within these records sug-
gested that they could also have been categorised under the ‘Data Loss Event’ sub-category.
It must be noted that the 22 investigation records, which were found to contain an incorrect
category, also by extension contained an incorrect sub-category. This is because different
sub-categories exist for each category and therefore in reality, 25 investigation records were
found to have an incorrect sub-category. The follow-up interviews were then used to identify
reasons why these ‘miscategorised’ investigation records were assigned the specific category
and sub-category as found in the documented record. Further questions from the interview
also focused on identifying any problems or benefits of using the security incident taxonomy
within the organisation.
5.4.3 Participant’s Perspective on Classification Taxonomy
During the interview, participants were presented with five examples of ‘miscategorised’ in-
vestigation records. The five ‘miscategorised’ investigation records were selected at random
by the author during the quantitative data analysis. The five investigation records shown to
the individuals are included below. The purpose was to establish potential reasons as to why
the miscategorisation had occurred. Note these examples have been anonymised to protect
the identity of the Fortune 500 Organisation.
Example 1
Example 1 was found to be documented as a ‘Security Event - Data Loss Event‘, as shown in
Figure 5.3. One individual agreed that the investigation record described a ‘security event’.
However, six individuals disagreed and argued that the investigation should have been la-
belled as a ‘security incident’.
The individual who argued that this investigation was a ‘security event’ stated that this was
because previous security evaluations of the third-party involved had determined that suf-
ficient security controls were in place to prevent additional data leakage. Therefore, based
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Investigation Details (Event - Data Loss Event) 
Incident Handler: Incident_Handler_1 
Status: Closed 
Date Opened: Date Removed 
Time Opened: Time Removed 
Location: Location_1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investigation record: 
Summary - Data Loss Prevention Software identified and audited an 
email that was successfully sent to a 3rd party containing legally 
privileged data.  The data was not sent securely. 
Individuals Referenced in Incident Record 
Person_1 - Human Resources Unit 
Person_2 - Human Resources Unit 
Person_3 - Information Security Unit 
Person_4 - Information Security Unit 
Person_5 - Information Security Unit 
Person_6 - Information Security Unit 
Person_7 - Information Security Unit 
 
Summary of Events 
• Email sent by Person_1 on Date Removed  
• Email sent successfully and flagged for audit by the email content 
filter. 
• Email contained 5 word documents with content marked as legally 
privileged. 
• Email not sent securely 
Date Closed: Date Removed 
Time Closed: Time Removed 
  	  
Figure 5.3: Miscategorised Investigation Record 1
on this information, the individual labelled the investigation as a ‘security event’. The indi-
vidual went on to add that this label would still apply, even if the investigation uncovered
that the third-party should not have had the data in the first place. Note that the information
regarding the third-party security controls is not mentioned in the investigation record. This
is an example of information about an investigation, which is not always documented by
security incident handlers.
The six individuals who argued that the investigation should be labelled as a ‘security in-
cident’ provided two main reasons. These reasons included the data was sent successfully
and in the ‘clear’, and that the data contained ‘legally privileged’ information which is con-
sidered to be ‘sensitive’. However, two out of the six individuals also noted that in certain
circumstances, this investigation could have also been labelled as a ‘security event’. For
example, one individual implied that although encryption was not used (which is actually
against organisational policy), if the third-party involved was supposed to receive this infor-
mation, then they would label this investigation as an event. This is because a breach of data
had not actually occurred. Another individual added that if TLS (Transport Layer Security)
was used and the third-party was not supposed to receive this information, then they would
label this investigation as a ‘security event’. When asked to explain further, the individual
stated that if the secure transport mechanism was in place and the third-party had secure con-
trols to prevent additional data leakage, then they were confident that this would have been
an ‘event’.
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Investigation Details (Event – Regulatory Investigation) 
Incident Handler: Incident_Handler_2 
Status: Closed 
Date Opened: Date Removed 
Time Opened: Time Removed 
Location: Location_1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investigation record: 
Summary – Business reports, containing Personally identifiable 
information (PII), sent in the clear to external third-party. 
Individuals Referenced in Incident Record 
Person_1  - Information Security Unit 
Person_2  - Information Security Unit 
Person_3  - Third-party Individual 
Person_4  - Regulatory Risk Unit 
Record of Events 
• Person_1 found email during Data Loss Prevention Software audit.  
• Investigation involved an employee sending business reports 
containing Personally identifiable information (PII) unencrypted 
Date Closed: Date Removed 
Time Closed: Time Removed 
  	  
Figure 5.4: Miscategorised Investigation Record 2
Example 2
Example 2 (presented in Figure 5.4) was labelled as a ‘security event’ by the Primary Incident
Handler (PIH). Two individuals agreed that this investigation record described a ‘security
event’. However, four individuals argued that the investigation described a ‘security incident’
and one individual was undecided.
The two individuals who suggested that the investigation was a ‘security event’ argued that
this was because the Personally Identifiable Information (PII) which was sent to the third-
party, was neither confidential nor ‘enough’ for it to be considered a ‘security incident’.
While the organisation does not have a uniform definition for the term PII, discussions with
the two individuals revealed that PII in this case can be defined in terms of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology definition:
“any information about an individual maintained by an agency, including,
but not limited to, education, financial transactions, medical history, and crimi-
nal or employment history and information which can be used to distinguish or
trace an individual’s identity, such as their name, social security number, date
and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, biometric records, etc., including any
other personal information which is linked or linkable to an individual” [189].
When the individuals were asked to define ‘enough PII’ for a ‘security event’ to be consid-
ered a ‘security incident’, both individuals answered that this would vary depending on the
regulatory requirement that was concerned with the investigation.
The four individuals who indicated that the investigation was a ‘security incident’ provided
two main reasons as their justification. First, the data was sent in the ‘clear’ without the
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use any encryption and second, the PII was not blocked by any of the organisation’s data
loss prevention systems. Two out of the four individuals added that because there was no
TLS between the two end-points, there was the potential for interception on route and hence,
the investigation has to be classified as an ‘incident’. These two individuals went on to
state that if TLS had been implemented between the two end-points, then this investigation
could have been documented as a ‘security event’. The individual who was undecided if the
investigation was a ‘security event’ or a ‘security incident’ stated that further information
was required within the investigation record before they could make a decision.
Example 3
Example three as presented in Figure 5.5, was defined by its PIH as a ‘security event’. Six
individuals agreed that this investigation should be labelled as a ‘security event’, but one
individual argued that the investigation described a ‘security incident’. The one individual
who argued that the investigation was a ‘security incident’ stated that this was because the
investigation record described a ‘regulatory investigation’. This individual was implying that
a ‘regulatory investigation’ means that it must be a ‘security incident’ and not a ‘security
event’ because of its regulatory nature. This is consistent with the definition of a ‘security
incident’ as defined by the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) [99].
Investigation Details (Event – Regulatory Investigation) 
Incident Handler: Incident_Handler_1 
Status: Closed 
Date Opened: Date Removed 
Time Opened: Time Removed 
Location: Location_1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investigation record: 
Summary – Request for data to be secured and written to CD for 
transfer to third-party. 
Individuals Referenced in Incident Record 
Person_1 - Information Security Unit 
Person_2 - Legal Services Unit  
Record of Events 
• Person_1 received a request from Person_2 to encrypt secure data 
and burn this data for transfer to a third-party. Approval has been 
granted.  
• Person_1 collected data, encrypted and created to two copies of the 
data to a CD. 
Date Closed: Date Removed 
Time Closed: Time Removed 
  	  
Figure 5.5: Miscategorised Investigation Record 3
The six individuals who argued that the investigation described a ‘security event’ stated that
this label was a “best-fit approach”. The individuals went on the state that this type of
investigation was actually neither a ‘security event’, nor a ‘security incident’. Instead, the
six individuals suggested that the investigation should be labelled as ‘Security Assistance’
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and nothing more. In fact, one of the six individuals implied that this type of investigation
should not really be documented in the security incident response database.
Example 4
Example four, as shown in Figure 5.6, was labelled by its PIH as a ‘security event’. Three
individuals agreed and indicated that the investigation did indeed describe a ‘security event’.
However, two individuals argued that the investigation described a ‘security incident’, while
two individuals were undecided. Two out of three individuals who suggested that the in-
vestigation was a ‘security event’ indicated that this was because even though the data in
question had been accessed by another part of the organisation, it had still remained within
the parent organisation’s physical infrastructure. The third individual who suggested that the
investigation was a ‘security event’ indicated that this was based on their understanding of
the documented definitions, that an ‘event’ becomes an ‘incident’ when it is confirmed that a
security problem has occurred. The individual argued that the security problem and not yet
been confirmed and therefore, this investigation was a ‘security event’. The individual also
added that the investigation should be extended to examine the access control issue and not
only the data loss problem identified in the investigation record.
Investigation Details (Event - Data Loss Event) 
Incident Handler: Incident_Handler_3 
Status: Closed 
Date Opened: Date Removed 
Time Opened: Time Removed 
Location: Location_2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investigation record: 
Summary – It has been identified that there was an access control issue 
with the Application_Name_Removed application located within the 
organization. This meant that employees in Country_X and Country_Y 
could access UK-specific business information. The issue was not 
initially relayed to Information Security and a retrospective-type 
investigation into the event was launched. 
Individuals Referenced in Incident Record 
Person_1 - Information Security Unit 
Person_2 - Information Security Unit 
Person_3 - Information Security Unit 
Person_4 - Information Security Unit 
Person_5 - Information Technology Services Unit 
Person_6 - Information Technology Services Unit 
Person_7 - Information Technology Services Unit 
Person_8 - Head Regulatory Unit 
Record of Events 
• Incident_Handler_3 was tasked with investigating a potential data 
loss event relating to the Application_Name_Removed application.  
• The alert was raised based on the identification that employees 
within Country_X and Country_Y could access UK-specific 
business information. 
Date Closed: Date Removed 
Time Closed: Time Removed 
  	  
Figure 5.6: Miscategorised Investigation Record 4
The two individuals who indicated that the investigation record described a ‘security inci-
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dent’ stated that this was the case because unauthorised individuals accessed sensitive in-
formation, regardless of the fact that they work within the parent organisation. The two
individuals who were unsure how to label the investigation stated that they would require
additional information before confirming the classification. The individuals then went on
to state that if the parent-company employees were supposed to view this information then
the investigation could be labelled as a ‘security event’. However, both individuals added
that if access to the data were successful, this investigation would likely become a ‘security
incident‘ as it would have repercussions under local data protection laws. One of the two
individuals also noted that there was a potential ‘grey area’ with regards as to whether the
data involved had actually left the organisation or if it had remained within the organisa-
tion’s control. This individual was referring to the fact that although the data has left the
UK-part of the organisation, it had not actually left the parent company and as a result, was
still within the ‘organisation’ itself. Hence, the individual requested that further clarity be
made on defining ‘organisation’ in this context.
Example 5
Example five as shown in Figure 5.7, was categorised as a ‘security event’ by its PIH. Two
individuals agreed that this was a ‘security event’, four suggested that the investigation de-
scribed a ‘security incident’ and one individual was undecided. The two individuals who
indicated that the investigation was a ‘security event’ argued that the information involved
was not confidential and according to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), there
was not ‘enough’ Personally Identifiable Information (PII) for it to be considered an ‘inci-
dent’.
It is interesting to note that the ICO guidelines [99] do not actually define what the term
‘enough’ entails, but the document does provide guidance on what should be reported to the
ICO. One of the two individuals added that because of this assumption, they were inclined
to classify the investigation as a ‘security event’. However, the same individual added that if
the PII was ‘enough’ then the investigation should be classified as a ‘security incident’.
The four individuals who answered that this investigation should be a ‘security incident’ in-
dicated this was the case because PII was disclosed to individuals who were not supposed to
receive this information. However, one of the four individuals did note that if the informa-
tion in the memo was publicly available, this investigation could be classified as an ‘event’.
The undecided individual wanted more information documented in the investigation record
before they could make a decision.
Two main themes emerge from the above analysis of ‘miscategorised’ investigation records.
The first theme is that there still appears to be a lack of agreement on the definition of
a ‘security event’ and a ‘security incident’ within the organisation. The results from the
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Investigation Details (Event - Data Loss Event) 
Incident Handler: Incident_Handler_2 
Status: Closed 
Date Opened: Date Removed 
Time Opened: Time Removed 
Location: Location_3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investigation record: 
Summary – An internal memo containing organisational information 
was accidently sent by a third-party to one of their third-party suppliers.  
The company reported the event to third-party and returned the memo.   
Individuals Referenced in Incident Record 
Person_1 - Information Security Unit 
Person_2 - Information Security Unit 
Person_3  - Third Party Person 
Person_4  - Third Party Person 
Person_5 - Third Party Relationship Manager 
Record of Events 
• An internal memo containing organisational information was 
accidently sent by one of the organization's third-party suppliers to 
another third-party.  
• The third-party who received the memo returned it to the sender 
and confirmed that all copies of the data had been deleted.  
Person_3 and Person_4 informed Person_5 of the event and that 
they were conducting their own investigation. 
Date Closed: Date Removed 
Time Closed: Time Removed 
  	  
Figure 5.7: Miscategorised Investigation Record 5
analysis have shown that the individuals had conflicting views on the classification of the
five examples presented to them. As a result, the organisation could still be consuming
valuable resources on investigations, which have been classified as a ‘security incident’ by
incident handlers, but may not really be considered an actual ‘incident’.
The second theme to emerge from the analysis is that some incident handlers appeared to
underestimate the impact of specific security problems. As seen within Example 1, the
investigation record stated that sensitive information was sent to a third-party without the
use of encryption. One of the interviewed individuals argued that they were confident that
the third-party had sufficient security controls in place to prevent additional leakage. As
a result, the individual suggested that nothing more could be done with regards to the data
leakage and therefore, this was a ‘security event’. However, the other interviewees disagreed.
These individuals stated that regardless of the security control situation, data containing
‘legally privileged’ information was transmitted without the use of encryption and therefore
this investigation was a ‘security incident’. The conflicting views on estimating the impact
of a particular security problem could lie with how the problem is initially identified at the
start of an investigation. If the incident handler does not correctly identify the ‘problem
statement’ and scope of the actual security problem, then the proceeding investigation could
end up being too narrow. In addition, the investigation may not actually uncover the root
causes of the actual security problem.
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5.4.4 Classification Taxonomy: Problems and Benefits
In addition to asking practitioners to identify why investigation records were assigned a
specific category and/or sub-category, participants were also queried on potential benefits
and problems with the security incident taxonomy. Four individuals indicated that they did
not encounter any problems with the taxonomy. However, two of these individuals noted
that a future problem, which could occur, is that a particular investigation may not fit into
any of the proposed sub-categories. As a result, these individuals suggested that additional
sub-categories could be required in the future. The other two individuals who indicated that
they did not experience any problems with the taxonomy stated that they did not foresee any
future problems.
Three individuals indicated that they had experienced a problem with the implemented tax-
onomy. One individual suggested that the definition of a ‘security event’ be expanded to
include investigations where a security problem can exist, but the existing security controls
have been effective. When queried further, the individual added that they have encountered
scenarios where if a security control ‘has worked’, the security problem is not reported to
the team, even though there could be other issues related to the problem to investigate. An-
other challenge identified by these three individuals was that in some cases, the provided
sub-categories did not adequately describe their investigation. As a result, these individu-
als noted that they had to use a ‘best fit’ category for these investigations. The individuals
proposed that the organisation re-examine the taxonomy on a regular basis, possibly once
a year. It is also worth noting that the three individuals who experienced problems also
suggested against using mutually exclusive sub-categories, as dictated in the implemented
taxonomy. The individuals preferred that multiple sub-categories be used in the taxonomy.
As discussed at the end of Section 5.2.1, the use of mutually exclusive sub-categories was
a managerial decision made at the start of the experiment. Simon [190] states that the work
of a manager includes making decisions for the good of an organisation and communicating
these decisions to other individuals within an organisation. However, Simon adds that in
order for a manager to make the right decisions, they need to know about the environment in
which they work and how their decisions will impact other employees and their work [190].
The incident handlers opinion against using mutually exclusive sub-categories suggests that
they were either not consulted or over-ruled by managers with regards to their demands for
non-exclusive sub-categories. The use of multiple sub-categories, along with a potentially
‘Other type’ in the security incident taxonomy, could have allowed for deeper analysis and
trend identification.
When the individuals were asked if they had experienced any benefits in using the imple-
mented taxonomy, all seven respondents answered ‘Yes’. Five out of the seven respon-
dents indicated that the main benefit derived from using the taxonomy was that it helped
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the security incident response team and management understand the true extent of the threat
landscape within the organisation. The five individuals added that without a well-defined
taxonomy it can be difficult to identify the true frequency of particular ‘security events’ and
‘incidents’ within the organisation. One of the five individuals added “that the addition of the
definitions and sub-categories have enhanced both the reliability and consistency of the data
generated from the incident response process”. One individual identified a different benefit.
This individual suggested that the definitions and sub-categories removed uncertainty and
confusion within the team on how to approach a particular investigation, especially at the
start of the organisation’s security incident response process. Furthermore, this individual
noted that if anyone was to query why a particular investigation had been identified as either
a ‘security event’ or a ‘security incident’, the team could point to a documented definition to
justify their selection.
When the participants were asked if the security incident taxonomy assisted or hindered
the overall investigation process, all seven individuals agreed that the taxonomy assisted the
process. The individuals highlighted numerous benefits including removing ambiguity at the
start of an investigation, helping to define clear escalation paths, reducing the time consumed
on ‘security event’ investigations and assisting with reporting true ‘security incidents’ to
regulators outside the organisation.
5.4.5 Classification Taxonomy Anomalies over Time
Examining the security investigation records, which were ‘miscategorised’ from a chrono-
logical perspective, presents an alternative view on the results. Note that the data collected
for the analysis of this section for February 2014 and March 2015 does not encompass the
whole of these months. This is because the data collection for February 2014 begins when
the taxonomy was implemented within the organisation and the data collection ends in March
2015 when the analysis was undertaken. Figure 5.8 presents the results from the chronolog-
ical analysis. Three observations were made from this analysis.
The first observation from the chronological analysis is the high number of ‘miscategorised’
investigation records at the start of the experiment. The results show that in February 2014,
three investigation records contained incorrect categories and four investigation records con-
tained incorrect sub-categories. These results suggest that initially, the security incident
response team took some time adjusting to the implemented taxonomy within the organisa-
tion. As a result, a high number of ‘miscategorised’ records were documented at the start
of the experiment. However, as the experiment progressed the number of ‘miscategorised’
records decreases to about one record per month during the period March 2014 to October
2014. No ‘miscategorised’ records were identified in May 2014.
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Figure 5.8: Chronological Miscategorised’ Investigation Record Analysis
The second observation from the chronological analysis is the increase in the number of
‘miscategorised’ records during the month of November 2014. A total of five investigation
records had an incorrect category and six records had an incorrect sub-category during this
month. A possible explanation for this increase is that a new incident handler joined the se-
curity incident response team during this period. This incident handler may have taken some
time to familiarised themselves with the implemented taxonomy. As a result, this incident
handler may have used incorrect categories or sub-categories for investigations, where the
distinction was not very clear, or they did not receive enough training with regards to the
implemented taxonomy.
The third observation identified from the chronological analysis is an increase in the number
of ‘miscategorised’ records during the month of January 2015. A total of five investiga-
tion records with incorrect categories and five records with incorrect sub-categories were
identified during this month. There are several possible explanations for this increase includ-
ing a reduced number of incident handlers, increased work-load during vacation schedules
and variations in the experience of newly appointed incident handlers. After January 2015,
the number of ‘miscategorised’ records drops to one investigation record with an incorrect
category and one investigation record with an incorrect sub-category, both of which were
documented February 2015. No ‘miscategorised’ records were found in March 2015.
5.4.6 Analysis of Information within Investigation Records
The security investigation record template implemented within the organisation contained 26
fields. This part of the analysis focused on examining which of the 26 fields within the 324
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Field Name Investigation Records With Com-
pleted Fields (% of Overall)
Date Reported 324 (100%)
Time Reported 324 (100%)
Reported To 323 (99.7%) )
Reported By 324 (100%)
Date of Discovery 324 (100%) )
Contact Name 321 (99.1%)
Job Title 314 (96.9%)
Telephone 231 (71.3%)
Department 310 (95.7%)
Business Unit 290 (89.5%)
Line Manager 225 (69.4%)
Incident Handler 324 (100%)
Status 324 (100%)
Date Opened 324 (100%)
Time Opened 324 (100%)
Location 306 (94.4%)
Investigation Record 324 (100%)
Date Closed 322 (99.4%)
Time Closed 322 (99.4%)
Lessons Learned Field 1 288 (88.8%)
Lessons Learned Field 2 286 (88.2%)
Lessons Learned Field 3 269 (83%)
Lessons Learned Field 4 264 (81.4%)
Lessons Learned Field 5 265 (81.7%)
Actions To Be Taken 324 (100%)
Hours Working 324 (100%)
Table 5.4: Analysis of Completed Fields within Investigation Records
investigation records were used by the security incident response team and what information
was recorded within these fields. This analysis involved two steps. First, the investigation
records were examined to determine whether the fields within each record contained infor-
mation. Second, the fields were then examined to identify the extent to which the information
within the 26 fields was considered to be ‘actionable information’. Actionable information
is “information (that can be) used to take actions that mitigate against future threats, or help
address existing compromises” [188]. An example of ‘actionable information’ in the ‘Lo-
cation’ field is the name of the business unit or team within the organisation affected by a
particular ‘security event’ or ‘incident’. In the same field, an example of ‘non-actionable’
information would be either a blank entry in the field or any other information, which does
not describe a location within the organisation. Table 5.4 presents the results of the analysis
which examined how much information was documented in the 324 investigation records.
5.4. Data Collection and Analysis 102
The results of this analysis show that 11 out of the 26 fields were completed in all 324 in-
vestigation records. Furthermore, four fields were found to have been completed in over
99% of the investigation records. These four fields were the ‘Contact Name’, ‘Date Closed’,
‘Time Closed’ and ‘Reported To’ fields. In the five ‘Lessons Learned’ fields, information
was documented in between 81% and 88% of the analysed investigation records. In con-
trast, information from six fields was found to be missing in ten or more of the analysed
investigation records. The results show that the ‘Telephone’ and ‘Line Manager’ fields were
the least documented fields within the investigation record. The ‘Telephone’ field was not
documented in 93 records, while the ‘Line Manager’ field was not documented in 99 inves-
tigation records. Further analysis showed that five out of the six fields, which were missing
information in ten or more fields within the record template, were those in the ‘Reporting
and Contact Information’ section. These fields are used to document the name and contact
information of the individual who has reported a security problem to the security incident
response team.
The results presented above have shown that information was documented in the majority
of the fields in the investigation record template. However, the initial analysis has identified
that some of this information was ‘non-actionable’. The next step in the analysis was to
examine the information in the actual fields to determine how much of the information can
be considered to be ‘actionable’ information. This involved separating the 324 investigation
records into ‘event investigations’ (255) and ‘incident investigations’ (69) depending on the
sub-category assigned by the incident handlers. Table 5.5 presents the results of this analysis.
Several observations can be drawn from the analysis of the ‘actionable’ information within
the investigation records. The results show that ten fields within the investigation records
labelled as ‘security incidents’ contained more ‘actionable’ information than those records
labelled as ‘events’. This is particularly evident in the five ‘Lessons Learned’ fields. While
85.5% of the ‘security incident’ records contained ‘actionable’ information from Lessons
Learned field 1, only 43.1% of the ‘security event’ records contained ‘actionable’ informa-
tion within this field. Similarly, 55% of ‘security incident’ records contained ‘actionable’
information from Lessons Learned field 3, only 35.2% of the ‘security event’ records con-
tained ‘actionable’ information within this field. Furthermore, 100% of the ‘security inci-
dent’ records contained ‘actionable’ information in the ‘Location’ field, but 92.9% of the
‘security event’ records contained ‘actionable’ information in this field.
Five fields within the ‘security event’ investigation records contained more ‘actionable’ in-
formation than the same fields in the ‘security incident’ records. However, in all five cases
the difference in ‘actionable’ information between the two types of investigation records was
minimal. For example, while 99.6% of the ‘security event’ records contained ‘actionable’
information in the ‘Contact Name’ field, while 97.1% of the ‘incident records’ contained ‘ac-
tionable’ information in this field. Likewise, in the ‘Date Closed’ and ‘Time Closed’ fields,
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Field Name Event Investigations With
Actionable Info. (% of Type
Total)
Incident Investigations
With Actionable Info. (%
of Type Total)
Date Reported 255 (100%) 69 (100%)
Time Reported 255 (100%) 69 (100%)
Reported To 254 (99.6%) 69 (100%)
Reported By 255 (100%) 69 (100%)
Date of Discovery 255 (100%) 69 (100%)
Contact Name 254 (99.6%) 67 (97.1%)
Job Title 252 (98.8%) 62 (89.8%)
Telephone 181 (70.9%) 50 (72.4%)
Department 254 (99.6%) 65 (94.2%)
Business Unit 235 (92.1%) 64 (92.7%)
Line Manager 169 (66.2%) 56 (81.1%)
Incident Handler 255 (100%) 69 (100%)
Status 255 (100%) 69 (100%)
Date Opened 255 (100%) 69 (100%)
Time Opened 255 (100%) 69 (100%)
Location 237 (92.9%) 69 (100%)
Investigation Record 255 (100%) 69 (100%)
Date Closed 254 (99.6%) 68 (98.5%)
Time Closed 254 (99.6%) 68 (98.5%)
Lessons Learned Field 1 110 (43.1%) 59 (85.5%)
Lessons Learned Field 2 110 (43.1%) 56 (81.1%)
Lessons Learned Field 3 90 (35.2%) 38 (55%)
Lessons Learned Field 4 5 (1.9%) 6 (8.6%)
Lessons Learned Field 5 3 (1.1%) 8 (11.5%)
Actions To Be Taken 255 (100%) 69 (100%)
Hours Working 255 (100%) 69 (100%)
Table 5.5: Analysis of Actionable Information within Investigation Records
‘actionable’ information was recorded in 99.6% of the ‘security event’ records and 98.5% of
the ‘security incident’ records. In summary, the results have shown that the security incident
response team are more likely to document ‘actionable’ information for a ‘security incident’
over a ‘security event’ investigation.
5.4.7 Incomplete Investigation Records over Time
The results from the analysis discussed in Section 5.4.6 have shown that a number of inves-
tigation records contained fields where ‘non-actionable’ information was documented. This
section of the analysis focused on examining these investigation records in order to determine
when they occurred in the context of the experiment. 149 out of the 324 (46%) investiga-
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tion records were found to have one or more fields containing ‘non-actionable’ information.
Figure 5.9 provides a breakdown of the number of investigation records containing ‘non-
actionable’ information against the total number of records created for each month of the
experiment.
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Figure 5.9: Non-Actionable Information Investigation Record Analysis
The figure shows that highest number of investigation records with ‘non-actionable informa-
tion’ was observed during April 2014. 34 such records were identified during this period.
Furthermore, the investigations records documented during April 2014 included one very
large ‘multi-record’ investigation. As result, the number of investigation records with ‘non-
actionable information’ could be much lower if the ‘multi-record’ investigation is excluded
from the analysis. If the results for April 2014 are excluded, then the month with the highest
number of investigation records with ‘non-actionable information’ is November 2014. 21
records contained ‘non-actionable information’ during this month.
The results also show that May 2014 has the highest percentage of investigation records with
‘non-actionable information’. 8 (67%) out of the 12 investigation records in this month, were
identified as containing ‘non-actionable information’ in one or more fields. Data was not
collected during the entire months of February 2014 (start of experiment) and March 2015
(end of experiment). Therefore, if the data for February 2014 and March 2015 are excluded
from the analysis, June 2014 is considered the month with the lowest number of investigation
records containing ‘non-actionable information’. Only one out of the fifteen (7%) records
created during this period was found to contain ‘non-actionable information’. After this
period, the number of investigation records with ‘non-actionable information’ increases each
month until November 2014. After November 2014, the number of investigation records with
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‘non-actionable information’ begins to decrease until the end of the experiment.
The 149 incomplete records were then analysed to determine which fields were the most
prevalent with regards to ‘non-actionable information’. The results from this analysis showed
that 140 out of the 149 records contained ‘non-actionable information’ in one or more fields
from the ‘Reporting and Contact Information’ section of the investigation record template.
This section consisted of the ‘Contact Name’, ‘Job Title’, ‘Telephone’, ‘Department’, ‘Busi-
ness Unit’, and ‘Line Manager’ fields. The follow-up interviews with practitioners were then
used to investigate why these particular fields contained ‘non-actionable information’.
5.4.8 Investigation Record Template Participant Analysis
Initial questions about the investigation record template focused on the participant’s opinion
on whether the revised template implemented within the organisation captures all relevant
information about a ‘security event’ and a ‘security incident’. All seven participants were
unanimous in that the investigation record template captured all relevant information about
a ‘security event’. However, only six out of the seven individuals agreed that the revised
template captured all relevant information about a ‘security incident’. The one individual
who disagreed noted that they would like to see a field to record information related to the
remedy being applied to prevent a recurrence of the problem, as well as if the remedy has
been successful or unsuccessful. Another field the individual suggested which they would
like to see implemented was a drop-down menu with a list of security controls, which have
worked/failed depending on the particular investigation. The first recommendation proposed
by this individual supports the findings from the literature that security incident response
teams (and by extension organisations) are more focused on eradication and recovery when
it comes to security investigations [18, 44]. While this was not examined further, the pro-
posal from the individual suggests that there is likely pressure from management within the
organisation on incident handlers to demonstrate that their investigations are conclusive and
that any problems will not reoccur. Hence, the proposal of an addition field to the investiga-
tion record is likely to satisfy demands from management about statistics regarding incident
eradication and recovery.
However, the second recommendation from the individual provides a different view to the
above assumption. What this request suggests is that potential discussions are taking place in
the security incident response team about which security controls are working/failing within
the organisation. For this type of information to be identified and documented, incident
handlers would need to conduct in-depth investigations, and not just focus on eradication
and recovery [15]. Alternatively, like the first suggestion, the request for the security con-
trol drop-down list could also be to satisfy management demands regarding security control
implementation.
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5.4.9 Investigation Record Template: Problems and Benefits
Subsequent interview questions were used to query individuals about any problems or ben-
efits experienced using the revised investigation record template. The participant’s answers
suggested that they encountered some problems with documenting and completing various
fields within the investigation record template. These fields include the ‘Date Reported’
field, the ‘Lessons Learned’ fields, the ‘Contact Information’ section fields, the ‘Date of
Discovery’ field and the ‘How Many Hours Working’ field.
Four individuals indicated that they had encountered problems completing the ‘Lessons
Learned’ fields within the investigation record template. These four individuals stated that
they found it difficult to identify and document security controls to prevent a future recur-
rence of the problem. The individuals attributed this problem to a lack of awareness sur-
rounding the security controls actually implemented within the organisation. The individu-
als argued that without knowing enough about security controls actually implemented within
the organisation, it can be difficult to suggest improvements. Currently, security analysts in
other parts of the Information Security unit will identify and implement security controls
based on requests from information security managers. This is done because of a segrega-
tion of duties policy, which exists within the organisation. One individual suggested that
either the security incident handlers are provided with additional training regarding what se-
curity controls are implemented within the organisation or that the security incident response
team includes an individual who has knowledge of these controls. The proposal is that this
individual would help the team to identify what controls are currently implemented and what
recommendations can be made to management to strengthen existing controls. This problem
provides an explanation as to why very little ‘actionable information’ was documented in
the ‘Lessons Learned’ fields. Segregation of duties is a classic security method to manage
conflicts of interest, fraud and the amount of power held by any one individual [54]. In the
security incident response context, it is there to prevent individuals from not applying se-
curity controls which are required to prevent a recurrence of a security incident. However,
the individual’s answers have suggested that this segregation of duties policy has impacted
the completeness of information in the security investigation record. In this case the organ-
isation needs to trade-off the segregation of duties policy with the data capture requirement
for the security incident response team. An alternative would be to remove the requirement
for the security incident response team to document security control failure, and prompt the
individuals implementing the control to gather information about which control failed and
what modifications were required to improve it. This way, the information captured about
security control failure and the segregation of duties policy is both sustained.
Three individuals stated that they had encountered problems with identifying and document-
ing contact information about the employee who has reported a security problem to the se-
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curity incident response team. These individuals noted that because the reporting of security
problems within the organisation can come from various sources (including through word of
mouth), often the incident response team will only have the employee’s forename and sur-
name available. When this information is used to lookup the employee in the organisation’s
electronic address book, a common problem that is encountered is that many fields within the
address book are either missing or contain incomplete information. This finding shows that
the quality of data in the organisation’s address book directly impacts the security incident
response team’s ability to document the information they require for their process.
Two individuals answered that they had encountered difficulties in identifying information
for the ‘Date of Discovery’ and ‘Date Reported’ fields within the investigation record tem-
plate. When asked to elaborate further, these individuals stated that employees are sometimes
unaware of how or when to report a security problem to the incident response team. One of
these participants added that in their experience, employees can often take a long time to
report a security problem. As a result, when the report is eventually made to the security
incident response team and employees are queried on the ‘Date of Discovery’, they can of-
ten reply that they are unsure or cannot remember the exact date when the problem was first
discovered.
Another difficulty experienced by two individuals concerns the identification of information
within the ‘Date Reported’ field. The individuals argued that because security problems are
often reported via word of mouth, this can usually involve as many as three or four individ-
uals being notified of the problem before it actually reaches the security incident response
team. As a result, when attempts are made to obtain the true ‘Date Reported’ information, the
team finds it difficult to track all the individuals who the problem was reported to, in an effort
to obtain the actual date. Instead, the team has to document the date that the team receives the
actual report. Interviewees suggested that the information within the ‘Date Reported’ field
could be more accurate if employees are made aware to report security problems directly to
the incident response team. Although 100% ‘actionable information’ was identified in both
the ‘Date of Discovery’ and ‘Date Reported’ fields, the answers from the individuals above
suggest that some of the dates stored in these fields do not report the true dates that they are
supposed to represent.
Two individuals stated that they had problems completing the ‘How Many Hours Working’
field within the record template. The problem raised by both individuals is that when multiple
incident handlers are working on the same investigation it can become difficult to calculate
the number of hours each incident handler has contributed to the investigation. Hence, these
individuals revealed that in such scenarios, it could be difficult to identify the exact number
of hours that both incident handlers consumed on the investigation.
All seven participants agreed that they had experienced a benefit in using the revised inves-
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tigation record template. The main benefit identified by the majority of the interviewees was
that when an investigation record is fully complete, it can provide a comprehensive picture of
a specific security problem resolved by the team. The interviewees added that a complete in-
vestigation record can also provide a rich source of information for the Information Security
unit’s intelligence life-cycle. This is a process where the Fortune 500 Organisation collects
and processes security information from various sources and produces intelligence for its
management to make strategic information security decisions. One individual added that
more information was now being captured using the revised investigation record template,
when compared to the previous investigation record template. This individual went on to
state that this enhanced information allowed the security incident response team to identify
trends and themes surrounding the threat landscape, as well as which parts of the organisa-
tion are affected the most by particular security problems. All seven individuals answered
that the revised security investigation record template assisted the overall investigation pro-
cess. The main reason provided is that when compared to the original template, the revised
investigation record template captures more relevant information using a standardised ap-
proach.
While all seven interviewees appeared to suggest that they had experienced some benefit
with using the revised investigation record template, concerns were also raised that incident
handlers encountered difficulties in capturing specific data for the investigation record. How-
ever, an observation from the individual’s responses is that the data capture problems were
nearly always caused by someone else’s (lack of) actions within the organisation. This indi-
cator suggests that there is a blame culture within the organisation [191]. This is a problem
which has been identified in the financial services industry in previous case studies [192,193]
and will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.5.2.
5.4.10 Security Incident Response Metric Analysis
In Section 4.3.3 of the exploratory case study, two metrics were calculated the response time
and the total time to resolve. Response time is defined as the period of time from the first
report of a security problem to the implementation of the first mitigating actions [108]. The
total time to resolve is defined as the time from when the security problem was reported
to when the investigation was closed [108]. A limitation identified in the exploratory case
study was that the calculated metrics only incorporated a small proportion of the investi-
gation records in the organisation’s security incident response database. For the response
time analysis, 28% of the investigation records contained information for this calculation,
while 36% of the investigation records contained information for the total time to resolution
calculation. As a result of the small number of investigation records included in the metric
calculations, there is the possibility that the results from the exploratory case study do not
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provide an accurate representation of the organisation’s security incident response perfor-
mance. Therefore, in order to investigate this claim, this section will revisit the above metric
calculations and present the results of new metric calculations using data collected from the
experiment (the post-implementation analysis). The purpose of this new analysis was to
investigate whether the new metrics calculated, using a more complete dataset of security
investigation records, presented a more accurate representation of the organisation’s security
incident response performance.
Response Time Analysis
To calculate the response time metric in the post-implementation analysis, information was
used from the ‘Date Reported’, ‘Time Reported’, ‘Date Opened’ and ‘Time Opened’ fields.
Although ‘actionable information’ was documented in all four fields within the 324 inves-
tigation records, the information within 21 investigation records was disregarded. This was
because the response time values calculated from these 21 investigation records were a neg-
ative number. This means that the information recorded in the date and time opened fields
was before the date and time the problem was actually reported. Therefore, information from
303 (94%) out of the 324 records was used in the calculation of this metric.
The results from the post-implementation response time calculation show that the minimum
response time was zero minutes and the maximum response time was 39,840 minutes (27
days). Therefore, the mean average response time calculated was 2,516 minutes (1.74 days).
The results also show that using the documented investigation record information, the secu-
rity incident response team took mitigating actions within 60 minutes for 37% of the security
investigations and within 8520 minutes (5.91 days) for about 90% of the investigations. Fig-
ure 5.10 compares the distribution of response times for the investigation records used in the
post-implementation calculation with the distribution of response times from the exploratory
case study calculation.
Figure 5.10 shows that in comparison with the response time calculations from the ex-
ploratory case study, the total duration of the longest response time is several times longer
in the post-implementation calculation. The longest response time in the exploratory case
study was 325 minutes, while the longest response time in the post-implementation calcula-
tion was 39,840 minutes. Only 28% of the investigation records in the post-implementation
calculation were responded to within 325 minutes. While these results suggest a degrading
security incident response team performance, the results from the post-implementation cal-
culation could also provide a more accurate indication of the team’s true performance. While
52 (of 188, 27.6%) investigation records were used in the exploratory case study calculation,
303 (of 324, 93.5%) investigation records were used in the post-implementation calculation.
With more data being available in the post-implementation calculation, it is plausible that
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Figure 5.10: Response Time Analysis for 303 records
the new results from the response time analysis provide a better reflection of the security
incident response team’s ‘response time’ performance.
In order to further investigate the plausibility of the new data, the analysis then focused
on the number of investigation records responded to between 1 and 325 minutes for both
the exploratory case study and post-implementation calculations. This was the maximum
time for response during the exploratory case study calculations. This was done to obtain
a better understanding of the differences between the two metric calculations with regards
to the response times and plausibility of the new results. The post-implementation analysis
revealed that 18% of the analysed investigation records had a response time of ‘zero’ minutes,
which is considered implausible within the organisation. Therefore, this analysis excluded
the investigation records where the response time was zero minutes. Figure 5.11 presents the
results of this analysis.
The figure shows that up to about 100 minutes, the two curves are very similar. In fact, it
can be argued that the shape of the two curves shows that the enhanced investigation record
template implemented within this experiment has not significantly altered the data recorded
for the analysis of this metric between 0-5 hours. Given that response times for greater than
325 minutes in the post-implementation investigations follow a similar trend, this suggests
that this portion of the data can be considered reliable.
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Figure 5.11: Response Time Analysis Within 325 Minutes
Total Time to Resolve Analysis
In the post-implementation analysis, the Total Time to Resolve (TTR) metric was calculated
using information recorded in the ‘Date and Time Reported’ fields and the ‘Date and Time
Closed’ fields. Information from 317 (98%) out of the 324 records was used in this metric
calculation. Seven records were disregarded because the TTR calculated from these records
was a negative value. This means that the information recorded in the ‘Date and Time Re-
ported’ fields was after the information recorded in the ‘Date and Time Closed’ fields. The
identification of these seven records suggested that any metric calculated using the informa-
tion in the remaining 317 records should be treated with caution, as data quality issues could
exist within these investigation records.
The analysis of the 317 records showed that the minimum TTR was half a day and the maxi-
mum TTR was 208 days. Therefore, the mean average TTR was 23.41 days. A comparative
analysis was then undertaken to compare the TTR results from the exploratory case study
calculation, with the TTR results from the post-implementation calculation. Figure 5.12
presents the results from this comparative analysis.
The results of the comparative analysis showed that investigations analysed in the post-
implementation calculations were taking longer to resolve when compared to investigations
analysed in the exploratory case study. In the exploratory case study, 60% of investigations
were resolved within five days, while in the post-implementation calculation only 35% of
investigations were resolved in five days. Similarly, in the exploratory case study calcu-
lation, 81% of investigations were resolved within 20 days but in the post-implementation
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Figure 5.12: Total Time to Resolve Comparison Analysis
calculation, only 67% of investigations were resolved in 20 days.
Similar to the response time analysis, an extended analysis was also undertaken examining
the TTR calculations from the exploratory case study and post-implementation calculations.
In the exploratory case study, the results showed that 100% of the investigations were re-
solved in 130 days. Therefore, the extended TTR analysis focused on the number of inves-
tigations from the post-implementation calculation, which were resolved in 130 days. The
results of this analysis were then compared to the findings from the exploratory case study
calculations and the results are presented in Figure 5.13.
In summary, the results suggest that the security incident response team is now taking longer
to resolve security investigations in the post-implementation calculation. However, one pos-
sible explanation to this increase in resolution time is that the security incident response team
is now focusing more attention on enhancing data capture. In particular, more attention could
now be paid to recording information about the timing of an investigation more accurately.
Therefore, while these investigations appear to be taking longer to ‘resolve’, more detailed
information is now being captured, which shows a clearer picture of the resolution times of
investigations within the organisation.
Methods of Detection Analysis
As noted in Section 5.4.8, practitioners were queried about the potential benefit of using the
revised security investigation template implemented in the organisation. Individuals who
were interviewed stated that one of the benefits from the revised investigation record tem-
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Figure 5.13: Total Time to Resolve Analysis over 140 days
plate was that it provided a better source of information for the organisation’s information
security intelligence life-cycle. An example provided by one of the individuals was that the
investigation records now allow the security incident response team to determine the methods
used to detect/report security problems within the organisation.
Industrial surveys [41, 43, 194] have suggested that given the workload of an average secu-
rity incident response team, a key metric for an organisation is to determine the methods of
detection and reporting within security incident response. The purpose behind this metric
calculation is to determine the level of automation in the identification and detection of secu-
rity problems and how many of these problems require manual discovery or reporting [194].
The calculation of this metric was not possible in the exploratory case study because the
organisation was not capturing the required information. However, the metric can now be
calculated using information from the post-implementation data, which has been recorded in
the ‘Reported By’ field. ‘Actionable information’ within this field was available in all 324
investigation records. Table 5.6 presents an overview of the results. The table shows that
five main methods of identification/detection/discovery/reporting were found within the 324
investigation records.
The table shows that 162 security problems were brought to the attention of the security
incident response team through direct employee reporting to the team. Internal notifications
and third-party notifications to the team accounted for ten security problems. This means that
172 out of the 324 (53%) investigation records were as a result of ‘manual reporting’. These
forms of reporting included via email, verbally or through the telephone directly to the team.
Information from 152 out of the 324 (47%) investigation records showed that some level of
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Detection/Identification/Reporting Method Number of Investigations
Detected by Data Loss Prevention System 54
Detected by Email Content Filter System 98
Employees Reporting to SIRT 162
Internal Notifications to SIRT 5
Third-party Notifications to SIRT 5
Total 324
Table 5.6: Total Time to Resolve Comparison Analysis
automated detection/reporting does exist within the organisation. 98 security problems were
identified to the team via the organisation’s email content filter and 54 security problems
were identified to the team by the data loss prevention system.
5.5 Discussion
The results from the data analysis have raised several points for discussion with regards to
using a revised investigation record template to collect data of value to a security incident
response team and removing classification ambiguity using a well-defined security incident
taxonomy. These points of discussion include the organisational factors influencing data
capture, the importance of security education within security incident response teams, con-
solidated data quality improvement, incentives for security incident reporting, and difficulties
in classifying investigations upfront.
5.5.1 Organisational Factors Influencing Data Capture
The data analysed from the experiment has revealed several organisational factors that has
influenced the capture of specific data in the investigation record, as well as the classification
of security events and incidents. The consequences of these factors are particularly evident
in the amount of none-actionable information in the Lessons Learned field, as well as the an-
swers provided by incident handler’s, who stated that their failure to capture security control
information was because it is ‘someone else’s job’. These observations from the experiment
results suggests the prominence of a ‘blame culture’ within the organisation.
According to Khatri, et al. a blame culture is a “set of norms and attitudes within an or-
ganisation characterised by an unwillingness to take risks or accept responsibility for mis-
takes because of a fear of criticism or management admonishment” [191]. Khatri, et al. go
on to state that “an organisation does not purposefully choose a blame culture, but rather,
such a culture evolves out of a bureaucratic management style that is highly rule-oriented,
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compliance-driven, and focused on assigning blame or accountability to individuals even for
system-level failures” [191]. A blame culture will force individuals to protect themselves by
shifting blame and more importantly, hindering continuous improvement [191, 193]. While
these findings suggest that a blame culture could be one reason why information was not
correctly captured, it would also be appropriate to examine how the ‘culture of information
security teams’ relates to the findings.
While the fear of blame is certainly a barrier as to why certain information was not captured,
there could also exist other deep-seated socio-cultural problems within the security incident
response team [195]. These can include security incident handlers not understanding their
responsibilities, relationship to the wider role of information security within the organisation,
and generally not understanding their task and function [196]. It is also worth remembering
that the requirements regarding information which was not captured or investigations which
were not correctly classified, was all documented in the security incident response policy
and related documentation. Hence, managers also need to be held responsible for the failure
in compliance of the policies as they are traditionally responsible for the implementation of
the policy in their teams and units.
5.5.2 Security Education within Incident Response Teams
As discussed in Chapter three, several security incident response approaches have been pub-
lished providing guidance to security incident response teams [7–9, 12, 13, 109, 185]. Some
of these approaches highlight that extended incident response preparation and training can
provide new security incident handlers with the necessary skills to undertake their work;
broaden the abilities of existing incident handlers and generally ensure that a security in-
cident response team’s skill set is up-to-date with emerging threats, trends and technolo-
gies [108]. This means that security education within security incident response teams can
cover an array of topics including knowledge transfer, other security processes, every day
activities of organisational units who collaborate with the team, as well as the results of
potential risk assessments.
The importance of security education and training to enhance the quality of data in secu-
rity investigation records has been highlighted at several points in the experiment. First,
during the analysis of the investigation records examining the information documented in
the ‘Lessons Learned’ fields, it was identified that much of the information recorded was
‘non-actionable’. When incident handlers were queried about this, they argued that they had
very little knowledge about the security controls actually implemented within the organisa-
tion and therefore, found it difficult to suggest improvements. In addition, when incident
handlers were shown five examples from the 25 records, which were considered to be ‘mis-
categorised’ during the follow-up interviews, the results suggest that there were still varied
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translations of the term ‘security event’ and ‘security incident’ within the organisation.
A potential explanation points to a lack security education and knowledge transfer. The defi-
nitions and categories were developed using input from one of the organisation’s information
security managers. It was anticipated that the manager would transfer any knowledge with
regards to the definitions, the sub-categories and their translations directly to the security in-
cident response team. The results from the experiment suggest that this knowledge transfer
may not have completely taken place. Evidence for this suggestion comes from the follow-
up interviews, where the incident handlers provided varied interpretations of terms ‘security
event’ and ‘security incident’, even though these terms were defined in the documented pro-
cess within the organisation.
Another example where enhanced security education could have benefited the quality of data
generated using the revised investigation template was during the identification of security
controls. The analysis of the investigation records showed that only eleven records contained
information about security controls to prevent recurrence. Within the follow-up interviews,
practitioners indicated that one of the reasons why this field was not completed was because
incident handlers did not know enough about the security controls implemented within the
organisation. As a result, these individuals argue that before they can propose security con-
trol improvements, they need to know more about what is currently implemented within the
organisation. This again points to a wider security education issue. Although many of the
incident handlers identify themselves as ‘security analysts’ or ‘senior security analysts’, spe-
cific interview questions established that their primary job role is within security incident
response. There are however, specific individuals within the organisation whose job role
includes the implementation and review of security controls. Therefore, there is a need to
transfer knowledge from these individuals to the security incident response team. This need
has only emerged as a result of reviewing and improving the quality of data captured with
regards to security control implementation. There are two possible solutions. Either the
security incident response team receive training in the security controls implemented in the
organisation, or an individual who is aware of the security controls implemented within the
organisation is integrated into the security incident response team.
5.5.3 Consolidated Data Quality Improvement Initiatives
The data analysis of the security investigation records showed that 140 (43%) out of the 324
investigation records were missing information from the ‘Reporting and Contact informa-
tion’ section of the investigation record. The purpose of these fields is to document the name
and contact information of the individual who has reported a security problem to the security
incident response team. Three individuals interviewed during the experiment stated that they
had encountered difficulties in actually obtaining contact information about the employee
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who had reported a security problem to the security incident response team. This is because
when this information is used to lookup the employee in the organisation’s electronic address
book, a common problem that is encountered is that many fields within the address book are
either missing or contain incomplete information.
While the security incident response team are not the asset owners of the organisation’s elec-
tronic address book, their use of the information in this asset directly impacts the quality of
data in their own security investigation records. The findings from the investigation records
analysis and interviews suggest that other organisational processes and data sources can im-
pact the security incident response team. However, research in this thesis specifically focused
on improving the quality of data generation within security incident response and data qual-
ity problems outside this domain fall outside the scope of the thesis. Therefore, a suggestion
which arises from this discussion is that organisations should look to address data quality
issues in all processes which input data either directly or indirectly into a security incident
response process and not just those which are used by the team during their investigations.
5.5.4 Lack of Incentives for Incident Reporting
Two participants from the follow-up interviews noted that they had encountered difficulties
in identifying the ‘Date of Discovery’ for particular security investigations. The participants
explained that this was a problem because employees who reported security problems, often
found it difficult to recall when the problem was first discovered. The participants suggested
that employees may not recognise that a particular security problem could have regulatory
implications for the organisation and therefore, may not prioritise its reporting. In addition,
if a particular security problem has been on-going for a period of time it may be difficult for
employees to recall the exact date when the issue was first discovered.
Jaatun, et al. [122] argue that employees within organisations need to be aware of their re-
sponsibilities to send alerts about potential security incidents to relevant teams as soon as
possible. However, as the results from the experiment show, in reality this can become a
challenge for security incident response teams. One solution to this problem could be the in-
troduction of an incentive to report security problems in a timely manner. This incentive can
be either positive (e.g. an increased financial bonus) or negative (e.g. a decreased financial
bonus) depending on the enforcement of the incentive [197].
5.5.5 Difficulties Affecting Upfront Investigation Classification
The results from the analysis of the ‘miscategorised’ investigation records have highlighted
the complexity of security incident response when incident handlers attempt to classify a se-
curity investigation upfront. During the follow-up interviews, when incident handlers were
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shown examples of ‘miscategorised’ investigation records, they requested more information
from the investigation record before they could assign a classification. Within the first ex-
ample of a ‘miscategorised’ investigation record (Example 1), one of the incident handlers
answered that they would have used a different classification if the third-party involved had
sufficient controls in place to prevent additional data leakage. Likewise in Example 4, one
of the incident handlers stated that they would have requested further information about who
should have access to the information in the parent organisation. In both these examples, the
requested information would have required some form of investigation to take place. With-
out this information, incident handlers have argued that they would have found it difficult to
classify these investigations upfront, which is what is required in a typical security incident
response process.
5.6 Summary
This chapter presented an experiment to evaluate the use of a well-defined security incident
taxonomy and revised security investigation record template within the Fortune 500 Organi-
sation. The purpose of the experiment was to evaluate if the taxonomy and the investigation
record template help to collect data, which has value to the security incident response team
within the organisation.
The results from the experiment have shown that the introduction of a well-defined security
incident taxonomy can help reduce any investigation classification uncertainty at the start
of an investigation. However, the analysis of the investigation records showed that some
uncertainty still exists in the organisation with regards to investigation classification. 25
out of the 324 analysed investigation records from the experiment were ‘miscategorised’ by
the security incident response team. When the issue was discussed during the follow-up
interviews, security incident handlers revealed that various translations of the terms ‘security
event’ and ‘security incident’ still exist within the organisation. One potential explanation as
to why this has occurred is because the information security manager who helped to define
the terms did not transfer their knowledge across to the security incident response team who
use the definitions on a daily basis.
In addition to evaluating a well-defined security incident taxonomy, the experiment also eval-
uated a revised security investigation record. The results from this part of the experiment are
encouraging. The results show that the addition of the revised investigation record template
has enhanced the overall investigation process and incident handlers are now documenting
more detailed information about a security investigation. Practitioners have suggested that
the revised investigation record template also provides a more comprehensive picture of the
investigation undertaken, when compared to the information from the previous investigation
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record template.
However, the results from the experiment have also identified that even when a security in-
cident response team is given the correct tools to collect enhanced information for incident
learning, other factors can prevent this from occurring. It is only through the process of im-
proving the investigation record template and enhancing the information captured during an
investigation that this has become apparent. The results from the analysis of the ‘actionable
information’ within specific fields revealed that contact information about employees who
have reported or detected a security problem was not well documented. When queried about
this problem in the follow-up interviews, incident handlers argued that this was because there
was a data quality problem with the organisation’s electronic address book. This is used by
the team to locate employee information when they report a security problem. The finding
suggested that organisations that are attempting to improve data quality within security inci-
dent response, need to also address data quality issues with other processes which can input
data into security incident response.
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Chapter 6
Using Retrospectives to Validate and
Enhance Security Investigations
Chapter three established that many security incident response approaches include a ‘follow-
up’ phase, where an organisation can reflect and learn from a security investigation. How-
ever, little research has been conducted to examine tools and techniques for this purpose.
Chapter four presented evidence that one of the areas where the Fortune 500 Organisation’s
security incident response process could be improved was within its ‘post-incident’ phase.
One of these opportunities was the development of lessons learned and the capture of addi-
tional information to help with security incident learning. This chapter presents an experi-
ment where a lightweight measure, the retrospective, was implemented within the Fortune
500 Organisation’s security incident response process. The purpose of the experiment was
twofold. First, the experiment was used to evaluate if a retrospective can help a security inci-
dent response team validate information that has been collected from a security investigation.
Second, the retrospective was evaluated to determine if it can be used to collect additional
information that may have been missed during an investigation without requiring substantial
extra resources. It is anticipated that the information collected from the retrospective would
help enhance security incident learning within an organisation.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 introduces retrospectives and discusses
how they have been used within software development. Section 6.2 describes how retro-
spectives and a ‘retrospective of retrospectives’ (meta-retrospective) were adapted for use
within the organisation’s security incident response team. Section 6.3 outlines the experi-
ment design and defines the experiment’s research questions. Sections 6.4 and 6.5 present
the data collected from the retrospectives and meta-retrospectives respectively which were
implemented in the Fortune 500 Organisation. Section 6.6 examines the impact of the ret-
rospectives through a qualitative and quantitative data collection. Section 6.7 discusses the
main findings from the experiment and Section 6.8 summarises the chapter.
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6.1 Retrospectives within Software Development
The last principle within the agile manifesto proposes that “at regular intervals, the team
reflects on how to become more effective, then tunes and adjusts its behaviour accordingly”
[198]. The basis for this principle is that no software development process is perfect and
that agile development teams will encounter new and unique situations whenever they take
on software projects [199]. As a result, agile software development teams are encouraged to
continually inspect, reflect and adapt their development processes to match their changing
situations and environments [199–203].
A common technique used by agile software development teams to inspect, reflect on and
adapt processes and practices is the retrospective [204]. Retrospectives are typically held at
the end of a Sprint (a development iteration) [204]. Pham and Pham define retrospectives as
a “meeting during which a Scrum team will go through what worked and what did not work
during the Sprint they have just finished and determine whether there is anything they can
learn from their experience that will make the process even better for the next Sprint” [205].
Although this definition suggests that retrospectives are a part of the Scrum methodology, ret-
rospectives also play important roles in eXtreme Programming [206] and Crystal Clear [207].
In addition to finding ways to improve, agile teams can also use retrospectives to understand
the reasons behind missed targets, findings ways to improve responses to customers and re-
building damaged relationships [204]. Numerous methods have been proposed for gathering
data during a retrospective, including using colour coded dots, ‘mad sad glad’ and satisfac-
tion histograms [204]. However, a retrospective can also be implemented by simply asking
an agile team three questions [208]:
• What worked well during this iteration and that we want to continue doing?
• What did not work well during this iteration that we should stop doing?
• What should we start doing to improve?
The answers to these three questions can then be collected and analysed to determine what
actionable changes can be implemented, which would allow an agile team to continue to the
next iteration with an incrementally-improved process [208].
Several studies have examined the impact of retrospectives on agile teams [200, 209, 210].
Maham [200] studied how an agile Scrum team performed retrospectives after a three-week
Sprint. The results from the study showed that the team members highlighted what had
worked well and what could be improved on from the previous Sprint. Areas of improve-
ment were then prioritised and implemented in the next Sprint [200]. Maham noted that the
success of the practice resulted in the team performing ‘release retrospectives’ at the end of
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each software version release [200]. The purpose of the ‘release retrospective’ was that it
provided the software development team with a high-level view of “where they had been and
how they had gone to their current location” [200].
Tiwari and Alikhan [209] reported that the agile team within their study found retrospectives
to be ineffective and boring. To help the team realise the value of retrospectives, Tiwari
and Alikhan changed the scope and method of the retrospectives and decided to include cus-
tomers and clients in the practice instead of just the agile team [209]. The perceived benefit
of this modification was that it would provide customers and clients with an opportunity
to hear first-hand about the team’s performance in the previous iterations [209]. Tiwari and
Alikhan reported that after a few retrospectives, the customers and clients began to contribute
to the retrospective and that these individuals noted that they felt like they were a part of the
agile team and could contribute towards the development of their product [209].
McHugh, et al [210] studied three agile teams to examine if agile practices can enhance trust
among team members. The results from this study showed that all three teams agreed that
retrospectives provide transparency and visibility regarding the achievement of Sprint goals.
In addition, the studied team members noted that retrospectives provided their teams with an
opportunity to seek clarification from each other when delays occur and what caused these
delays [210].
Multiple agile teams can often be working on the same product or project. Often, each
team will do their own retrospective and then look to conduct a retrospective of retrospec-
tives [211]. Gonc¸alves and Linders describe a retrospective of retrospectives as a method of
improving collaboration between the various teams [211]. Retrospectives of retrospectives
can also be viewed as a tool for sharing information between agile teams [211].
The success of retrospectives within software development motivated a proposal (from the
author) to employ retrospectives within security incident response. The intention was that
the retrospective would provide two benefits. First, the retrospectives would provide security
incident handlers with an opportunity to ‘take a step back’ from the complex environment
of a security investigation and allow them to reflect on the information documented during
the investigation. Second, the retrospectives could help a security incident response team
capture additional information about a security investigation.
As noted in Chapter three, one of the goals of the ‘follow-up’ phase within typical security in-
cident response approaches is that an organisation implements security controls and process
improvements that it identifies during the investigation [7,8,185]. However, these approaches
do not define how an organisation can identify or evaluate if the improvements identified
during the ‘follow-up’ phase are actually implemented or if the modifications were effective.
Therefore, a retrospective of retrospectives (hereafter referred to as a meta-retrospective)
was also introduced into the organisation’s security incident response process. Based on the
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approach proposed by Gonc¸alves and Linders [211], a meta-retrospective was used to evalu-
ate if security controls and incident response-related process improvements identified in the
retrospectives were actually implemented within an organisation.
6.2 Retrospectives Within Security Incident Response
This section describes how retrospectives and meta-retrospectives were adapted for use within
security incident response and then implemented within the Fortune 500 Organisation. The
retrospective consisted of six questions. The objective of the six questions was to estab-
lish ‘What worked well?’, ‘What did not work well?’ and ‘What should we start doing or
improve?’. The six questions used in the retrospectives are shown in Figure 6.1.
1. Which information assets did you need to investigate in this security event/ inci-
dent?
2. Which information asset could you not investigate in this security event/ incident?
3. Who did you need to communicate with during this security event/ incident?
4. Who could you not communicate with during this security event/ incident?
5. What information security controls could have prevented the security event/ inci-
dent from occurring?
6. What process changes would help you investigate a similar security event/incident
in the future?
Figure 6.1: Security Incident Response Retrospective Questions
Questions 1 and 3 are used to identify ‘What worked well’ regarding any information assets
and individuals involved in the investigation. Information assets are defined as previously
(in Chapter 3) for the purpose of this experiment. Questions 2 and 4 are used to identify
‘What did not work well’ during the investigation. Question 2 is used to identify from the
incident handler what information assets could not be included in the investigation, while
Question 4 is used to identify which individuals within the organisation, the incident han-
dler had problems communicating with during an investigation. Questions 5 and 6 are used
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to identify, ‘What should we start doing or looking to improve’. These two questions fo-
cus on identifying security control improvements to prevent recurrence and security incident
response-related process improvements to assist security incident handlers with a similar in-
vestigation in the future. Question 5 probes the identification and documentation of one or
more security controls, which could have prevented the security event/incident from occur-
ring. Question 6 provides an opportunity for the incident handler to identify security incident
response-related process improvements to assist in future investigations.
In software development, retrospectives are typically held at the end of a development iter-
ation [204]. However, unlike agile software development where work is broken down into
iterations, security incident response investigations generally ‘pause’ at the end of an inves-
tigation (i.e. the end of the process life-cycle). Therefore, the retrospectives within security
incident response in the organisation were conducted at the end of each security investiga-
tion. This was typically within one to three days after the closure of the investigation record
by an incident handler. In practice, just under 92% of the retrospectives were held within this
time frame and the longest time between the closure of an investigation and a retrospective
was seven days. This time period was proposed and agreed upon with the organisation’s
Head of Information Security.
The meta-retrospective was also adopted for use within security incident response and con-
sisted of asking two questions as shown in Figure 6.2. The purpose of the meta-retrospective
within security incident response is to evaluate if the security controls and/or security inci-
dent response-related process improvements identified during the retrospectives are imple-
mented within an organisation. Therefore, a meta-retrospective is only undertaken when a
security incident handler identifies a security control and/or process improvement during the
initial retrospective. If the control or improvement had not been implemented, then a query
was made as to why the change had not happened. Meta-retrospectives were undertaken with
the same incident handler(s) involved in the initial retrospective. It was planned to conduct a
meta-retrospective between three to four weeks after the initial retrospective was undertaken.
100% of the meta-retrospectives were undertaken within this time period. This time period
would allow the organisation to implement the improvements identified in the retrospective.
The specific time period was used based on the requirements of the organisation’s Head of
Information Security.
Typically in a software development context, a retrospective is performed with all the mem-
bers of an agile team present at the same time [204, 208]. As a result, an agile team can
view the outcomes from the retrospective and collectively decide on how to improve in the
next iteration [208]. However, security incident response within the organisation is typically
undertaken by only one security incident handler. Therefore, a briefing was used to discuss
the collective results from the retrospectives and meta-retrospectives at the end of the ex-
periment. The briefing also provided the security incident handlers and their managers an
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opportunity to reflect on the data collected from the retrospectives and meta-retrospectives.
The next section will discuss the experiment design explaining how the retrospectives and
meta-retrospectives were implemented within the Fortune 500 Organisation.
1. Have the security controls you identified in the retrospective been implemented?
If No, why not?
2. Have the process improvements you identified in the retrospective been made? If
No, why not?
Figure 6.2: Meta-Retrospective Questions
6.3 Experiment Design
An experiment was devised based on the on-going case study in the Fortune 500 Organisa-
tion, where the retrospectives and meta-retrospectives were implemented within the organi-
sation’s security incident response team. Three research questions guided the experiment:
1. Do retrospectives help a security incident response team to identify and document ad-
ditional information about a security investigation, which may otherwise not be docu-
mented within the corresponding investigation record?
2. Do retrospectives help a security incident response team to identify and document
security controls and security incident response-related process improvements?
3. To what extent can a meta-retrospective highlight how many security controls and
security incident response-related process improvements are actually implemented
within an organisation?
An experiment was designed as follows. The author performed face-to-face retrospectives
with the Primary Incident Handler(s) (PIHs) identified from the particular investigation record
as being involved in a security investigation. This involved the author asking the PIHs the six
questions as shown in Figure 6.1. Recall from Chapter four, that a PIH is an individual who
facilitates and coordinates the organisation’s response to a security event/incident. During a
retrospective, PIHs were allowed to open and view the corresponding investigation record.
Responses to the retrospective questions were initially recorded by hand and then digitally
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documented. Each retrospective lasted approximately ten minutes and was conducted at the
PIH’s desk.
A total of 324 retrospectives were undertaken between February 2014 and March 2015.
These retrospectives were conducted with six individuals identified as the PIHs from the in-
vestigation records. 321 out of the 324 retrospectives were conducted with only one PIH. One
retrospective was conducted with two PIHs and two retrospectives were conducted with three
PIHs. The security incident response team uses multiple PIHs when a large-scale security
investigation arises within the organisation. The data collected from the 324 retrospectives
is presented in Section 6.4.
The organisation was given the opportunity to implement any security controls and/or se-
curity incident response-related process improvements identified in the retrospective. Any
changes to security controls and security incident response-related processes were initiated
based on the recommendations from the PIHs. These controls were implemented together
with the support of the individuals within the Information Security unit who are responsi-
ble for security control and security-related process implementation. A meta-retrospective
was then undertaken to examine if the control or process improvement that had been identi-
fied in the original retrospective was implemented within the organisation. If the control or
process improvement had not been implemented, PIHs were asked to explain why. A total
of 48 meta-retrospectives were undertaken within the organisation. Each meta-retrospective
lasted approximately five minutes and was conducted at the PIH’s desk. The PIH’s responses
were initially recorded by hand and then digitally documented. The results of the meta-
retrospectives are presented in Section 6.5.
The briefing was then undertaken with the PIHs who participated in the retrospectives and
meta-retrospectives, as well an information security manager. This provided the security
incident response team together with their managers an opportunity to reflect on the data
generated from the retrospectives and meta-retrospectives. After the briefing, the final stage
of the experiment involved undertaking a qualitative and quantitative data collection in order
to analyse the effect and impact of the retrospectives on the security incident response team.
Qualitative data was collected using semi-structured interviews [30]. The purpose behind
the interviews was to gather the security incident response team’s opinion on the use of a
retrospective as a method for identifying and documenting further information from security
investigations. The interview participants consisted of the PIHs who had direct experience
with the retrospectives as well as the information security manager who had participated in
the briefing. The interviews were conducted in March 2015 and the interview instrument
consisted of a combination of open-ended and closed questions [30]. The follow-up inter-
view questions can be found in Appendix B.
In addition to the follow-up interviews, quantitative data was also collected through the
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analysis of the relevant security investigation records. The analysis involved comparing the
answers provided from each question in the retrospectives with the information documented
in the corresponding investigation record. The purpose of this analysis was to examine if
more or less information was being identified using the retrospective. This analysis was
undertaken for all 324 retrospectives and corresponding investigation records.
6.4 Retrospectives Data
This section describes the data collected from the 324 retrospectives undertaken within the
organisation.
Question 1: Which assets did you need to investigate in this security event/
incident?
This question was answered in all 324 retrospectives. A total of 502 information assets were
identified from this question. Further analysis of the data shows that 37 different information
assets were identified from the question. Table 6.1 provides an overview of these information
assets which have been grouped together according to their type or purpose to the organisa-
tion. A complete list of the assets which were identified from this question can be found in
Appendix E.
Asset Group Name Occurrences
Desktop, personal and laptop computers 6
Email assets and associated logs 280
Intranet and Internet-based assets 5
Network devices, servers and logs 15
Organisation-specific assets 7
Security-specific assets 162
Third-party assets 9
Various data repositories and databases 18
Total 502
Table 6.1: Information Assets Identified as Investigated in Retrospectives
The results from Table 6.1 show that the organisation’s security incident response team
require access to a range of information assets both within and outside the organisation.
The data indicates that a large number of security investigations involved the organisation’s
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Asset Name Total Reason Provided
Deleted email mes-
sages
1 Could not recover deleted emails because incident
handler together with relevant business unit could not
determine when to restore the affected email account.
Email attachments 3 Email attachments were missing because of a histor-
ical problem where certain attachments were deleted
several years ago.
Encrypted file contents 4 Lack of decryption keys because individual left or-
ganisation and decryption keys were deleted.
Laptop computer 1 Incident handler wanted to perform deeper analysis
but was not requested to undertake such an analysis.
Live email account 1 Could not access live email account because it was
disabled after the individual left the organisation.
Lotus Notes mail file 9 Data retention period had expired at the time of the
security investigation.
Organisation-specific
system
1 System owner was not found during the course of the
investigation.
Virtual machines 1 Could not get physical access to the virtual machines
to perform a deeper analysis.
Windows Registry set-
tings
1 Lack of available tools
Table 6.2: Information Assets which could not be Investigated
‘Email assets and associated logs’ group. This group of assets were identified in 280 (55%)
out of the 502 information assets identified from this question in the retrospective. This re-
sult reflects the organisations use of Email as the primary method of communication both
within the organisation and to third-parties outside of the organisation.
Question 2: Which information asset could you not investigate in this security
event/incident?
Question two from the retrospectives was answered 18 times by the incident handlers. In the
remaining 306 retrospectives, the answer provided to this question was “None”. The incident
handlers identified that they had encountered problems investigating nine individual assets
during their security investigations. In total, 22 information assets were identified from the
18 retrospectives, with three of these assets repeatedly identified in multiple retrospectives.
Table 6.2 provides a breakdown of the information assets, which the incident handlers could
not investigate, along with the reason provided during the retrospective.
The table shows that the incident handlers identified several different information assets
which they could not investigate because of various reasons. These assets include virtual
machines that had since been deactivated, expired email accounts and missing email attach-
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ments due to expired retention periods. One observation from Table 6.2 is that in a number
of cases, the ability to investigate an asset is largely down to factors outside the control of
the security incident response team. For example, there were nine investigations where the
incident handlers required access to a Lotus Notes mail file. However, the data retention pe-
riod for these mail files had expired and therefore, was no longer available for examination.
It is also worth noting that in one retrospective, the incident handler indicated that the reason
why they could not investigate the contents of the Windows Registry was due to limited tool
access. This supports previous findings [27] that security incident response teams often need
to develop their own tools and use tacit knowledge to perform specific tasks within security
incident response.
Question 3: Who did you need to communicate with during this security event/
incident?
Question three was answered in all 324 retrospectives and the incident handlers indicated that
they needed to communicate with a total of 737 individuals or teams within the organisation
during their security investigations. Table 6.3 provides an overview of the individuals or
teams within the organisation, whose assistance was required during security investigations.
These security incident response contacts have been categorised according to the common
function they provide to the organisational structure. A complete list of the individuals or
organisational teams identified by the incident handlers in question three can be found in
Appendix E.
Individual/Organisational Team Identified Total
Customer-facing organisational units 21
Email and information technology services units 129
Individuals, managers and team leaders affected by incidents 323
Legal and regulatory requirements units 58
Physical and information security units 154
Software development and support units 10
Third-parties and contractors 42
Total 737
Table 6.3: Individuals and Organisational Teams Identified in Retrospectives
The data collected from question three shows that in addition to the individuals affected by
a security event or incident, their managers and team leaders (323 cases), the most common
teams within the organisation that the incident handlers needed to communicate with during
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security investigations are the Physical and Information Security units (154 cases) and the
Email and Information Technology Services units (129 cases). The findings from this ret-
rospective question support previous findings [43, 110, 212], that security incident response
teams need to collaborate with various individuals and organisational teams (often in var-
ious disciplines) when investigating security events and incidents. In addition, the results
also suggest that the incident handlers needed to communicate with individuals external to
the organisation including third-party vendors, Information Technology support teams and
external legal services (Third-parties and contractors).
Question 4: Who could you not communicate with during this security event/
incident?
The purpose of fourth question was to identify which individuals or teams within the organ-
isation the incident handlers had problems communicating with during a security investiga-
tion. The incident handlers identified five cases where communication was a problem during
an investigation. A total of four individuals were identified through this question, with one
individual being identified in two different retrospectives.
In four retrospectives, the individuals were information asset owners and their assistance
was required for gathering data from their information asset. In the fifth retrospective, the
individual’s assistance was required as he/she was a managerial figure for an individual af-
fected by a security event. The incident handler indicated that the communication problems
were caused by outdated contact information (four cases) and the individual concerned being
away on holiday (one case).
Question 5: What information security controls could have prevented the se-
curity event/incident from occurring?
Question five was used to identify whether one or more security controls, if implemented,
could have prevented the particular security event/incident from occurring. The incident
handlers identified a total of 36 security controls from 30 retrospectives. Moreover, there
were 179 “None” responses and 115 “Not-applicable” responses from the individuals in
response to this question.
Within 25 retrospectives, the incident handlers identified that a single security control could
have prevented the security event/incident, while in four retrospectives, the incident handlers
noted that two security controls would be required. There was one retrospective were three
security controls were identified from this question. The security controls identified in each
retrospective can be classified as belonging into one of three groups: technical security con-
trols, administrative security controls or a combination of these two types [54]. Within five
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ISO/IEC 27002 Domain Total Example
Access Control 9 Define administrative permissions for virtual
machines used in test development servers
Asset Management 2 Check all hardware for CD media prior to send-
ing for recycling
Communications Security 1 Enhanced logging on Network File System
share
Cryptography 2 Transport Layer Security to be implemented be-
tween organisation and third-party involved in
incident
Human Resources Security 4 Education re-enforcement surrounding Secure
Remote Access Service tokens and PIN num-
bers
Information Security Policies 4 Creation of new lock-down standard for web
server security
Operations Security 10 Block access to specific file-upload portal on
web gateway
Supplier Relationships 4 Third-party involved to implement technical
and procedural controls
Total 36
Table 6.4: Security Controls Identified in Retrospectives
retrospectives, the incident handlers indicated that a combination of administrative and tech-
nical security controls were required, while in 16 retrospectives, only technical controls were
recommended. In nine retrospectives, only administrative security controls were proposed.
In order to protect the confidentiality of the organisation’s implemented security controls, the
controls identified by the incident handlers in response to Question 5 are mapped to one of
the fourteen domains within the International Organization for Standardization/ International
Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) 27002 information security standard [6]. Table 6.4
presents the number of controls identified in eight of the domains from the standard, along
with an example security control identified during the retrospectives. This mapping shows
that 19 out of the 36 security controls identified from question 5 are related to ‘Access Con-
trol’ and ‘Operations Security’. This result reflects the organisational location of the security
incident response team within the Information Security unit, which is responsible for im-
plementing everyday operational security. The results also show that the incident handlers
prefer to focus on restricting access to information assets, through the enforcement of en-
hanced access controls.
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Question 6: What process changes would help you investigate a similar secu-
rity event/incident in the future?
Question six specifically attempts to identify security incident response-related process im-
provements, which would help the incident handlers investigate similar security problems
in the future. The incident handlers identified a total of 29 process improvements from 28
retrospectives. Within 27 retrospectives, the incident handlers identified a single process
improvement, while in one retrospective, the incident handlers identified two process im-
provements. The 29 process improvements can be categorised into one of four types. Four
of the process improvements would involve the creation of a new process within the or-
ganisation, e.g. the creation of a process for managing lost and stolen laptops within the
organisation. Eleven of the process improvements involved enhancing existing processes
within the organisation, which includes adding contact information for asset owners to the
organisation’s electronic address book. Eight of the process improvements identified by the
incident handlers involved the introduction of new tools and/or methods to assist the secu-
rity incident response team with future investigations. Six process improvements involved
changes to existing processes owned by other teams within the organisation, but affect the
security incident response team. An example of such a process improvement is modifying
existing email message recovery procedures so that attachments are included with all email
messages.
6.5 Meta-Retrospectives Data
Recall that questions five and six from the retrospectives were used to identify security con-
trols and security incident response-related process improvements. A total of 65 security
controls and security incident response-related process improvements were identified from
48 retrospectives. These improvements were identified as follows.
• Within 20 retrospectives, the incident handlers identified only a security control and no
process improvements. 23 security controls were identified in these 20 retrospectives.
• Within 18 retrospectives, the incident handlers identified only a process improvement
and no security controls. 18 process improvements were identified in these 18 retro-
spectives.
• Within 10 retrospectives, the incident handlers identified both a security control and a
process improvement. 13 security controls and 11 process improvements were identi-
fied in these 10 retrospectives.
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48 meta-retrospectives were undertaken in order to determine whether the security controls
and process improvements identified in the retrospectives had been implemented and if not,
determine why an enhancement was not made. The results from the meta-retrospectives
inquiries were categorised in the following manner:
• Change Made (CM) – the proposed security control or security incident response-
related process improvement was implemented within the organisation at the time of
the meta-retrospective.
• Change On-going (CO) – the implementation of the proposed security control or se-
curity incident response-related process improvement was still on-going at the time of
the meta-retrospective.
• Change After meta-retrospective (CA) – the implementation of the proposed security
control or security incident response-related process improvement was initiated during
or after the meta-retrospective.
• Escalated to Management (EM) – the implementation of the proposed security con-
trol or security incident response-related process improvement was escalated to senior
management within the Information Security unit for progression.
• No Changes (NC) – the proposed security control or security incident response-related
process improvement was not implemented.
Table 6.5 presents the results of the 48 meta-retrospectives. The table shows that 42 out of
the 65 security control and process improvements identified in the retrospectives were either
implemented in the organisation or their implementation was considered ‘on-going’ at the
time of the meta-retrospective. Two enhancements (one security control and one process im-
provement) resulted in no changes being implemented at the time of the meta-retrospective.
However, in both cases the PIHs started to take actions to implement these enhancements
shortly after the meta-retrospective. One possible explanation is that the act of the under-
taking a meta-retrospective may have prompted the PIHs to remember to take action with
regards to the implementation of these enhancements.
The results from the meta-retrospectives also identified that a security incident response team
can face numerous challenges when attempting to implement security controls and process-
related improvements. During the meta-retrospectives, the PIHs indicated that 15 out of
the 65 enhancements could not be implemented. As a result, these enhancements had to
be escalated to senior management within the Information Security unit. In all 15 cases,
senior management either assisted in the implementation of the proposed enhancement or
continued to champion the enhancement on behalf of the PIHs. This shows that although
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Meta-retrospective Type CM CO CA EM NC Total
Security control-only 15 5 1 2 0 23
Process improvement-only 5 2 1 6 4 18
Combination 10 5 0 7 2 24
Total 30 12 2 15 6 65
Key: CM = Change Made; CO = Change On-going; CA = Change After
meta-retrospective; EM = Escalated to Management; NC = No Changes
Table 6.5: Security Control and Process Improvement Implementation Status
a security incident response team may have autonomy within an organisation to identify,
manage and handle security incidents, the team may not necessarily have the authority to
change security controls to prevent recurrence.
Six out of the 65 security control and process-related improvements identified in the retro-
spectives resulted in ‘No Changes’ being made within the organisation. In all six cases, this
involved process-related improvements and not security controls. The reason provided was
that the security incident response team does not have authority over all the processes within
the organisation. When the security incident response team propose changes to processes
owned by other organisational teams, it is dependent upon that particular team to decide
whether it will modify its process or not to satisfy the security incident response team. For
example, a PIH identified that enhanced logging for a web-based system would assist with
investigating the system. However, while the system’s owners acknowledged the potential
benefit, a business decision was made not to implement more detailed logs and the risk as-
sociated with this decision was accepted by the organisation.
6.6 Measuring the Impact of Retrospectives
Recall, the aim of the experiment was to determine if retrospectives can be used by a security
incident response team to identify and document enhanced information at the conclusion
of a security investigation. In order to examine this further, qualitative and quantitative
data was collected from both the security incident response database and the individuals
involved in the experiment. Quantitative data was collected through analysing the relevant
investigation records and comparing the information documented within these records with
the information identified in the corresponding retrospective. This analysis was performed
for all 324 retrospectives. Qualitative data was collected through follow-up interviews with
practitioners who actively participated in the retrospectives, as well as those who had direct
experience with the retrospectives as security incident response process owners within the
organisation.
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The aim of the data collection was twofold. First, it was used to evaluate if a particular
retrospective identified more or less information when compared to its associated security
investigation record. Second, the follow-up interviews were conducted with the aim of gain-
ing a practitioner’s perspective on the use of retrospectives within security incident response.
6.6.1 Comparison of Retrospectives and Investigation Records
The comparison of the information identified from the retrospectives with the informa-
tion documented within the investigation records showed that more ‘information items’
were identified using the retrospectives than those found in the corresponding investiga-
tion records. The term ‘information item’ is used in this context to describe any information
asset, individual, group, security control or process improvement identified in either the ret-
rospective or investigation record.
The results show that 148 (46%) out of the 324 retrospectives contained more information
about an investigation when compared with the information documented in the correspond-
ing record. 151 (47%) out of the 324 retrospectives identified the same information about
an investigation as the information documented in the relevant record. Finally, 25 (7%) in-
vestigation records contained more information than what was actually identified using the
retrospectives. A detailed comparison of the ‘information items’ identified in each question
from the retrospective with the number of ‘information items’ documented in the correspond-
ing investigation record is shown in Table 6.6. Note for question three, that results have been
provided for a) where more information was identified using the retrospectives; and b) where
more information was identified in the investigation records.
Question Investigation Record Retrospective Total
Question 1 424 assets 78 additional assets 502
Question 2 11 assets 11 additional assets 22
Question 3a 601 individuals/groups 94 additional individuals/groups 695
Question 3b 34 additional individuals/groups 42 individuals/groups 76
Question 4 1 individual/group 4 additional individuals/groups 5
Question 5 11 security controls 25 additional security controls 36
Question 6 3 improvements 26 additional improvements 29
Table 6.6: Retrospective vs. Investigation Record Analysis Results
Retrospective Question 1
Within question one, the PIHs identified 502 information assets using the retrospectives. In
comparison, the analysis of the corresponding investigation records revealed that 424 infor-
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mation assets were documented within the records. 65 retrospectives contained more infor-
mation about information assets being required for inclusion in a security investigation than
what was documented in the investigation records. In terms of actual assets being identified,
78 additional information assets were identified from the 65 retrospectives. Furthermore,
259 retrospectives and investigation records contained the same information assets, while no
investigation record was found to contain more information than a retrospective.
Retrospective Question 2
The information analysed concerning question two showed that there were eleven retro-
spectives where the PIHs identified more information about the assets, which could not be
investigated. Within these eleven retrospectives, the PIHs identified 22 information assets.
The analysis of the corresponding investigation records revealed only half the number of
assets (11) than those in the retrospectives. The comparative results also showed that seven
retrospectives and investigation records contained the same information about assets which
could not be investigated.
Retrospective Question 3
The analysis of the information collected from question three showed that there were 80
cases where the PIHs identified more individuals and groups within the organisation using
the retrospectives than those documented within the investigation records. An additional 94
individuals and groups were identified in the 80 retrospectives, which were not documented
within the corresponding investigation records. However, the analysis also showed that there
were 25 instances where more information was documented within the investigation record
when compared with the information identified using the retrospective. As a result, an ad-
ditional 34 individuals and groups were identified in the investigation records from these
cases.
Retrospective Question 4
Regarding question four, answers to this question were only provided by the PIHs on five
occasions. Although this question was answered only five times, the analysis showed that
more information about individuals and groups where communication was a problem was
identified using the retrospectives than the investigation records. This proved to the case in
four out of the five retrospectives. In the remaining case, the information identified from the
retrospective was also found in the corresponding investigation record.
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Retrospective Question 5
With regards to question five, the analysis of the investigation records showed that eleven
security controls were documented within the investigation records. When compared to
the information in the retrospectives, 24 retrospectives contained more information than the
corresponding investigation records. In these retrospectives, a further 25 security controls
were identified. Six retrospectives and investigation records contained the same security
control, while no investigation record contained more information about the security controls
than the retrospective.
Retrospective Question 6
For question six, the comparative analysis showed that a total of 29 security incident response-
related process improvements were identified using the retrospectives. When the investiga-
tion records were analysed, only three process improvements were documented within the
records. This means that 26 additional process improvements were identified using the ret-
rospectives. The results suggest that PIHs are identifying process improvements during their
investigation but these improvements are not being documented in the investigation records.
This may because PIHs are be under time pressures to conclude their investigation and move
onto the next security problem. As a result, they may not have enough time during the initial
documentation of the investigation to identify process improvements which could help the
security incident response team. Further analysis was required to explore this assumption
and this was examined in the follow-up interviews.
6.6.2 Follow-Up Interview Analysis
The follow-up interviews were undertaken in March 2015. The objective of the follow-up
interviews was to assess the practitioner’s perspective on using retrospectives as a method
for validating and enhancing the quality of data within security incident response. Seven in-
dividuals were interviewed and the follow-up interview questions can be found in Appendix
B. The answers to the questions are summarised below.
Description of Participants
Initial questions established the participant’s current role in the organisation and provided
a brief idea of his/her role within the security incident response team. The answers from
these questions revealed that the participants identified themselves as information security
managers, senior security analysts and security analysts. One individual was a trainee infor-
mation security analyst. These individuals assume various roles within the security incident
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response team. These roles include managers who own and enforce the organisation’s se-
curity incident response process, as well as analysts who identify, investigate and eradicate
information security events and incidents. Six out of the seven individuals indicated that
they had participated in the retrospectives. The one individual, who did not participate, is
the security incident response policy owner, who had an overview of how the retrospectives
were implemented and undertaken within the organisation.
When the participants were asked if they were involved in any post-investigation activities
within the organisation, six out of the seven respondents indicated that they are involved in
various activities after an investigation has been closed. These activities can include iden-
tifying and improving security controls, reviewing and modifying existing security policies
and standards, analysing the risk associated with security incidents and escalating security
control recommendations to wider stakeholders. Two participants added that in addition
to the above activities, retrospectives were also considered to be a part of the organisa-
tion’s post-investigation activities. This result shows that the retrospectives have not yet
been fully recognised by all the individuals within the security incident response team as
a post-investigation activity, even though a retrospective was undertaken at the completion
of all the investigations during the experiment. One individual indicated that they had not
participated in any post-investigation activities because their role did not explicitly involve
such activities.
Perceptions of Briefing
The interviewees were then queried on their participation and perception of the briefing
discussion. Six out of the seven respondents participated in the briefing, with one individual
unable to attend due to time constraints. The participants’ responses indicated that there gen-
erally advantages with regards to the briefing and the data discussed. The positive answers
indicated that the briefing provided an alternative view of the security incident response data,
which was useful to identify patterns, themes and potential bottleneck areas. One of the re-
spondents indicated that the data assisted in highlighting where new processes and guidelines
for interacting with specific assets and individuals were required. This individual stated “the
retrospectives have highlighted that we have a lot of conversations and interactions with
the Lotus Notes team, nearly on a daily basis, yet we don’t have an actual process which
defines how this should be done, what data is actually available nor what we should do
when something goes wrong.” Another individual, whose job role includes examining how
information security risk changes within the organisation noted that “the data tells me we
should be looking to implement security processes at a much lower level than we are at the
moment, however this information is usually not shared with the relevant units and therefore
the changes are never actually implemented.” The one manager who did participate in the
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briefing, added that the data from the briefing has helped to highlight where management
needs to focus their attention with regards to the most common threats to the organisation.
Two out of the six respondents who participated in the briefing indicated that there are various
opportunities to enhance the briefing experience. One individual suggested they would have
liked to see the data from question six from the retrospectives presented into quarter periods
instead of the entire year. Another individual suggested that the data from question one from
the retrospectives was presented focusing on the types of investigations affecting the specific
assets. For example, the number of ‘security events’, which required the PIHs to have access
to the email server and the number of ‘security incidents’ which required the PIHs to have
access to the email server. The individual who made this suggestion stated that this type of
analysis could help management improve access to specific assets, which are considered to
be more important in overall security investigation objectives.
Using Retrospectives to Identify ‘What Worked Well’
The interviewees were then queried about using the retrospectives to identify ‘What Worked
Well’. Question 5 from the follow-up interview, was used to determine the benefits of us-
ing the retrospectives to identify ‘What Worked Well’ from the perspective of information
assets investigated and people communicated with during an investigation. The predomi-
nant answer from the majority of the interviewees was that this part of the retrospective has
helped to capture additional information, which can be used to identify frequency of asset
use and stakeholder involvement. One individual added that the information generated from
this part of the retrospective has also helped the security incident response team to identify
which teams within the organisation they must enhance and maintain relationships with in
the future. The suggestion was that building stronger relationships with the teams and in-
dividuals identified in this part of retrospective would assist with resolving investigations
quicker and more effectively. One information security manager also argued that this part of
the retrospective provided incident handlers with a second chance to document investigation
information, which can then be “rolled-up” and used to identify trends and gaps in current
practices.
Question 6 from the follow-up interview was used to determine the disadvantage of using the
retrospectives to identify ‘What Worked Well’ during an investigation. None of the respon-
dents indicated that there was a disadvantage to using the retrospective to identify and collect
this information. All seven participants stated that this part of the retrospective provided an
additional avenue for the PIHs to identify and document information, which may otherwise
not be documented within an investigation record. One information security manager added
that there can be no disadvantage to this part of the retrospective, provided that the informa-
tion collected is used by the PIHs to become more proactive in future investigations.
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Question 7 was used to determine the overall impact of using the retrospectives to identify
assets investigated and people communicated with during an investigation. The majority of
respondents stated that this part of the retrospective has had a positive influence on the secu-
rity incident response process. The respondents indicated that this part of the retrospective
can be used to enhance information capture with regards to important assets and stakeholders
required for investigations. However, one individual argued that this part of the retrospec-
tive could be better suited for more complex ‘security incidents’ instead of ‘simple events’,
which do not involve several assets and/or individuals during an investigation. When asked
to expand on this answer, the individual added that performing a retrospective for ‘simple
events’ does not justify the time required to actually undertake the activity.
Using Retrospectives to Identify ‘What Did Not Work Well’
Questions 8 to 10 queried the interviewee about using the retrospective to identify ‘What
Did Not Work Well’. Question 8 was used to determine any benefits of using retrospectives
to identify ‘What Did Not Work Well’ during an investigation. Five interviewees stated that
this part of the retrospective has helped to identify and capture information, which would
otherwise not be documented within an investigation record. One of the interviewees argued
that this information was not usually documented within an investigation record because it
is perceived to be “negative” information, which the incident handlers do not have time to
document. The interviewee went on to state that capturing this “negative” information can
help with the identification of gaps with regards to obtaining access to key information assets
and stakeholders, which could be required for future investigations.
With regards to Question 9, the seven interviewees indicated that there were no disadvan-
tages to using a retrospective to identify and document information about which assets and
individuals ‘did not work well’ during an investigation. Three interviewees added that there
could be no disadvantage in identifying and documenting information about an investigation
which would normally not be included in a typical security investigation record.
Question 10 was used to examine the overall impact of the retrospective question ‘What
Did Not Work Well’ with regards to information assets, which could not be investigated,
and individuals who the PIHs could not communicate with during an investigation. All the
interviewees agreed that this part of the retrospective has provided an opportunity for PIHs
to stop and reflect about ‘what went wrong’ in the investigation and to document additional
information, which can help the team, improve its process. One interviewee added that
this part of the retrospective should be undertaken immediately after the conclusion of an
investigation so that any identified problems can be eradicated or improved upon before the
next security investigation. Although this was the objective at the start of the experiment,
it was not always possible to execute the retrospective immediately after the closure of an
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investigation. This was because incident handlers were assigned to new investigations, which
then took priority over performing a retrospective of previous investigations.
Identifying Information Security Controls
Questions 11 to 13 queried the interviewees about using the retrospective to identify security
controls that can be improved upon after a security investigation. The respondents generally
agreed that security controls should be identified and documented within an investigation
record. One of the information security managers reiterated that this is actually a process re-
quirement and that the investigation record includes a field for documenting this information.
However, the manager added that in reality this does not occur. These comments support the
results from the analysis presented in Section 6.6.1, which showed that security control in-
formation is not always documented in the investigation record. When asked why this was
the case, the majority of the incident handlers stated that information was not documented
because of limited knowledge surrounding current security controls. While the incident han-
dlers acknowledge that its is important to document this information, they have also stated
that their limited knowledge about the security controls implemented in the organisation has
affected their ability to identify security control improvements.
The incident handler’s interview answers also suggest that the retrospective could be one
way of solving this problem. The incident handlers indicated that the retrospective provided
a ‘safety-net mechanism’ to help document security controls improvements. More specif-
ically, one of the PIHs suggested that the problem with identifying security controls could
be countered by making this part of the retrospective, a group activity. The reasoning be-
hind this suggestion was that individuals within the security incident response team will have
varied levels of understanding of the security controls implemented within the organisation.
The individual added that a group retrospective specifically focusing on security control im-
provements, would help PIHs with limited knowledge about security controls to identify
improvements. Although the majority of the retrospectives undertaken within the organisa-
tion were conducted with a single individual, a group retrospective for identifying security
controls emulates how retrospectives are undertaken in other domains, such as agile soft-
ware development [200, 209, 210]. Within agile software development, the Agile Manifesto
encourages autonomy and providing individuals the environment and support they need to
reach specific objectives [198]. Similarly, undertaking a group retrospective could provide
a security incident response team with the right environment to expand their knowledge and
help with the identification of further security controls.
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Identifying Security Incident Response-Related Process Improvements
Questions 14 to 16 from the follow-up interview, were used to query the interviewees about
using the retrospective to identify security incident response-related process improvements.
The interviewees were unanimous in that the retrospectives have assisted with the identi-
fication of process improvements that can help the security incident response team. Two
individuals indicated that this type of information was important to identify and document.
However, the individuals added that the organisation’s security incident response process
does not require the PIHs to document this information. The two individuals went on to
state that the retrospective has assisted with the identification and documentation of process
improvements, which would otherwise not have been documented within the organisation.
One of the information security managers provided an alternative view on the matter. The
manager suggested that they did not expect any security incident response-related process
improvements to be recorded within the investigation record. This is because PIHs are more
likely to be focused on eradicating and recovering from security problems, rather than decid-
ing how to improve the way they work. The manager added that looking for ways to improve
is important and that these specific questions in the retrospective have helped with identifying
and documenting process improvements, which would otherwise not be documented.
Overall, the interviewees were in agreement that the retrospectives had a positive influence
on the identification and documentation of security incident response-related process im-
provements. The main reason provided by the respondents was that this part of the retro-
spective provided a mechanism, which prompted incident handlers to stop and think about
how they can improve the way they conduct security investigations. Six out of the seven
interviewees indicated that there was no disadvantage to using the retrospectives to identify
and document security incident response-related process improvements. However, one indi-
vidual noted that this part of the retrospective was ‘less important’ than identifying security
controls and suggested that instead, a monthly retrospective is undertaken to identify pro-
cess improvements. There are both advantages and disadvantages to executing a monthly
retrospective. The advantage is that a security incident response team can obtain a wider
perspective on the various processes that they have identified as needing to be improvement
to assist with future investigations. However, the disadvantage is that undertaking a monthly
retrospective can also mean that there is the possibility that PIHs could forget details about
investigations and therefore, fewer security process improvements will actually be identified.
Other Factors
Question 17 is used to determine what other factors have contributed to the successful or
unsuccessful attempt in using retrospectives to identify and document security controls and
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security incident response-related process improvements. Five interviewees acknowledged
that the incident handlers limited knowledge of the organisation’s security controls and se-
curity incident response-related processes was a key factor in their inability to identify im-
provements. These individuals added that if the PIH does not know about a specific control
or the existence of a particular process, it could be difficult to suggest improvements.
Two individuals added that the success of a retrospective was dependent on how quickly it
was undertaken after the closure of an investigation. The individuals indicated that the retro-
spectives should be undertaken swiftly at the conclusion of an investigation. However, both
individuals concluded that this might not be feasible. This is because when the security inci-
dent response team has to handle multiple investigations at once, the priority is to close the
investigation and move onto the next problem. One information security manager suggested
that a security incident response team needs to ‘buy-in’ into the idea of using retrospec-
tives as a method for documenting further information and improving security controls and
processes. The manager added that “a security incident response team, together with their
managers, need to want to improve and without the will to want to improve, there is no point
in undertaking the retrospectives.”
6.7 Discussion
One of the themes which emerges from the experiment is that the completion of a security
investigation and the closure of its corresponding investigation record does not necessarily
mean that an incident handler has documented all the information about the particular inves-
tigation. The comparative analysis of the retrospectives and security investigation records
has shown that further information about an investigation can be identified and documented
during a retrospective.
Experiment Research Question 1
The results from the experiment have shown that retrospectives can help a security incident
response team to identify and document additional information about a security investiga-
tion. The results from the comparative analysis has shown that integrating retrospectives into
security incident response can help with the documentation of additional information which
may not necessarily be captured during the initial investigation. 148 out of the 324 retrospec-
tives (46%) undertaken during the experiment resulted in more information being identified
and documented during a retrospective when compared to the corresponding investigation
record. Further analysis showed that the retrospectives were particularly useful in capturing
‘negative information’ such as what assets could not be investigated and which individuals
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the PIHs encountered problems communicating with during an investigation. However, the
results of the comparative analysis also showed that a retrospective is not a replacement for
the investigation process itself. 25 security investigation records were found to contain more
information about the investigation, when compared to the information identified using the
retrospective. This was particularly evident from question three in the retrospectives, where
34 individuals and groups within the organisation were documented within the investigation
record, but were not identified during the retrospective.
The results from the follow-up interviews have shown that retrospectives can also provide
an additional avenue for the identification and documentation of information, which may
otherwise not have been recorded. The interviewee’s comments indicated that information
captured from the ‘What Worked Well’ questions could provide the security incident re-
sponse team and management with an indication of the number of security investigations
involving key information assets and stakeholders. As highlighted in the follow-up inter-
views, the advantage of capturing this information is that it can help a security incident
response team to identify which individuals and groups it should maintain relationships with
to resolve investigations more quickly and efficiently in the future.
Experiment Research Question 2
The results show that retrospectives can help a security incident response team to identify
and document information security controls and security incident response-related process
improvements. A comparison of the information from the retrospectives and the information
in the investigation records has shown that the retrospectives have helped to identify and
document 25 additional security controls and 26 additional security incident response-related
process improvements. With many organisations looking to implement information security
standards such as ISO/IEC 27001/27002, it is becoming increasingly important to be able to
audit what security controls are implemented within an organisation. Having a rich dataset
of security investigation records from a detailed data generation process can assist with this
auditing process. The results from the meta-retrospectives have shown that the activity can
be used to audit which security controls have actually been implemented, as well as which
controls still need to be implemented within an organisation.
Although the identification and documentation of security controls is a process requirement,
within the Fortune 500 Organisation, individuals noted in the follow-up interviews that this
information is typically not recorded. The reason provided is that PIHs are under time pres-
sures and often have limited knowledge surrounding existing security controls. While the
PIHs acknowledged that the documentation of this information is important, they have ar-
gued that unless they know about existing security controls, it can be difficult to suggest
improvements. A solution proposed by one PIH is to make this part of the retrospective a
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group activity where individuals with a good understanding of the security controls can help
those members who have less knowledge within this area.
Experiment Research Question 3
The results from the meta-retrospectives show that 42 out of the 65 security control and
security incident response-related process improvements identified using the retrospectives
were either implemented in the organisation or their implementation was considered ‘on-
going’ at the time of the meta-retrospective. A further two improvements were implemented
after the specific meta-retrospective were undertaken. In both of these cases, no changes
were implemented prior to the meta-retrospective and the changes within the organisation
were only instigated during the meta-retrospective.
The results from the meta-retrospectives have also showed that a security incident response
team faces numerous challenges when attempting to implement security controls and process-
related improvements. During the meta-retrospectives, incident handlers reported that 15
out of the 65 security control and process improvements had to be escalated to manage-
ment within the Information Security unit. These managers then either assisted with the
implementation of the security control/process improvement or continued to champion its
implementation on-behalf of the PIH. Furthermore, six out of the 65 security control/process
improvements identified in the retrospectives resulted in no changes within the organisation.
This is because the incident handlers do not have authority over all the processes within
the organisation. These findings suggest that organisations need to assist security incident
response teams implement security controls/process improvements in order to improve the
wider security posture and security incident response processes.
Process Culture and Retrospectives
The comparative analysis of the retrospective results with the investigation records suggests
that further information about an investigation can be identified and documented using a
retrospective. However, the results of this analysis have also emphasised challenges with
process and management demands with regards to security investigations. This is partic-
ularly evident in answers from question one through to question four, which were used to
identify what assets could/could not be investigation, and which individuals could/could not
be communicated with during a particular investigation. The answers from questions two
and four provide specific evidence that a ‘process culture’ exists within the organisation,
which Deal and Kennedy [150] argue is common in financial services organisations. The
downside of a process culture is that stress can arise because of internal politics, bureaucracy
and problems with systems and processes currently used in an organisation [150]. As the ret-
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rospectives have highlighted, management expect incident handlers to conduct through and
conclusive investigations, but this is not always possible and the security incident response
process does not take into consideration deviations from the ‘normal’ investigative events.
The process is expected to work all the time, but the retrospectives have highlighted that
incident handlers may not have access to some assets or individuals required for their inves-
tigations. In other words, the organisation places less emphasis on adaptability and changes
to the process, which can mean that assets may not be investigated, and therefore incident
causes may not be identified [213].
However, the retrospectives can also be used as a feedback mechanism for a security in-
cident response process. Another problem with a process culture is the lack of immediate
feedback from the process, which can result in employees not knowing if the process actually
works [150]. The results from the experiment suggest that retrospectives could be one way
a security incident response team can measure their work by receiving feedback from the
questions they ask during the retrospectives. Focusing the retrospective questions on the in-
cident response process, as was demonstrated in the experiment, allows an incident response
team to obtain feedback on the process they use for incident investigations.
Impact on Information Dissemination and Incident Learning
Researchers [13, 14] have argued that organisations find it difficult to disseminate informa-
tion from security incidents. These researchers go on to state that information and knowledge
from a security incident investigation is either not documented, and when it is documented,
information often does not reach management [13, 14]. Ying adds that there is no system-
atic or standardised way to disseminate or manage information dissemination in security
incident response [129]. While a detailed report could be produced for management, these
individuals may find it difficult to digest the information in the report because of the ‘inter-
related information it will contain [14]. Furthermore, these reports are likely to be written
for an administrative purpose rather than an ‘engineering’ purpose [214]. The results from
the comparative analysis of the retrospectives with the investigation records suggest that the
retrospective could be a lightweight mechanism to support information dissemination in in-
cident response for ‘engineering’ purposes. As the experiment has shown, the retrospective
can be tailored to collect information that will be useful to a security incident response team
and its managers. Therefore, unlike a report the information will not serve just an adminis-
trative purpose, but also provide a perspective on how security controls and security incident
response-related processes can be improved.
While the retrospectives can be used improve information dissemination and feedback from
a security incident response process, the information collected using retrospective can also
be used for wider organisational learning. By extension, this can be considered one of the
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objectives of the experiment that the additional information captured using the retrospec-
tives would be used by a security incident response team to learn about a security incident.
However, an observation made during the experiment was that the security incident response
team in the Fortune 500 organisation did not frequently use this information for the purpose
of extending their incident learning capabilities. Even though the team had this additional
information at their disposal, very few actions were taken to extend learning from particular
incidents. A further observation was that managers often requested information from the
incident response team. This information often came from the retrospectives themselves,
which was then used for metric reporting to higher-level managers. The question which
needs to be asked is does the additional information captured from the retrospectives help
the security incident response team learn about an incident or does it help management learn
more about how the process is used by the team? One could argue that some form of learning
is taking place by management who were using the information to learn if the process was
working, but this would not necessarily help the organisation learn about security incidents
or how to prevent them. Furthermore, it would appear that minimal support was given to
the security incident response team in order for them to learn about security incidents using
the collected information. These are problems and issues which can arise in organisations
that have a process culture, where internal politics, bureaucracy and problems with systems
currently used in the organization can hinder improvements and feedback in the organization
itself [150].
6.8 Summary
This chapter described an experiment to evaluate the use of retrospectives as a method for
validating and enhancing data collected during a security investigation. Furthermore, the
experiment evaluated the use of meta-retrospectives within security incident response as
method for identifying what security controls and process improvements are actually im-
plemented within an organisation. The results from the experiment have shown that retro-
spectives can be used to ‘inspect and adapt’ security investigations processes. It is through
the process of ‘inspection and adaptation’ that the retrospectives have been used to first val-
idate the information documented within an investigation record and second, enhance the
information that has been missed during the investigation. Practitioners interviewed within
the studied organisation have stated that the retrospectives provided a ‘safety net’ and an ad-
ditional avenue for incident handlers within the organisation to document information which
may otherwise not have been documented in the investigation record. A comparative analy-
sis with the corresponding investigation records has also shown that retrospectives can help
to identify and document “negative” information, which can be used to enhance the quality
of data generated from a security investigation.
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Chapter 7
Security Incident Response
Dashboard
Chapter three established that detailed security investigations increase the potential for an
organisation to identify information that could be used to prevent future incidents. However,
before an organisation can learn from a security incident, they need to collect detailed data
from their investigations. The exploratory case study in Chapter four demonstrated that
many of the security investigation records in the Fortune 500 Organisation did not contain
enough information. For example, 126 out of 188 investigation records did not contain
date and time information with regards to response-time metric calculations. Furthermore,
the exploratory case study highlighted that the information documented within the security
investigation records did not reflect the state of an investigation as understood by security
incident handlers. In these cases, there was the potential to capture additional information
about the investigation, as many fields in the relevant security investigations records were
incomplete.
This chapter describes an experiment in which a security incident response dashboard was
implemented within the Fortune 500 Organisation. The purpose of the dashboard was twofold.
First, it was hypothesised that the dashboard would enhance the transparency of data quality
issues within security investigation records in the organisation. Second, it was hypothesised
that the dashboard would assist the security incident response team to identify and correct
incomplete security investigation records. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.1
introduces dashboards and provides an overview of previous research focused on developing
dashboards within information security. Section 7.2 provides an overview of the experiment
and the research questions that guided the experiment. Section 7.3 discusses how the various
dashboard requirements were identified and collected from individuals within the Fortune
500 Organisation. Section 7.4 describes the dashboard architecture including the hardware
and software components required to develop and deploy the dashboard application. Sec-
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tion 7.5 discusses the deployment of the dashboard within the Fortune 500 Organisation’s
security incident response team. Section 7.6 reports on the impact of the dashboard through
a qualitative and quantitative data analysis. Section 7.7 discusses the main findings from
the experiment and examines the challenges and limitations of the experiment. Section 7.8
concludes and summarises the chapter.
7.1 Information Security Dashboards
In the past few years, information security vendors have attempted to integrate a variety of vi-
sual indicators into information security dashboards as a method of reporting organisational
security performance. A dashboard is defined as a “visual display of information needed to
achieve one or more objectives which fits entirely on a single computer screen so it can be
monitored at a glance” [215]. Marty [216] argues that one of the key points not covered in
this definition is that a dashboard must be constructed for a specific audience. Marty goes on
to state that there are three main types of dashboards within information security [216]:
• Operational dashboards, which are used to track core processes, metrics, and sta-
tuses within an organisation. This type of dashboard provides low-level information at
a glance and is often used for real-time security monitoring activities.
• Tactical dashboards, which are used to track processes of organisational groups,
computer networks and security states of systems. These types of dashboard help
to analyse security conditions and summarise data to analyse security problems.
• Strategic dashboards, which are used to monitor the execution of strategic objectives
and are usually used by senior security executives. Information from these dashboards
is typically presented in the form of trend visualisations, while real-time information
is less common.
Marty [216] adds that, no matter what type of dashboard is employed within an organisa-
tion, an important requirement is ‘comparison’. In this context, ‘comparison’ is the capabil-
ity to see trends and changes over time that should attract the attention of the viewer who
uses a dashboard [216]. At the time of writing, several commercial information security
dashboards were available including Splunk [217], IBM Tivoli Compliance Insight Man-
ager [218] and Security Wizard’s Radar [219]. In addition to these commercial dashboards,
several researchers have also proposed and developed a variety of dashboards for use within
an information security context [220–222].
Sun, et al. [220] proposed and develop a dashboard with the aim of helping system admin-
istrators understand the state of system security within their organisation through the use
7.1. Information Security Dashboards 150
of security metrics. The dashboard was developed using Java and a prototype was pre-
sented in their paper, however the prototype was not evaluated outside of a lab-based envi-
ronment [220].
Novikova and Kotenko [223] proposed and developed a prototype visualisation component
for a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system which helps to capture
and store large amounts of data from monitoring activities. The visualisation offered attack
modelling graphics and security evaluation calculations using data gathered from the SIEM
system. These same researchers then expand on this earlier work and developed VisSec-
Analyzer [221], a dashboard that presents information about network security monitoring
activities. The tool was demonstrated in a lab-based environment, but was not implemented
within a commercial setting.
Sobesto, et al. [222] developed DarkNOC, which is a dashboard for managing and moni-
toring collections of honeypots and other data collecting devices on a computer network.
DarkNOC was deployed on a university network, which is used for honeypot research pur-
poses. The results from the study showed that DarkNOC provided researchers with informa-
tion about targeted systems, attacks and their origin, as well as an overview of the honeypot
activities within the subnet [222].
Dashboards have also been proposed for use with data generated from a security incident
response process [224, 225]. Jacobs and Rudis [224] provide guidelines and recommenda-
tions for using visualisations, including a dashboard to display information from security
incidents and data breaches. Jacobs and Rudis argue that the goal in collecting and visual-
ising security breach data “is to support the decision-making process within security lead-
ership” [224]. They go on to state that collecting and visualising data on breaches helps
to reduce uncertainty between “what you know and what you need to know” and this is
particularly important in responding to data breaches [224].
As part of a larger project into exploring security incident response data generated by national
Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs), Madnick, et al. [225] developed the
Exploring Cyber Incident Relations (ECIR) Data Dashboard. The purpose of the dashboard
was to provide a comprehensive view of a data set collected from national level CSIRTs
about the state of their security incidents affecting their countries [225]. The dashboard used
publicly available data and presented visualisations of this information in three parts: demo-
graphic information about the countries, information technology data and cyber-security data
about the incidents affecting the specific countries [225]. A prototype of the dashboard was
developed but the focus of the study was primarily publicly available data from national-level
security incident response teams and not security incident response teams within organisa-
tions. Based on the literature, the following points informed the design of the dashboard
application within the Fortune 500 Organisation:
7.2. Experiment Design 151
• An operational-type dashboard was chosen as the preferred design. This is because
the dashboard will be used to present real-time information about the state of security
incident response within the organisation.
• Marty’s [216] concept of ‘comparison’ will be integrated into the visualisations created
for the dashboard application. The visualisations in the dashboard, when viewed by
security incident handlers within the organisation, will present trends and changes to
various aspects of the security incident response process over time.
• Ultimately, the goal of the dashboard application will be to provide the security in-
cident team within the organisation with information which will help reduce any un-
certainty between “what you know and what you need to know” about a particular
security investigation [224].
Although numerous security dashboards have been proposed in the literature, very little re-
search evaluates the use of a security incident response dashboard as a tool for identifying
data quality issues in security investigation records. Therefore, based on the points identified
from the literature, a security incident response dashboard was developed and implemented
in the Fortune 500 Organisation in order to meet these requirements. The next section will
describe the experiment, which guided this research.
7.2 Experiment Design
An experiment was designed based on the on-going case study in the Fortune 500 Organisa-
tion which involved a security incident response dashboard being developed, implemented
and evaluated within the organisation. The purpose of the dashboard was twofold. First,
it was hypothesised that the dashboard would enhance the transparency of data quality is-
sues within security investigation records in the organisation. Second, it was hypothesised
that the dashboard would assist the security incident response team to identify and correct
incomplete security investigation records. Three research questions guided this experiment:
1. Does a dashboard assist a security incident response team to identify investigation
records which are incomplete and require further detailed information?
2. What fields are considered important to a security incident response team with regards
to security investigation record closure?
3. Does a dashboard enhance collaboration within a security incident response team?
7.3. Identifying and Collecting Requirements 152
In order to answer these research questions, an experiment was designed which involved
four stages: 1) identifying and collecting the dashboard requirements; 2) developing the
dashboard application; 3) implementing the dashboard within the organisation; and 4) evalu-
ating the dashboard through a data analysis period. The following subsections will describe
each stage of the experiment.
7.3 Identifying and Collecting Requirements
Guidance was sought from various books [215, 216, 224] and white papers [226–228] on
the topic of developing dashboards and visualising security data as discussed in Section 7.1.
In addition, discussions were held with the security incident response team and informa-
tion security managers within the organisation. These discussions were held to gather the
practitioners’ requirements regarding the dashboard design. A recurring theme from these
discussions was that a ‘lightweight’ dashboard layout would be essential to any final de-
sign. The consensus from these individuals was that “less visualisations would provide more
information”.
Two information security managers (hereafter referred to as Manager 1 and Manager 2) were
consulted over the design of the dashboard. Manager 1 is responsible for security intelligence
generation and management within the organisation, while Manager 2 is responsible for ev-
eryday operational security management including the security incident response team. As
noted in Chapter four, one of the problems identified from the exploratory case study was that
187 out of the 188 investigation records were missing information from one or more fields
in the record template. In these cases, there is the potential for security incident handlers to
capture further information about a security investigation. It was hypothesised that the dash-
board would help identify those records considered to be ‘incomplete’ and help a security
incident handler to identify the fields which needed to be corrected so that the investigation
record would be considered ‘complete’. In order to define a ‘complete’ and ‘incomplete’ se-
curity investigation record, discussions were held with both information security managers
to gather their requirements.
After discussions with both managers, it was proposed that a security investigation record
would be considered ‘incomplete’ if information from one or more of eleven fields from the
security investigation record was missing. The eleven fields considered by the managers to
be the criteria to measure an ‘incomplete’ investigation record, along with their descriptions
are presented in Table 7.1. The security investigation record described in this discussion was
the same investigation record implemented in the organisation as discussed in Chapter 5.
Several observations can be made with regards to the selection of the eleven fields by man-
agement. An initial glance at the choice of fields shows that the ‘Investigation Record’ was
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Field Name Description
Subject Subject line which describes investigation record
Category Category and Sub-Category type of security occurrence
Date Reported The date the security occurrence was reported to the Security Inci-
dent Response Team (SIRT)
Time Reported The time the security occurrence was reported to the SIRT
Date Discovered The date the security occurrence was discovered within the organi-
sation
Status Status of the investigation record (Open/Closed)
Date Opened The date the security investigation record was opened by the SIRT
Time Opened The time the security investigation record was opened by the SIRT
Date Closed The date the security investigation record was closed by the SIRT
Time Closed The time the security investigation record was closed by the SIRT
Working Hours The number of working hours that have consumed on a particular
security occurrence
Table 7.1: Proposed Incomplete Investigation Record Criteria
excluded from the list of criteria to measure an ‘incomplete’ investigation record. On one
hand this could be considered an important field, as it would describe information on how
an actual investigation has taken place. On the other hand, the manager’s choice to exclude
the field from the selection of ‘closed fields’ highlights that particular metric information re-
garding the time to eradicate and recover from an incident have been favoured instead. The
choice of these metrics support the findings from other case studies [18, 19, 44] that organi-
sations are more focused on eradication and recovery, instead of incident learning. This idea
is further supported by the lack of consideration of the ‘Lessons Learned’ and ‘Actions to
be Taken’ fields from the criteria. While the information security managers made a decision
to exclude certain fields from their criteria, a problem that could arise is that information
from these excluded fields could actually be used to learn more about a security incident.
However, its capture has not been formally specified in a policy or procedure to the incident
response team and therefore, it may be missing from the organisation’s security investigation
records.
Manager 2 requested that specific metrics related to the security incident response process are
integrated into the dashboard application. The manager requested metrics which would in-
dicate a) how long it takes the security incident response team to resolve a security problem;
b) how long a particular type of security problem affected the risk profile of the organisation;
and c) how long the incident handlers were taking to manage investigations based on the
number of working hours. Three metrics were proposed to meet the manager’s requirements
and taken from the relevant literature [179, 229]. These three metrics are:
1. Time To Resolution - this metric is calculated as the number of working hours be-
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tween when a security problem was reported to the security incident response team and
the time to when the investigation record related to the problem was closed. Working
hours in this context is defined as 09:00 to 17:00, Monday to Friday.
2. Time To Reduce Risk - this metric is calculated as the number of calendar hours
between when a security problem was reported to the security incident response team
and the time when the investigation record related to the problem was closed. Calendar
hours in this context are defined as 00:00 to 23:59, Monday to Sunday.
3. Time Working on Investigation - this metric is calculated as the number of working
hours consumed by the security incident response team on a particular security prob-
lem and is calculated using the information documented in the ‘Working Hours’ field
in the revised security investigation record.
The metrics were accepted by Manager 2 and were integrated into the design of the dash-
board Graphical User Interface (GUI). Both Manager 1 and Manager 2 also requested fur-
ther metrics. The calculated results from these metrics would need to provide a graphical
visualisation within the dashboard, showing the frequency of security events and incidents,
which have occurred within the organisation over a particular period of time. Both managers
agreed that four graphical visualisations would need to be integrated into the dashboard GUI.
Two visualisations would present frequency information for ‘security events’ and two visu-
alisations would present frequency information for ‘security incidents’. The time periods
suggested for the graphical visualisations was 30 days for one part of the visualisation and
the previous 12 months for the second part of the visualisation.
During the development stage of the application, the Head of Information Security within
the organisation requested that an additional graphical visualisation was integrated into the
dashboard. This visualisation would provide information about the number of ‘Open’ and
‘Closed/Incomplete’ security investigation records at a particular point in time. This would
involve calculating the number of records in each case and then storing the results so that the
graphical visualisation can be generated, presenting the number of respective records over
time. The implementation of this visualisation was included into the design of the dashboard
GUI.
7.4 Dashboard Architecture
This section describes the various systems which interacted with the dashboard application,
how the application collected data and how this data was used to produce the dashboard GUI.
The dashboard application consists of a Microsoft Excel 2010 macro-enabled file that was
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hosted on a network file share within the organisation. The network share is accessible to
all individuals within the Information Security unit, including the security incident response
team.
The dashboard application was designed and developed using Visual Basic for Applications
(VBA version 7) within the Microsoft Excel 2010 file. VBA was the choice of development
framework for two reasons. First, VBA has been used in the past within the organisation to
develop various security tools for the Information Security unit. Second, VBA was the only
development framework readily available. The VBA code for the dashboard application has
subsequently been hosted on Github1. Some data processing routines have been removed
from the published code to protect the organisation’s anonymity. The dashboard application
consists of three main parts: 1) the back-end ‘Raw Data’ worksheet which interacts with
an IBM Lotus Notes server to extract data; 2) the network component for saving data from
the dashboard back to the network file share; and 3) the GUI which presents the various
visualisations. The various components and systems, which interact with the dashboard are
discussed in more detail below.
7.4.1 IBM Notes Security Incident Response Database
At a high-level, the dashboard application collects information from the security incident
response database, calculates various metrics or creates visualisations and then presents these
in the dashboard GUI. The security incident response database is hosted on an IBM Lotus
Notes server within the organisation. The database itself is stored within an IBM Notes
Document Library [230]. Within this document library, individual security investigation
records are stored as separate documents.
7.4.2 Dashboard Application
The core of the dashboard application is a ‘Raw Data’ worksheet, which is used to store
the individual security investigation records within the Microsoft Excel file. When the dash-
board application is executed, the ‘Raw Data’ worksheet is cleared and a network session
with the IBM Lotus Notes server is initiated. After a connection has been established, the
security investigation records are retrieved from the document library on the server. As the
individual documents (i.e. investigation records) are retrieved from the server, text saved in
the various fields in the investigation record is stored under individual columns within the
‘Raw Data’ worksheet. These columns represent the individual fields within the investigation
record template, with each field in the record having its own column in the Excel worksheet.
Therefore, each row from the worksheet corresponded to a particular investigation record.
1http://github.com/grisposgeorge/SIR-Dashboard
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While the data from the investigation records was stored to the ‘Raw Data’ Excel worksheet,
several data consistency checks were undertaken. These data checks focused on the format
of any dates and times in the investigation record. These were done in order to provide data
consistency when using this information for metric calculations. Dates were corrected to the
format dd/mm/yyyy, while times were stored in the format hh:mm. If a date or time was in
an incorrect format, the information was corrected and stored in the right format within the
worksheet. If any information from a particular investigation record field was missing, the
word ‘Unknown’ was used as a substitute. The intention was that security incident handlers,
prior to executing the dashboard GUI would view the word ‘Unknown’ within a cell and
then attempt to correct this information either in the ‘Raw Data’ worksheet or in the security
investigation record itself. Figure 7.1 shows several security investigation records as they
stored in the ‘Raw Data’ Excel worksheet. Note, the incident handler’s identities have been
redacted to ensure anonymity.
7.4.3 Data Saved to Network File Share
After the dashboard application completed retrieving and sorting the security investigation
records from the database into the ‘Raw Data’ worksheet, a ‘snapshot’ of the worksheet was
taken. A ‘snapshot’ is a ‘Raw Data’ worksheet, containing the information from the security
investigation records, as a separate Microsoft Excel file. This Excel file was saved in a sub-
folder in the network share hosting the dashboard application. The ‘snapshot’ file was named
using the date the snapshot was taken. Figure 7.2 shows a set of snapshots as stored on the
local network file share.
Figure 7.2: Snapshots Stored on Network File Share
‘Snapshot’ file generation was implemented into the dashboard application and therefore,
snapshots were created every time the dashboard was used by individuals within the organ-
isation. Furthermore, the author also executed the dashboard application on a working day
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Figure 7.1: Worksheet Showing Retrieved Investigation Records
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basis. Snapshots generated by the author were stored separately from the snapshots gen-
erated by the individuals within the organisation. The purpose behind the ‘snapshots’ was
twofold. First, the action of taking daily snapshots of the security incident response database,
provided the author with a view of the number of investigation records which were consid-
ered ‘Open’ or ‘Closed/Incomplete’ for the given day. Second, the collection of snapshots
stored in the network file share was used to calculate metrics about the number of ‘Open’
and ‘Closed/Incomplete’ records and data for a visualisation within the dashboard GUI.
7.4.4 Graphical User Interface Display
The Graphical User Interface (GUI), is a worksheet within the Microsoft Excel file where
the visualisations are organised to present a summary of security incident response activities
within the organisation. Figure 7.3 shows the dashboard GUI. The following sub-sections
discuss the various parts of the GUI.
Traffic light-based listing of security events and incidents
The traffic light-based visualisation, as shown in Figure 7.4 provides the dashboard user
with information about the state of the last 30 security investigation records in the security
incident response database. The visualisation takes into consideration that an investigation
record can be in one of three possible states: Open (red), Closed (green) and Incomplete
(yellow).
Record	  Number Type Date	  Reported Status
2015-­‐107 Incident	  -­‐	  Data	  Exposure 02/04/15 Open
2015-­‐106 Event	  -­‐	  E-­‐Disclosure 02/04/15 Open
2015-­‐105 Event	  -­‐	  Data	  Loss	  Event 02/04/15 Open
2015-­‐104 Unknown 01/04/15 Closed
2015-­‐103 Event	  -­‐	  Security	  Assistance 31/03/15 Closed
2015-­‐102 Event	  -­‐	  Security	  Assistance 31/03/15 Closed
2015-­‐101 Unknown 26/03/15 Closed
2015-­‐100 Event	  -­‐	  Security	  Assistance 16/03/15 Closed
2015-­‐99 Incident	  -­‐	  Data	  Exposure 25/03/15 Open
2015-­‐98 Incident	  -­‐	  Fradulent	  Activity 23/03/15 Open
2015-­‐97 Incident	  -­‐	  Data	  Exposure 22/03/15 Open
2015-­‐96 Event	  -­‐	  Security	  Assistance 26/03/15 Open
2015-­‐95 Event	  -­‐	  Data	  Subject	  Access	  Request 25/03/15 Open
2015-­‐94 Event	  -­‐	  E-­‐Disclosure 19/03/15 Open
2015-­‐93 Event	  -­‐	  Security	  Assistance 18/03/15 Closed
2015-­‐92 Event	  -­‐	  Security	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Figure 7.4: Traffic Light-based Visualisation
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Figure 7.3: The Dashboard Graphical User Interface
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An ‘Open’ record is one where an investigation was likely to still be on-going or the inves-
tigation has been completed and the incident handler(s) have not updated the status of the
record to ‘Closed’. A ‘Closed’ record is where the status field within the record has been set
to ‘Closed’ and that information has been documented in all the fields shown previously in
Table 7.1. A ‘Closed/Incomplete’ record is one where the status field within the record has
been set to ‘Closed’ but one or more fields from Table 7.1 have not been documented within
the investigation record.
Pie and Bar Chart Metric Display
The pie and bar charts provide the dashboard user with a visualisation of the proportion of
‘security events’ and ‘incidents’ documented within the database, based on the different sub-
categories. The pie charts display the number of security events and incidents recorded in
the database in the past 30 days, while the bar charts display the number of security events
and incidents recorded in the database in the past 12 months. Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6
present examples of the pie and bar charts implemented in the dashboard GUI. Note that
numerical values for the pie and bar charts have been removed to protect the anonymity of
the organisation.
Event	  Types	  -­‐	  Previous	  30	  days Incident	  Types	  -­‐	  Previous	  30	  days
Data	  Loss	  Events	  
Data	  Subject	  Access	  Request	  
E-­‐Disclosure	  
Security	  Assistance	  
Data	  Exposure	  
Fraudulent	  Ac=vity	  	  
Figure 7.5: Pie Chart Visualisation
The sub-categories used in the pie charts are those which are presented in Section 5.2.1.
Information for both the pie and bar charts was calculated by analysing the ‘Date Reported’
field in the security investigation record template. Within the bar charts, a calculation was
made to determine how many records were reported in each specific month. In addition, the
mean average number of security events/incidents over the twelve month period was also
calculated and this is shown as a red line in the two bar charts.
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12	  Month	  Event	  Trend 12	  Month	  Incident	  Trend
Number	  of	  Events	   Average	   Number	  of	  Incidents	   Average	  
Figure 7.6: Bar Chart Visualisation
Trend Chart Metric Display and Drop-Down Menu
In order to provide the dashboard users with the necessary information to identify incomplete
fields, a drop-down menu was added to the dashboard. The purpose of the drop-down menu
was reduce the scope of the ‘Raw Data’ worksheet and present to the dashboard user with
only the investigation records which are either ‘Open’ or ‘Closed/Incomplete’. Upon selec-
tion of the desired option, a new worksheet is then presented to the dashboard user showing
the relevant information. In the case of the ‘Open’ records menu option, the dashboard dis-
plays all those investigation records within the database, which are considered to be ‘Open’.
Similarly, when the ‘Incomplete records’ menu option is selected, a separate worksheet is
presented to the dashboard user and all those records considered to be ‘Closed/Incomplete’
are shown. Incomplete fields in this worksheet are identified to the dashboard user with
the word ‘Unknown’ in the respective cell. Figure 7.7 shows an extract from the worksheet
highlighting the ‘Unknown’ fields to incidents handlers from the ‘Closed/Incomplete’ inves-
tigation records.
In addition to providing functionality to identify investigation records which are ‘Open’ or
‘Closed/Incomplete’, a line-chart visualisation was also introduced in the dashboard GUI, as
shown in Figure 7.8. This chart visualises the number of ‘Open’ and ‘Closed/Incomplete’
records over a period of time. The data for this chart is calculated using the information
stored in the ‘snapshot’ files. The computation of this information involves calculating the
number of ‘Open’ and ‘Closed/Incomplete’ records from each snapshot on a particular day.
This action is repeated for each ‘snapshot’ file in the network file share and the resulting data
identifies the total number of ‘Open’ and ‘Closed/Incomplete’ records from all the snapshot
files. The results of this calculation is then used to create the visualisation shown in Figure
7.8.
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Figure 7.7: Dashboard Extract Showing ‘Incomplete’ Fields
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Figure 7.8: Trend Chart Visualisation
Security Incident Response Metric Display
This part of the dashboard GUI is comprised of three drop-down menus. These drop-down
menus present the dashboard user with the option to calculate one of three metrics: mean
time to incident resolution, mean time to reduce risk and mean time working on occurrence.
The options within each drop-down menu allow the dashboard user to select how they would
like to apply the metric calculation. The dashboard user can choose to apply the metric
by category (all events or all incidents); by sub-category (e.g. all Malware incidents; all
data loss events; all E-discovery requests etc.); or all occurrences (all security events and
all security incidents). These options were repeated within each drop-down menu. Figure
7.9 provides an example of the drop-down menu for the mean time working on occurrence
metric.
Figure 7.9: Example of Dashboard Drop-down Menu
The metrics were calculated using the information in the ‘Raw Data’ sheet for the given
occurrence in the past three months. Only investigation records, which were denoted as
‘Closed’ and ‘complete’, were included in the metric calculations. When an end-user selects
the type of occurrence they would like a metric for, the dashboard returned the calculation
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within a message box. Figure 7.10 illustrates an example where the dashboard user has
selected ‘All Events’ from the drop-down menu for the ‘Mean Time Working on Occurrence’
metric.
Figure 7.10: Metric Calculation for Mean Time Working on Events
7.5 Dashboard Implementation
The dashboard application was demonstrated to the organisation in April 2014. Cosmetic
changes were made to the dashboard GUI, which included providing a name to the dashboard
as seen in Figure 7.3. The application was then made available to the security incident
response team and their relevant managers in the middle of April 2014. The dashboard was
used in the organisation from the middle of April 2014 until the end of March 2015.
7.6 Data Analysis
As stated earlier, the purpose of the dashboard was twofold. First, it was hypothesised that
the dashboard would enhance the transparency of data quality issues within security inves-
tigation records in the organisation. Second, it was hypothesised that the dashboard would
assist the security incident response team to identify and correct incomplete security inves-
tigation records. This section discusses the analysis of data collected from the experiment to
investigate these two aims.
At the time of the analysis, the dashboard application had been in use for just under 12
months. The analysis consisted of quantitative data collected through the use of the dash-
board within the organisation, as well as qualitative data collected through follow-up inter-
views with practitioners within the organisation. Quantitative data was collected from both
the ‘snapshot’ files generated through the incident handlers use of the dashboard, as well as
through the author executing the application on a working day basis. The set of snapshots
generated by the incident handlers will be referred to as Snapshot Data Set 1, while the set of
snapshots generated by the author will be referred to as Snapshot Data Set 2. The discussions
below will make explicit which data set was used in that particular analysis.
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In addition to examining the quantitative snapshot data, qualitative data was also collected
in the form of semi-structured interviews. The purpose of the interviews was to gather the
practitioners’ perspective on the dashboard application, as well as to explore their motiva-
tions for using the application during everyday security investigations. As discussed earlier,
that the interviews were undertaken with seven individuals, six ‘Primary Incident Handlers’
(PIHs) and one individual who is the Security Incident Response Policy Owner. The in-
terviews queried individuals on several aspects of the dashboard including potential benefits
and problems, features most/least used, as well as determining what impact (if any) the dash-
board application had on the overall security incident response process.
7.6.1 Dashboard Application Usage
During the application development stage, an attempt was made to create a log that would
be used to document the name of individuals who used the dashboard application. This
however, proved unsuccessful due to limitations with the development environment. Instead,
application usage was examined using the ‘snapshot’ files. Each time a snapshot was created,
the name of the individual executing the dashboard along with the date of snapshot creation
were embedded into the snapshot file’s meta-data. The meta-data from each snapshot file
are then used to analyse application usage. Snapshot Data Set 1 was used for this part of the
analysis to examine incident handler dashboard usage.
The results from the application usage analysis show that the dashboard was used a total of
155 times within the organisation. The lowest number of login attempts in a single month
was five in April 2014. However, if we consider that the application was only implemented
in the middle of April 2014 and therefore was not available to the team for a full month, then
May 2014 has the lowest number of login attempts in a single month. The dashboard was
only used six times in this month. The highest number of login attempts in a single month
was 18 in November 2014. Therefore, the dashboard application was used on average 12.91
times each month, between the middle of April 2014 and the end of March 2015. Figure
7.11 shows the monthly dashboard usage within the organisation.
The graph shows that initially, the security incident response team did not use the dashboard
frequently at the start of the experiment. However, as the experiment progressed, application
usage continued to increased within the organisation. The dashboard was used five times in
April 2014 and six times in May 2014. The results show that application usage within the
first two months was ‘below the mean average’ for the period of the experiment. From this
point forward, usage of the application increased and was used nine times in June 2014 and
then increased ‘above average’ to 16 times in July 2014.
A sharp fall in application usage was then recorded in August 2014, with the dashboard only
being used nine times in this month. A possible explanation for this result is that incident
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Figure 7.11: Number of Dashboard Application Logins per Month
handlers may have been away on summer vacation. Dashboard usage returns to ‘above
average’ in September 2014 and this trend continues until March 2015. From September
2014 to the end of March 2015, the dashboard was used between 15-17 times per month. An
exception can be seen in December 2014, where the application was only used eleven times,
which is only slightly below the average usage. This drop in usage can again be attributed to
the winter vacation period and closure of the organisation over the holiday period.
Examining the number of dashboard logins relative to the size of the security incident re-
sponse team, presents an alternative view of the information. Figure 7.12 shows the per-
centage of individuals within the security incident response team who used the dashboard
application each month. Recall that the results from the analysis of the dashboard usage
showed that the number of login attempts during April 2014 and June 2014 was between
five to nine login attempts. Further analysis of the data showed that this translated to 75% -
100% of the individuals within the security incident response team actually using the dash-
board during this period. Additional team members joined the security incident response
team, first in September 2014 and then in November 2014. In these two months, dashboard
usage fell to between 50% and 80% of the team. This decrease in percentage of individuals
using the dashboard continued and in December 2014 and January 2015, only 33% of the
individuals in the team used the application. After this period, an increase is observed again
from February 2015 onwards until the end of the experiment, where 83% of the team used
the dashboard.
Alternatively, examining the dashboard logins for each individual per month provides an-
other insight on the information. Figure 7.13 highlights the dashboard usage for the six
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Figure 7.12: Percentage of Individuals Using Dashboard per Month
individuals who accessed the dashboard during the experiment. Several observations can be
drawn from this analysis. The graph shows that dashboard usage only increased for three
out of the six incident handlers. The graphs for incident handlers one, four and six all show
increasingly dashboard usage. However the results for incident handlers two, three and five
all showed decreasing dashboard use.
One individual (Incident Handler 1) used the dashboard application every month since it was
implemented within the organisation. Incident Handler 6 only joined the security incident
response team in September 2014 and therefore, has only used the dashboard application
every month since they became a member of the team. The second individual who joined
the team in November 2014 (Incident Handler 5) has only used the dashboard application on
two occasions, both in the same month that they joined the team. This incident handler later
noted in their follow-up interview that their role within the organisation was the forensic
examination of systems and therefore they did not need to refer to the dashboard to perform
these tasks.
While the initial results indicate that the security incident response team was using the dash-
board application, further analysis examined how the number of application logins equate to
the total number of investigations undertaken by the team. This analysis involved comparing
the total number of investigations each month the dashboard was used with the number of
collective logins from the security incident response team. The results of this analysis is
shown in Figure 7.14. The results show that initially in April 2014, the number of logins (5)
were far less than the number of investigation records (75) at a ratio of one login for every
15 investigation records. This result can be explained as the start of the experiment and that
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Figure 7.13: Individual Dashboard Usage per Month
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the individuals had not yet accustomed to using the dashboard application. Recall also that
the investigations during April 2014 included one very large ‘multi-record’ investigation.
Therefore, the application was used less frequently even though there were a high number
of investigations. During the remaining period of the experiment, the ratio of logins to in-
vestigation records decreased. In May 2014, there was one login to every two investigation
records, while in the months of July 2014 and March 2015, there were more logins to the
dashboard application than the number investigation records. In fact, during March 2015
the dashboard was used 16 times, while only six records were opened during the month.
In some months (August 2014, November 2014 and December 2014), the number of login
attempts was about half the number of investigations. These findings suggest that the apart
from April 2014, the number of dashboard logins by the security incident response team,
were approximate to the number of investigations in the security incident response database.
0	  
10	  
20	  
30	  
40	  
50	  
60	  
70	  
80	  
Number	  of	  Inves7ga7ons	   Number	  of	  Logins	  
Figure 7.14: Dashboard Logins vs. Number of Investigation Records
The results presented above have shown that the dashboard was used within the organisation.
However, the results do not indicate what features were actually used by the individuals. The
follow-up interviews were used to examine this aspect. Within the interviews, participants
were asked which features of the dashboard application they used most often. Four intervie-
wees stated that the drop-down menu options, which provide information about investigation
records which are ‘Open’ or ‘Closed/Incomplete’ were the most used part of the dashboard.
The reason provided was because this part of the application helped the security incident
response team to identify data quality issues within the security incident response database.
This is an opinion that is shared by the Security Incident Response Policy Owner, who agreed
that the information about investigation records which are ‘Open’ or ‘Closed/Incomplete’ did
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appear to help the team the most during the experiment. The manager added that the metric
information also provided by the dashboard, has helped to provide visual indicators about
the number of threats impacting the organisation.
One individual answered that the most used part of the dashboard application was the ‘Raw
Data’ spreadsheet. This individual suggested that this part of the dashboard has helped to
provide information that could easily be ‘sliced’ by managers who wanted the data for the
organisation’s information security intelligence lifecycle. Recall that this is a process where
the organisation collects data and produces intelligence for its management to make strategic
information security decisions. One individual stated that they did not use the dashboard
enough to determine which features were used the most because their role involved forensic
investigations.
Five of the interviewees argued that the incident response performance metrics and to a lesser
extent the bar and pie charts, were the least used features in the dashboard application. The
reason provided was because the participants believed that this type of information is more
suited for managers and security executives and not the security incident response team. Two
individuals indicated that they did not use the dashboard enough to determine which features
were used the least within the application.
7.6.2 Benefits of Using the Dashboard
When the practitioners within the organisation were queried if they see any benefit to using
the dashboard, all seven individuals answered that they see the added value of having the
dashboard application within the security incident response team. The interview participants
identified three main benefits. Four individuals reported that the dashboard has helped to im-
prove the quality of data documented in the security investigation records through visualising
missing information using the Graphical User Interface (GUI). Two individuals indicated that
the dashboard has helped to provide information summarising the security incident response
landscape for the monthly pack of statistics for senior management. One individual added
that another benefit was that the dashboard has assisted with the extraction of information
for the organisation’s information security intelligence lifecycle.
In order to investigate how the dashboard GUI has helped to improve the quality of data
documented in the security investigation records, an analysis of the data in Snapshot Data
Set 2 was undertaken. This analysis focused on identifying and calculating the number of
‘Closed/Incomplete’ records as well as the time taken to correct these incomplete records.
The analysis from Data Set 2 showed that 61 ‘Closed/Incomplete’ records were identi-
fied from the snapshot files. The minimum number of ‘Closed/Incomplete’ investigations
records at any given point during the experiment was zero, while the maximum number of
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Figure 7.15: Closed/Incomplete Investigation Records Analysis
‘Closed/Incomplete’ records was thirteen. The mean average number of ‘Closed/Incomplete’
records using Data Set 2 was 3.95 records. Figure 7.15 shows the number of ‘Closed/ Incom-
plete’ records over the period of the experiment. The figure shows that from the end of April
2014 to the start of July 2014, there was a gradual increase in the number of investigation
records considered to be ‘Closed/Incomplete’. The number of records increased from four at
the end of April 2014 to thirteen records in July 2014. What this increase in records suggests
is that although the security incident response team was using the dashboard application, the
team was slow to identify and correct ‘Closed/Incomplete’ records.
After this initial increasing trend, the figure also shows that the number of ‘Closed/Incomplete’
records declined from thirteen at the start of July to zero records at the start of September
2014. During September 2014, it was observed that the number of ‘Closed/Incomplete’
records fluctuated between 10 and 12 records. From October 2014 to the end of December
2014, there was a large decrease in the number of ‘Closed/Incomplete’ records, with the
mean average during this period being 2.83 records. From January 2015 to the end of March
2015, it can be seen that the number of ‘Closed/Incomplete’ records continues to be about
two records. An exception to this trend can be seen in February 2015, where the number of
‘Closed/Incomplete’ records increased to eight and then decreased swiftly back to about two
records at the end of this month. From January 2015 to the end of March 2015, the mean
average number of ‘Closed/Incomplete’ records was 1.48 records.
The results above suggest that initially the security incident response team was slow to re-
act to identifying and correcting security investigation records which were considered to be
‘Closed/Incomplete’. Therefore, the next stage in the analysis was to examine how long the
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security incident response team took to correct a ‘Closed/Incomplete’ investigation record.
This analysis involved examining the 61 ‘Closed/Incomplete’ investigation records within
Snapshot Data Set 2. To calculate the time taken by the security incident response team to
correct an ‘Incomplete’ record, involved first identifying the date the investigation record
was first visible in the dashboard as ‘Incomplete’ and then, examining the snapshot data to
determine the date when the record was considered to be ‘Complete’. The difference be-
tween these two dates was considered the time taken to correct an ‘Incomplete’ investigation
record. The results of this calculation show that the maximum number of days it took the
security incident response team to correct an ‘Incomplete’ record was 57 days, while the min-
imum time was one day. The mean average number of days to correct a ‘Closed/Incomplete’
record was 14.47 days (just over two weeks). Figure 7.16 presents the number of days that
were required to correct the 61 ‘Incomplete’ investigation records. The investigation records
in the graph are presented in the order that they appeared as ‘Incomplete’ within the snapshot
data.
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Figure 7.16: Time to React to Incomplete Investigation Records
Figure 7.16 can be interpreted in two parts. The graph shows that initially, the security in-
cident response team was slow to correct an ‘Incomplete’ investigation record. From April
2014 to September 2014, 32 records were found to be ‘Incomplete’. During this period,
the mean average time for the security incident response team to correct an ‘Incomplete’
records was 23.44 days. However, as the experiment progressed the time taken to correct
an ‘Incomplete’ record decreased. From October 2014 to the end of March 2015, 29 inves-
tigation records were identified as ‘Incomplete’ and the mean average time was 4.59 days.
This findings show that the mean average time to correct an ‘Incomplete’ record decreased
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by nearly 81% in the second half of the experiment. However, two investigation records de-
viated significantly from this average during this second half of the experiment. These two
records were identified as ‘Incomplete’ at the end of January 2015 and were both closed and
corrected within 23 days.
Alternatively, the dashboard data can be analysed to examine the relationship between the
number of logins by the security incident response team and the mean average number of
days to correct an ‘Incomplete’ investigation record. This analysis involved analysing Data
Set 2 and in particular, the 61 ‘Incomplete’ investigation records. The investigation records
were first sorted by the month they had appeared ‘Incomplete’. The average number of days
to correct the ‘Incomplete’ records was then calculated for each month. The average number
of days to correct ‘Incomplete’ records for each month was then compared with the number
of logins in that month by the security incident response team. The results of this analysis is
presented in Figure 7.17.
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Figure 7.17: Average Time to Correct Record vs. Number of Logins
The results show that in the months where a low number of dashboard logins were recorded
(April, June and August 2014), the mean average number of days to correct an ‘Incomplete’
record increased. In April 2014, five logins resulted in a mean average of 25 days to correct
an ‘Incomplete’ record. Similarly in June 2014, nine dashboard logins resulted in a mean
average of 23 days. In contrast, months where a high number of logins were recorded (Octo-
ber - December 2014 and February - March 2015), the average number of days to correct an
‘Incomplete’ record decreased. For example, in October 2014, 17 logins resulted in an av-
erage of three days to correct an ‘Incomplete’ record and February 2015, 16 logins resulted
in an average of four days to correct an ‘Incomplete’ record. Therefore, the results suggest
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that the number of logins to the dashboard application had an impact on the number of days
it took the security incident response team to correct an ‘Incomplete’ investigation record.
The analysis above was then expanded to examine the findings from the perspective of in-
dividual security incident handlers. This expanded analysis focused on the six incident han-
dlers and examined the number of incident handler logins to the dashboard, with the average
number of days each incident handler took to correct an ‘Incomplete’ investigation record.
The results of this analysis is shown in Figure 7.18. The figure shows that the three incident
handlers (Incident Handlers 1,4 and 6) who used the dashboard application more frequently,
took less time to correct an ‘Incomplete’ record. In contrast, Incident Handler 2, who used
the dashboard less frequently, took longer to correct an ‘Incomplete’ record. However, the re-
sults for Incident Handler 3 go against both these trends. This individual extensively used the
dashboard however; they still had the highest average number of days to correct an ‘incom-
plete’ investigation record. Incident Handler 5 had no ‘Incomplete’ records and therefore,
no calculation was possible for this individual.
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Figure 7.18: Time to Correct Record vs. Number of Logins per Incident Handler
7.6.3 Complications of Using the Dashboard
Five out of the seven interviewees stated that they did not encounter any problems with the
dashboard application. However, one of these five individuals did state that the output data
presented by the application should be periodically reviewed. The reason provided by this
individual was that in order to maintain the value of the application, the data presented to the
security incident handlers should be “real-time relevant information and within the scope of
the threat environment currently affecting the organisation.”
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One individual stated that they had a problem using the dashboard application. This problem
involved the application running slowly when it was used from remote locations for exam-
ple, when working from home. This is a problem which cannot be avoided as the connection
speeds between the individual’s home and the organisation are likely to influence the rate at
which the application retrieves records from the security incident response database. How-
ever, it may have affected the frequency with which the individual accessed the application.
One individual stated that they did not use the dashboard enough to encounter any problems.
7.6.4 Impact of the Dashboard on Security Incident Response
Process
All seven individuals unanimously agreed that the dashboard has assisted the overall secu-
rity incident response process. A variety of answers were provided as potential justifications.
These included the dashboard providing a graphical interface to identify ‘Incomplete’ and
‘Open’ investigation records; as well as the fields required to complete them; centralised
management of information related to open/closed/complete/incomplete security investiga-
tion records; visualisations of the threat environment using security incident response data;
and clear indicators showing what records have been open for a long period of time (for
example records escalated to management) and need to be closed.
When the interview participants were asked if the dashboard application helped with collab-
oration within the security incident response team, six out the seven participants answered
‘Yes’. The six respondents provided a variety of answers on how the dashboard application
assisted in collaboration efforts. Three individuals stated that they used the dashboard to
discuss which fields need to be completed within an ‘Incomplete’ investigation record. In
fact, one of these six individuals noted they would often execute the dashboard looking for
‘Incomplete’ records, which belong to other individuals within the team and then notify the
individual which records and fields needed to be corrected.
One individual stated that they had used the dashboard application to identify which investi-
gation records needed to be transferred to another incident handler while the initial incident
handler was away on vacation. Another individual answered that the dashboard application
provided the security incident response team with a platform to discuss investigation records.
This individual stated that “the dashboard is a useful tool to show between ourselves, what
records and fields need our attention because as a team, we have become more transparent
in what records need more information to be completed, basically now the whole team can
see those records which need attention.” This comment from the individual shows that the
dashboard application has resulted in increased data awareness and that transparency has
been introduced into the security incident response database from the perspective of ‘Open’
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and ‘Closed/Incomplete’ records. This finding is in line with the findings of previous re-
searchers [231–233], who have evaluated dashboards in software development contexts.
In order to further evaluate the impact of the dashboard on the security incident response
process, a quantitative data analysis was undertaken. This analysis focused on the number of
records opened during the experiment, as well as a combined perspective of Open/Closed/
Incomplete investigation records. The analysis was conducted using data from Snapshot
Data Set 2. The results of the open record analysis examined the number of records which
were opened by the security incident response team on each day of the experiment. The
results of this analysis are presented in Figure 7.19. Note, the results of the analysis do
not include data for the 11th April 2014. On this day, the security incident response team
opened 59 investigation records. These investigation records were in reaction to a security
incident involving various employees, and each employee was assigned a specific record.
These 59 records were excluded because they obscure the identification of any trend with
regards to the open investigation records. The results of the analysis show that the workload
of the security incident response team has increased during the course of the experiment.
In the first half of the experiment, from the middle of February 2014 to the end of August
2014, the results show that the security incident response team created on average 0.58 new
investigation records per day. From the start of September 2014 to the end of the experiment
at the end of March 2014, the team created 1.01 new investigation records per day, nearly
double the number of investigation records. Therefore, the results show that the workload
of the security incident response team has increased significantly during the course of the
experiment.
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Figure 7.19: Open Investigation Records Analysis
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In addition to examining the number of investigation records opened by the security incident
response team, a combined perspective of the open/closed/incomplete records presents an
alternative view on the information. This analysis involved examining the cumulative num-
ber of records that were considered ‘Open’ and the number of ‘Closed/Incomplete’ records
on a given day. Figure 7.20 presents the results of this combined perspective analysis. Sev-
eral observations can be identified from this analysis. The figure shows that initially, as the
number of ‘Open’ records decreased (i.e. investigation records were completed), the number
of ‘Closed/Incomplete’ records increased. This can be best seen from the data for the 30th
May 2014 where the number of ‘Open’ records decreased from 56 to 48 and the number of
‘Incomplete’ records increased from three to eleven. This result suggests that the security
incident response team was under pressure with an increased workload and as a result the
number of ‘Incomplete’ investigation records increased. Further evidence for this can be
seen during the months of June and July 2014. The figure shows that the number of ‘In-
complete’ investigation records during this period went from eight on the 23rd June 2014
to thirteen on the 8th July 2014 and then back to eight records on the 9th July 2014. Only
24 records were considered ‘Open’ during this period. Therefore, as the security incident
response team was under less pressure, they attempted to correct investigation records which
were identified as ‘Incomplete’ within the dashboard application.
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Figure 7.20: Time to React to Incomplete Investigation Records
From the start of October 2014, approximately five months after the dashboard was imple-
mented, the data shows that the security incident response team improved on identifying and
closing ‘Incomplete’ records. On the 2nd of October 2014, the number of ‘Open’ records
went from 56 to 47 records and the number of ‘Incomplete’ records went from eleven to
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four. The data also shows that from the end of October 2014, the security incident response
team’s reaction to ‘Incomplete’ records improved even further. From this date, the num-
ber of ‘Incomplete’ records does not surpass six for the rest of the experiment. In fact, the
mean average of ‘Incomplete’ records measured during this period was 1.60 records, while
the mean average number of ‘Open’ records was 43.27 records. In summary, this result,
together with a reduced time to correct an ‘Incomplete’ record (from 23.44 to 4.59 days)
within the same period, suggests that the dashboard application has had a positive impact on
the team’s ability to correct ‘Incomplete’ investigation records in a timely manner.
7.7 Discussion
Overall, the results from the evaluation of the security incident response dashboard shows
that for a first iteration design, the outcomes were mainly positive. This section answers the
research questions presented at the start of the chapter and discusses the use of the dashboard,
the data challenges encountered, as well as the experiment limitations.
Experimental Research Question 1
The experiment shows that a dashboard application has provided a mechanism for the se-
curity incident response team in the organisation to identify investigation records which are
considered to be ‘Incomplete’ and require further detailed information. The results from
this experiment have shown that 61 security investigation records, which were identified
as ‘Closed/Incomplete’, were corrected by the incident handlers and are now considered
‘Complete’. The findings from the exploratory case study presented in Chapter four showed
that security incident handlers within the organisation did not appear to go back and correct
investigation records that were missing information. Therefore, in the context of the exper-
iment, the dashboard has provided an opportunity for security incident handlers to discuss
and analyse 61 ‘incomplete’ investigation record and improve the capture of information in
these records.
The analysis of the results from the snapshot files and follow-up interviews supports the
suggestion that the dashboard application has assisted with the identification of investigation
records which were considered to be ‘Incomplete‘. Analysing the results further, the data
shows that the actual number of ‘Incomplete’ records has decreased as the experiment pro-
gressed. In the initial months of the experiment, the number of ‘Incomplete’ records was
approximately twelve records per day and by the end of the experiment this had dropped to
approximately two records per day. Furthermore, as the experiment progressed, the time it
took for the security incident response team to identify an ‘Incomplete’ investigation record
decreased from 23.44 days to 4.59 days.
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Experimental Research Question 2
In response to the second experimental research question “What fields are considered im-
portant to a security incident response team with regards to security investigation record clo-
sure?”, the answer can be seen in the requirements collected from individuals as discussed
in Section 7.3. Two information security managers were involved in the identification of re-
quirements including the definition of an ‘Incomplete’ investigation record. These managers
selected eleven fields from the organisation’s security investigation record template, which
would need to be completed by incident handlers. These fields included information about
the classification of the investigation, dates and times security events/incidents were reported
and discovered, dates and times investigations were open and closed, as well as the number
of hours consumed working on a specific investigation.
Experimental Research Question 3
The results from the follow-up interviews undertaken during the experiment have suggested
that the dashboard has encouraged collaboration between individuals within the security in-
cident response team. Practitioners within the organisation argued that the dashboard ap-
plication has assisted with collaboration efforts in various ways. These include the incident
handlers using the dashboard to discuss which investigation record fields need to be corrected
within an ‘Incomplete’ investigation record, as well as identifying and transferring ‘Open’
investigation records when one incident handler goes away on vacation and another incident
handler has to take over the investigation.
Use of the Dashboard Application
The analysis of the snapshot files has shown that all the individuals within the security in-
cident response team, including their respective managers, have used the dashboard appli-
cation. Although some individuals have used the dashboard more than others, specific job
roles and tasks dictated which individuals accessed the dashboard more frequently than oth-
ers. One of the security incident handlers identified that their job role focuses on the forensic
aspects of investigations and therefore, they did not use the dashboard as frequent as other
incident handlers.
Through the analysis of the results from of the experiment, it was also found that security in-
cident handlers periodically executed the dashboard and identified ‘incomplete’ investigation
records and then informed the relevant individuals that their records needed to be corrected.
While this was not a requirement and the security incident handlers were free to execute the
application when desired, having an individual periodically take on the identification and
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management of incomplete records appears to have assisted the team. When asked about
these actions in the follow-up interview, these individuals confirmed that they would execute
the dashboard and specifically identify incomplete records, including those that may not be-
long to them. These individuals confirmed that they would then share the dashboard findings
with the incident handlers who needed to correct their ‘Incomplete’ records.
Experiment and Data Challenges
While the results from the experiment suggest that the dashboard has provided an oppor-
tunity for incident handler to improve the capture of information in security investigation
records, numerous challenges and limitations were also observed during the experiment. Al-
though data consistency checks were performed when data was fetched from the IBM Lotus
Notes server, when the author periodically analysed the ‘Raw Data’ worksheet, there was
still evidence of ‘dirty’ data. This data caused numerous problems with the dashboard appli-
cation, for example run-time errors because information was not being stored in the correct
format within the investigation record. The majority of the run-time errors were cause by
dates and times being stored in a variety of different formats.
Problems were also observed within the ‘Status’ field, where words other than ‘Open’ or
‘Closed’ were documented within this field. These data quality challenges point to problems
with the security investigation record template stored within the security incident response
database. The problem is primarily caused by the lack of data checking during the input of
information into the record template. As a result, incident handlers can input information in a
wrong format, which is then accepted by the record template, because it is based on free-text
fields with no data checking. However, when the dashboard fetches this information from
the security incident response database, if some form of ‘data cleaning’ is not undertaken
during the processing of this information, the dashboard uses ‘dirty data’ in the metric cal-
culation and visualisations. As a result, either a run-time error is presented to the user or the
graphical visualisations are not generated. In these cases, once the data had been corrected
the dashboard continued to function as normal.
The experiment was also limited with regards to the dashboard being designed using re-
quirements from individuals who were no longer employed within the organisation. Recall
that two information security managers provided input into the requirements for the design
of the dashboard. One of these managers left the organisation half way through the exper-
iment and was replaced by another individual. However, various parts of the dashboard,
such as the metrics and security event/incident visualisations, which were created to present
information for managerial decisions, were not considered to be as important features by
the in-coming manager. This could explain why these features of the dashboard were used
the least within the security incident response team. Therefore, if the original manager had
7.8. Summary 181
remained throughout the experiment, these features could have been used more often during
the experiment.
Another limitation which needs to be acknowledged is the extend to which the dashboard
itself has improved with the capture of information within security investigation records.
While the data collected from the experiment has suggested that when the dashboard was
deployed in the organisation, ‘incomplete’ investigation records were corrected, it can be
difficult to isolate if the dashboard was the primary instigator of this change. An alternative
view is that the dashboard has assisted with improving group and investigation record aware-
ness within the security incident response team [231, 234]. In this context, awareness refers
to the “understanding of who you are working with, what is being worked on, and how your
actions affect others [231]. Evidence to support this argument can be seen in the answers
from the interviews with individuals in the organisation. Individuals during the interviews
suggested that the dashboard allowed the entire team to identify which investigation records
need more information and in a sense know who is working on what investigation and what
stage the investigation currently resides.
7.8 Summary
This chapter described an experiment to evaluate the use of a dashboard application within
a real-world security incident response team. The application was evaluated to determine if
a dashboard can help a security incident response team to improve the quality of data within
‘incomplete’ security investigation records. The experiment also evaluated if a dashboard
application can help provide a platform for collaboration within security incident response
teams. The initial findings from the experiment show that the dashboard application has as-
sisted with the identification and correction of ‘Incomplete’ security investigation records.
The results have shown that individuals within the security incident response team corrected
61 security investigation records, which were identified as ‘Closed/Incomplete. In the context
of the experiment, these are 61 investigations records, where further information has been
recorded, which if historical trends had continued, may not have been corrected within the
organisation. In addition to capturing further information, the results suggest that the dash-
board has assisted in reducing the time taken to correct an incomplete investigation record.
In the initial months of the experiment, the security incident response team took 23.44 days
to correct an ‘Incomplete’ record, while at the end of the experiment, this decreased to just
over four days.
Within the follow-up interviews, practitioners indicated that the dashboard application has
helped with collaboration efforts within the security incident response team. Practitioners
argued that the dashboard has assisted with collaboration efforts in several different ways.
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These include using the GUI interface to discuss which fields need to be corrected within an
‘incomplete’ investigation record and using the dashboard to identify and discuss the trans-
fer of open investigation records from one incident handler to another because of vacation
schedules.
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Chapter 8
Root Cause Analysis Framework
Chapter three presented evidence from the literature where researchers have argued that secu-
rity incident response teams should look beyond the immediate causes of security incidents
using methods such as root cause analysis. However, there is little empirical research actu-
ally investigating the effectiveness of such methods for security incident response. Chapter
four identified practitioners’ requirements for improved methods and tools to assist in the
development of lessons learned in the Fortune 500 Organisation (‘the organisation’). This
chapter presents a root cause analysis framework for the analysis of security incidents within
the organisation. The framework was developed and applied to a historical study of in-
vestigation records within the organisation, which highlighted the need for increased data
quality in security investigation records in order to examine underlying security issues. The
framework was then applied to three ‘live’ security investigations within the organisation.
The results have shown that applying the framework to ‘live’ security investigations helped
to identify underlying root causes as well as improve the quality of data generated from a
security investigation.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 8.1 reviews the motivation for developing the
framework and provides an overview of the research method used in the experiment, while
Section 8.2 describes the development of the framework. Section 8.3 describes how the
framework was applied to a historical set of security incident response investigation records,
along with the implications of these results. Section 8.4 describes how the framework was
applied to three ‘live’ security investigations within the organisation, along with the ques-
tions asked to obtain a more in-depth root cause analysis. Section 8.5 presents the results
from semi-structured follow-up interviews undertaken in the organisation which attempted
to gather practitioner opinions on the framework and its use within security incident investi-
gations. Section 8.6 presents an analysis of the ‘live’ three security investigations undertaken
and discusses the significance of the study. Section 8.7 summarises the chapter.
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8.1 Motivation and Research Method
Recall (Section 3.4.2) that researchers [16, 126, 127] have argued that organisations should
look beyond the immediate causes of a security incident and examine underlying root causes
using various tools and techniques. Previously, Johnson described how Violation and Vul-
nerability (V2) diagrams can be used to assist root cause analysis [126]. While Johnson
demonstrated how the V2 diagrams can be used in an analysis of fraudulent transactions in-
volving the Allfirst Bank, he observes that “much remains to be done” to extend and tailor the
technique described to support security investigations in a range of different domains [126].
Separately, Stephenson [127] proposed a methodology that uses coloured Petri nets to model
attacks of security processes within an organisation. Stephenson [127] then demonstrated
how to model a virus infection that has spread through an organisation’s network structure.
While these researchers have demonstrated various root cause analysis tools and techniques,
very little empirical research investigates the integration and effectiveness of such tools and
techniques in real-world security incident response investigations.
In addition to the literature, the interview results from the exploratory case study presented
in Chapter four showed that security incident handlers within the organisation called for im-
proved tools and techniques to assist in the development of lessons learned. While these
practitioners specifically mentioned root cause analysis as one potential tool, there is cur-
rently little evidence to suggest that such a tool would work in the organisation. Therefore,
based on increasing calls from academia to examine the underlying root causes of security
incidents, coupled with practitioners requests for improved tools and techniques to assist in
the development of lessons learned, a root cause analysis framework was designed and eval-
uated in the organisation. The objective of the research was twofold. First, the research was
used to investigate if a root cause analysis framework can help to identify underlying causes
of a security incident. Second, the research was used to examine if the root cause analy-
sis framework helps to enhance the quality of data during a security investigation. Three
research questions guided this experiment:
1. Can a framework be designed to help guide root cause analysis within security incident
investigations?
2. Can it be demonstrated through the use of the framework, that a root cause analysis
method does help to identify underlying causes of a security incident?
3. Can it be demonstrated through the use of the framework, that enhanced data can be
generated from security incident investigations within an organisation?
In order to answer these research questions, an experiment was designed which involved
four stages: 1) design the root cause analysis framework; 2) undertake a study using the
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framework to evaluate historical investigations within the organisation; 3) use the framework
in real-world ‘live’ security investigations; and 4) evaluate the framework through semi-
structured interviews with practitioners.
The first stage of the experiment was to design the framework. Inspiration for developing the
framework was sought from various books [15, 235], technical white-papers [236–239], as
well as previous academic research [240, 241] into root cause analysis in the nuclear, chem-
ical, manufacturing, aviation and healthcare domains. In addition to analysing the literature,
discussions were held with the industrial sponsor in the organisation. These discussions
were used to present ideas and recommendations for developing a framework for use within
the organisation’s security incident response team. The framework was validated by two
academics with experience within the information security research community, as well as
the Head of Information Security within the organisation. The validation involved the au-
thor explaining the framework and feedback being received from the above individuals. The
framework, including the suggested changes, is described in more detailed in Section 8.2.
The second stage of the experiment involved applying the validated framework to historical
security investigation records in the organisation. The purpose of this analysis was to inves-
tigate if a) a root cause can be determined using the framework and only the information
documented in a security investigation record and b) in the investigation records where no
root cause was established, to determine what questions need to be asked with regards to
obtaining more information about the root cause. The historical analysis involved reading
the security investigation records and applying the framework to identify a root cause. It
must be noted that any root causes described in the investigation records were not included
in the analysis and only information about the investigation itself was used for the analy-
sis. In the event a root cause could not be established or an answer to a question could not
be determined from the record, the analysis was stopped and the position in the framework
was documented along with the question which could not be answered. The purpose was
to determine what questions would need to be asked during an investigation to enhance the
quality of data for root cause analysis. The historical analysis and the results from the study
will be discussed in Section 8.3.
In the third stage of the experiment, the framework was applied to three ‘live’ security in-
vestigations. A ‘live’ investigation in this case is a security investigation that was reported,
investigated and closed by the security incident response team, at the time of the experiment.
This involved executing the framework together with one or more incident handlers within
the organisation’s security incident response team. The author undertook the responsibility
of executing the framework and collected the required information from the relevant secu-
rity incident handler(s). Effectively, the author executed a parallel investigation to that being
conducted by the incident handlers. The purpose of this third stage was to evaluate if the
framework can be used to develop enhanced lessons learned. In addition to obtaining an-
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swers from incident handlers with regards to the questions from the framework, additional
information was requested about the answer. This information included who provided the
answer to the question, how the answer was derived and what evidence could confirm the
answer to the relevant question. The results from the application of the framework to the
three ‘live’ investigations are presented in Section 8.4.
The fourth stage of the experiment involved a qualitative data collection through the use of
semi-structured interviews within the organisation. The purpose of the interviews was to
determine the practitioner perspective on the benefits/weaknesses of the framework, as well
to determine the impact that such a framework could have on the security incident response
process. The results from the semi-structured interviews are presented in Section 8.5.
8.2 Developing the Framework
The framework is an extension of the 5-Whys root cause technique. The 5-Whys technique
was originally developed for use within the Toyota Motor Corporation’s Production System
[242]. The technique is an iterative question-asking approach that can be used to determine
the root cause of a defect or problem [242]. The foundations of the technique involves
repeating the question “Why?” five times, with the answer from each “Why?” question
effectively forming the basis of the next question. It is expected that by repeatedly asking
“Why?”, an investigator ‘peels’ away layers of issues and symptoms that can lead to a root
cause [243]. Typically, five iterations are required to resolve a problem using the 5-Whys
technique [243].
The 5-whys technique was selected as a basis for the framework for two reasons. First,
researchers have cited the 5-Whys technique as an approach which can be adapted and ap-
plied to problems in a variety of domains including manufacturing [244], engineering [245]
and healthcare [246]. At the time of writing, no one has attempted to evaluate the 5-Whys
method as a root cause analysis technique within security incident response. The second
reason the 5-Whys technique was selected was because the approach does not require a con-
siderable amount of training, can be completed without statistical analysis and is considered
to be less stressful on participants [243, 247]. This was considered important, following the
‘lightweight’ practitioner requirements identified in the exploratory case study in Chapter
four.
8.2.1 Framework Overview
The framework as shown in Figure 8.1 consists of three parts labelled as Part A-C on the fig-
ure below. Labels have been added to aid the discussion. Part A is concerned with providing
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guidance as to when to execute the framework and undertake a root cause analysis within a
security investigation. A prerequisite of the framework is that a security incident response
team will have some information about an investigation. The first decision within the frame-
work prompts a security incident response team to determine from its security investigation
information, if there ‘Has there been an (un)deliberate attempt to violate the confidentiality,
integrity and/or availability of an information asset?’. For the purpose of this discussion, an
information asset is used in the context of the definition proposed in Chapter 3. The term
‘(un)deliberate’ is used to emphasise that both purposeful and accidental violations should
be considered. The purpose behind this question is to help security incident response teams
decide when to undertake a root cause analysis. More specifically, a root cause analysis on
a security investigation is performed when there has been a breach in either confidentiality,
integrity and/or availability of an information asset. This means that investigations such as
an E-Discovery Request, which do not involve a breach in confidentiality, integrity and/or
availability, would result in a ‘No root cause analysis required’ decision. As a result, an
organisation will not consume valuable resources on investigations, which do not require a
root cause analysis.
If the security information from an investigation identifies that there is a breach in either the
confidentiality, integrity and/or availability of an information asset then the next step (Part B)
is to determine if a third-party provider is involved. According to industrial surveys by Ernst
& Young [248] and Deloitte [249], organisations continue to outsource their information
technology facilities. As a result, there is an increasing probability that security investi-
gations could involve third-parties. While these third-parties may not own the confidential
information targeted in an attack, they might own the underlying hardware and therefore
their assistance could be required to conduct any in-depth investigation, including a root
cause analysis. Part B prompts a security incident response team to query if a third-party is
involved in the investigation. If a third-party is involved, then depending on any pre-existing
Service-Level-Agreements (SLAs), the security incident response team needs to determine
if it can obtain the investigation data it requires to undertake a root cause analysis. In this
context, an SLA is an agreement between an organisation and a third-party where the ser-
vices provided and expectations of the organisation are formally documented. Although not
explicitly part of the framework, if a security incident response team identifies that the SLA
is inappropriate (i.e. it does not permit requests of assistance from a third-party for a RCA),
then this could be identified during a retrospective as a potential issue for process improve-
ment (as discussed in Chapter 6). If the answer to the third-party involvement is ‘Yes’ then
the next part of the framework (Part C) is initiated.
If the answer is ‘No’ then a request must be made to the third-party involved to undertake a
root cause analysis on-behalf of the requesting organisation. Upon completion of the third-
party root cause analysis, the results can be examined and an organisation can ask ‘If the
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Has there been an (un)deliberate      
attempt to violate the
 CIA of an information asset?
Known data from security 
investigation
Is a third-party provider 
involved?
Begin Root Cause 
Analysis 
(Why?)
Continue Root Cause 
Analysis 
(Why?)
Do we have a current 
diagnosis for the problem?
Does the security incident response 
team have access to the required 
investigative data?
No root cause analysis 
required
If the current diagnosis was fixed, 
would the security problem reoccur?
Request root cause 
analysis from third-
party provider
Stop root cause 
analysis & document 
root cause(s)
YES
NO
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
If the current diagnosis was 
fixed, would the security 
problem reoccur?
YES
NO
Part A
Part B
Part C
Figure 8.1: The Root Cause Analysis Framework
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current diagnosis was fixed, would the security problem reoccur?’ If the answer is ‘Yes’
then a root cause analysis is again requested from a third-party. If the answer to the query is
‘No’ the framework stops and the root cause(s) are documented for the organisation’s future
reference.
In the event a third-party is not involved or a security incident response team has access to
the required security data to undertake a root cause analysis, Part C can be initiated. This part
of the framework is where the question “Why?” is asked and the answer from each question
effectively forms the basis of the next question. When an answer from a “Why?” question
is formulated, a security incident response team needs to consider: “Do we have a current
diagnosis for the problem?” If the answer is ‘No’, the next “Why?” question is asked using
the answer from the previous question. However, if the answer is ‘Yes’ then the next question
asked is: “If the current diagnosis was fixed, would the security problem reoccur?” If the
answer to this query is ‘Yes’, then the root cause analysis continues and the next “Why?”
question is asked. However, if the answer to this query is ‘No’, it is considered that the
current diagnosis, if fixed, would prevent a security problem from reoccurring. With this
indication, the iteration of framework stops and prompts the documentation of the identified
root cause(s).
The framework does not specify a particular number of ‘Whys?’ that must be asked, or a
limit on how many can be asked. Unlike other root cause analysis approaches, which do not
define when to stop a root cause analysis, the framework stops when a solution is identified
by a security incident response team, which if fixed, would prevent a security problem from
reoccurring. This feature of the framework helps to guide the conclusion of a root cause
analysis, when a solution(s) has been found and without consuming additional resources.
The next section will describe how the ‘Why?’ questions can be documented using a tabular
worksheet.
8.2.2 Framework Tabular Sheet
A pragmatic decision was made to use a tabular sheet for the purpose of documenting the
root cause analysis using the framework. This decision was based on literature which argued
that visualising a root cause analysis through a table can help to identify any links between
incident causes and the ultimate root cause(s) [243]. The tabular sheet used within the frame-
work is an extension of a Microsoft Excel table proposed by Bulsuk [250], who used it to
conduct a 5-Whys analysis. The table used in the framework is shown in Figure 8.2.
Prior to undertaking the actual root cause analysis, a security incident handler should look to
define the problem statement that the analysis will look to address as well as the name of the
investigation. The root cause analysis itself is documented in a series of “Why?” columns.
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Investigation Name
Problem Statement
Why 1 Why 2 Why 3 Why N Root Cause
Answer: 
Who:  
How:
Evidence: 
Figure 8.2: Table Used to Document Root Cause Analysis
Each “Why?” column is used to document one or more answers (causes) to a particular
“Why?” question. The ‘Root Cause’ column contains the final root cause(s) identified from
the various “Why?” questions. The first “Why?” question attempts to directly address the
problem statement. If more than one answer to a “Why?” question exists, then each answer
is documented on a separate line under the particular column. Each answer to a “Why?”
question is then handled separately in the next iteration and forms the basis of the next
“Why?” question. In subsequent iterations, “Why?” is asked for each answer under the
previous column and the answer to this question is placed under the next “Why” column (in
this case “Why 2”). The iteration continues until a root cause is found, which if fixed, would
prevent the security problem from reoccurring.
Additional provenance information is also documented for each answer to a “Why?” ques-
tion. This information includes “Answer” which is the actual answer to the “Why?” ques-
tion asked; “Who?”, the job title or name of the individual who provided the answer to the
“Why?” question; “How?”, what method did the individual use to provide the answer; and
“Evidence” what evidence can the individual provide justifying their answer to the “Why?”
question. The purpose of documenting this additional information was to enhance the cred-
ibility and validation of the root causes identified using the framework. If an information
security manager or any other individual within a management role wanted to audit the root
causes identified, this additional information could help with this validation. The next sec-
tion will be used to discuss how a historical study of the organisation’s security investigation
records was undertaken as well as the results from this historical study.
8.3 Historical Study
The second stage in the experiment involved applying the framework to historical security in-
cident response investigation records in the organisation. There are two parts to this section.
The first part presents a worked example, which is used to illustrate how this historical study
was undertaken. The second part presents and analyses the results from the historical study.
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Note, the security investigation records used in the historical study have been anonymised to
protect the identity of the studied organisation.
8.3.1 Historical Study Worked Example
The worked example describes an investigation about a virus infection within the organ-
isation. Below is a narrative summary of the content of the actual security investigation
analysed as part of the worked example:
1. The Intrusion Detection System (IDS) alerted the Helpdesk that a laptop was infected
with the myDoom.F virus, the laptop was then cleaned.
2. The Helpdesk were then notified by employees via email that files were being deleted
by the virus on the Local Area Network (LAN).
3. Information Security Analyst 1 advised the Helpdesk that this should not be the case
and that the virus should not be deleting any files.
4. Information Security Analyst 2 confirmed that files were indeed being deleted, further
analysis identified that a variant of the myDoom.F virus does indeed delete files.
5. A scan of the LAN was performed for Internet Protocol (IP) addresses with open port
TCP/UDP 1080 (the port the virus leaves open if it is on a laptop/computer).
6. Three laptops that were detected as infected were cleaned. It was documented in the
investigation record that two out of three laptops were not running the latest .dat an-
tivirus update.
7. Subnets with affected nodes were then isolated from the LAN.
8. Discussions were held around how the virus arrived on organisational LAN. It was sug-
gested that the virus arrived via email servers, which did not have latest .dat antivirus
updates.
9. Antivirus signatures (.dat files) updates ‘rolled-out’ across the organisation and these
updates were now blocking the virus.
10. Further virus infections reported overnight, network shares were then disabled to pre-
vent further infection and to help identify the nodes responsible for causing the new
infections.
11. Various restoration actions were then undertaken.
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Worked Example Investigation
Antivirus Infection Alert on Monitoring Systems
Why 1 Why 2 Why 3 Root Cause
Answer: Laptops and personal 
computers are reported to have been 
infected with MyDoom.F virus variant.                                   
Who: Helpdesk Analyst                                             
How: Investigation into alert          
Evidence: Intrusion Detection Logs
Answer: Virus emerged before email 
servers received their antivirus updates.                                          
Who: Intrusion Detection System 
Team Manager                                             
How: Investigation into alert          
Evidence: Antivirus Server Logs
Why were the antivirus 
updates not deployed 
quicker?
Figure 8.3: Worked Example Root Cause Analysis Table
The framework was then applied using only the information available in the security investi-
gation record.
‘Has there been an (un)deliberate attempt to violate the confidentiality, integrity, or avail-
ability of an information asset?’ - Yes
‘Is a third-party involved?’ - No
Figure 8.3 presents the framework worksheet for the worked example. The table was con-
structed using information only in the relevant security investigation record, which was sum-
marised above. As Figure 8.3 shows, the problem statement extracted from the investiga-
tion record was: “Antivirus infection alert on monitoring systems”. This problem statement
was then used as the input to the first ‘Why?’ question: “Why was the alert notifying the
Helpdesk team?” One cause (the answer) was identified: “Laptops and personal computers
have been infected with a variant of the myDoom.F virus”. This answer was provided by a
Helpdesk Analyst, through their investigation into the alert and supported by logs from the
IDS. The cause identified in the first ‘Why?’ question is then mapped under the “Why 1”
column in the table. The second “Why?” question uses this answer as the basis for the next
question: “Why was the virus present on the laptops/computers?”. The cause identified from
the second question is “The virus likely arrived via email before the email servers received
their antivirus updates”. This answer is provided by the IDS Team manager through their
investigation into the alert and supported by logs from the antivirus server. The cause is then
mapped to the “Why 2” column and is then used as the basis of the next question, “Why
were the antivirus updates not deployed quicker?”. The answer to the third “Why?” question
can not be found in the investigation record and as a result, this record is considered to have
stopped at the third “Why?”. The actions described in the worked example above were then
repeated in a historical study involving 530 investigation records in the organisation’s secu-
rity incident response database, which were recorded in the database from November 2003
to November 2014.
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Figure 8.4: Summary of Results from Historical Root Cause Analysis
8.3.2 Historical Study Results
The historical study was undertaken between November and December 2014. The study in-
volved examining the 530 investigation records and applying the framework to these records.
The purpose of the study was to investigate if these investigation records could have bene-
fited from a more in-depth analysis to look beyond the immediate causes of the incident
and examine underlying root causes. A deliberate decision was made not to involve se-
curity incident response employees and only use the information available in the security
investigation records. This was done because the purpose of the study was to identify the
quality of information in security investigation records and if this information can be used
to examine underlying root causes. This section presents the results of the historical study
analysis. As shown in Figure 8.4, the results show that out of the 530 investigation records,
364 records were found to describe problems which did not result in the breach of confiden-
tiality, integrity and/or availability of an information asset. Therefore, the analysis of these
364 records terminated at the first check. A further 45 records lacked sufficient information
to determine whether an attempt to breach the confidentiality, integrity and/or availability of
an information asset occurred, so again the analysis of these 45 records terminated at the first
check.
10 out of the 530 analysed investigation records terminated at the third check-box. This is
because the investigation records indicated that a third-party was involved in the security
incident, but the security incident response team did not have access to the required data to
undertake a root cause. In this case, according to the framework, the third-party would have
had to undertake the root cause analysis. However, no documented information within these
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Figure 8.5: Summary of Terminated Iterations for Discovered Root Causes
ten investigation records suggested that a root cause was undertaken by these third-parties.
A root cause was identified in 36 (7%) out of the 530 analysed investigation records. In these
36 records, the framework terminated because a root cause was found, which if fixed, would
have prevented the security problem from reoccurring. These 36 causes were identified at
various iterations in the framework. Figure 8.5, summarises at which “Why?” question the
36 records terminated because a root cause was found. In four out of the 36 records, the root
cause was found in the first “Why?” question. In these four cases, two causes were identified
as laptops stolen from the employee’s homes and two causes were identified as laptops being
lost while employees were away on business for the organisation. Based on the assumption
that the employees were permitted to remove the laptops from the organisation, in all four
cases the root cause was neither the employees nor the organisation’s fault but the result of a
particular set of circumstances. In 23 out of the 36 records, a root cause was identified in the
second “Why?” question. This means that for nearly 64% of the 36 investigation records the
root cause was identified in the second iteration of the framework. Within seven out of the
36 investigation records, a root cause was identified in the third “Why?”, while within two
investigation records the root cause was identified in the fourth “Why?” question.
The results from the above analysis were then compared with the root cause information doc-
umented in the relevant investigation records. This involved examining the 36 investigation
records and comparing the root cause established by the security incident handler with the
results from the historical analysis. The results of this comparison showed that within nine
out of the 36 investigations a different root cause analysis was identified using the frame-
work. In these nine cases, it was observed from the analysis of the investigation records that
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the incident handlers stopped their investigation prior to identifying the actual underlying
cause. For example, one investigation record described an incident about organisational data
being copied onto an USB flash drive. The underlying cause documented in the investigation
record was a ‘Breach of Policy’. However, the root cause analysis findings for this investi-
gation record indicted that the laptop which was used to copy the data did not have its USB
ports disabled and this was because the laptop was not ‘locked-down’. This finding suggests
that security incident handlers within the organisation could be focusing on documenting the
consequences of the incident rather than the causes of the security incidents.
While a root cause was identified using the framework in 36 security investigation records,
there were 75 records where a root cause could not be established using only the information
in the investigation records. This was because the answers to “Why?” questions could
not be found in the investigation record itself and the answer from the previous “Why?”
question would not have prevented the security problem from recurring, if it was fixed. This
finding highlights that if more rigorous data was captured during an investigation then a
more in-depth root cause analysis could have taken place, should the need arise. Figure
8.6 summarises the number of investigation records which did not complete the framework,
along with the position in the framework the analysis was terminated.
No investigation records stopped at the first “Why?”. However, 56 out of the 75 (nearly
75%) of the investigation records stopped at the second “Why?” question. This means that
in nearly three quarters of the examined records, an answer to the second “Why?” question
could not be found and the framework was terminated. Recall that nearly 64% of the dis-
covered root causes were identified at the second “Why?” question. This result suggests that
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if the incident handlers had recorded a little more information, then more root causes could
have been identified in the historical study. Furthermore, 12 out of the 75 records stopped
at the third “Why?” question and four out of the 75 records stopped at the fourth “Why?”
question. Finally, three investigations record stopped at the fifth “Why?” question.
8.3.3 Historical Study Findings
The significance of the findings from the historical study are discussed below. These findings
are discussed from the perspective of investigation record data quality for root cause analysis,
documenting security investigations for root cause analysis and the impact of third-parties
on root cause analysis.
Investigation Record Data Quality for Root Cause Analysis
The results from the historical study have showed that the quality of the data in 120 of
the analysed investigation records may not be detailed enough for an in-depth Root Cause
Analysis (RCA). This is visible at two points during the historical study. 45 security investi-
gation records lacked sufficient information to determine whether there had been an attempt
to breach the confidentiality, integrity and/or availability of an information asset. There-
fore, in these 45 cases, the analysis of the investigation record stopped at the first check and
could not proceed to undertake a full RCA. Furthermore, 75 security investigation records
did not contain enough information to provide an answer to one of the “Why?” questions
asked during the application of the framework. In these 75 records, the analysis using the
framework could have proceeded further if more information was document during the initial
investigation. If more information was available in these 120 investigation records, then fur-
ther analysis using the framework could potentially have identified an underlying root cause
within these investigation records.
Documenting Security Investigations for Root Cause Analysis
The analysis of the 530 security investigation records showed that typically, the documented
investigation records describe the consequences rather than the causes of a security incident,
i.e. explaining what happened, but not why it happened. An extract from one investigation
record documented that “individual customer records were found on an unauthorised local
area network share, the manager was contacted and asked to remove the data immediately
to avoid regulatory repercussions” and then “data removed” is one example where conse-
quences rather than causes have been documented. This is a problem which has also been
identified in the safety domain [239]. Livingston, et al. [239] add that this can be corrected
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when an organisation adopts investigation techniques that explicitly identify root causes and
the mind set with incident handlers is that there is the potential to learn from past slips and
avoid similar incidents in the future. This observation from the content of the security in-
vestigation records supports previous findings that organisations are more concerned with
eradication and recovery and less on security incident learning [18, 19, 44].
Third-Party Involvement
Organisations are progressively outsourcing their Information Technology (IT) demands to
third parties [248, 249]. However, outsourcing IT services can also introduce vulnerabilities
into an organisation’s infrastructure and therefore, alternative strategies to conduct security
incident response in these settings could be required [251]. This can also introduce sev-
eral additional challenges for an organisation’s security incident response team tasked with
investigating incidents involving third-parties.
The results from the historical study identified one such challenge. The analysis from the
study showed that for 10 out of the 530 investigations, the investigation records suggested
that the security incident response team did not have access to the required data. As a result,
the security incident response team may not be able to perform a comprehensive investiga-
tion to identify underlying root causes. At this point, depending on the organisation’s SLA
with the third-party, either no RCA would have been conducted or the organisation would
have had to depend on the third-party to undertaken the RCA. However, an organisation
may not control how this RCA is undertaken or the quality of investigation that may fol-
low. Furthermore, third-parties can provide services to a variety of other customers, often
with competing demands and therefore may not be able to provide specific information to a
security incident response team who are looking to perform a root cause analysis.
In summary, the results from the historical analysis have highlighted that if more informa-
tion was documented during an investigation, enhanced underlying root causes could have
been identified from the investigations. The next section will describe the application of the
framework to ‘live’ security incidents to investigate the impact of asking further questions
and documenting more information during a security investigation.
8.4 Analysis of Security Incidents using Framework
This section presents the results from the analysis of three ‘live’ security investigations,
where a parallel investigation to that being conducted by the security incident handlers was
undertaken. This involved the author applying the framework together with one or more
incident handlers within the organisation. The framework was applied to three investigations
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during the course of the experiment. The author undertook the responsibility of applying the
framework and collected the required information from the incident handler(s). Information
which was requested from the incident handler(s) included answers to “Why?” questions,
who provided the answer to the question, how the answer was derived (e.g. ‘investigation
analysis’ or ‘through discussion’) and what evidence could confirm the answer to the relevant
question. The details of the analysis have been anonymised, hence the names of individuals,
processes and systems have been altered or generalised to protect the identity of the studied
organisation.
8.4.1 Investigation 1
This security incident involved unauthorised access to a restricted folder within a local area
network file share belonging to the Human Resources (HR) Department. The restricted
folder contained details for a number of employees and the investigation was initiated be-
cause access to the folder was granted to the ‘Authenticated Users Group’. This means that
all users in the organisation with a valid username and password could access the folder. The
following is a narrative summary derived from the actual investigation record of the events
leading to the incident:
1. A specific HR folder (a child folder) resided within a parent folder, which inherited
access control permissions from the parent folder.
2. A request was made to limit access to the child folder but the folder owner was in-
formed this was not possible because the child folder inherited permissions from the
parent folder and therefore access was based on the parent folder’s permissions.
3. Instead a new folder was created at the same-level as the parent folder which would
have its own permissions that only the individual could access.
4. The folder was created with restricted permissions, and the access permissions were
verified and authenticated by the individual. At this point, only the individual who
requested the folder could access it.
5. Data was copied from the HR folder to this new folder by the Windows Server Support
Team. After the data transfer was completed, the permissions were tested and only the
folder owner could access the folder.
6. A month later, whilst auditing folder permissions, the individual’s line manager iden-
tified that the access control list for the new folder had been modified and as a result
was now accessible to anyone within the organisation.
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7. A report was made to correct the access control list and set the permissions to the
correct access level. However, for an unknown period of time, anyone within the
organisation had access to the folder.
8. A report was made to the security incident response team.
The following is a narrative summary of the actual investigation record which highlights the
actions taken during the investigation as documented in the relevant investigation record:
1. The incident was reported to the security incident response team and a security incident
investigation was raised.
2. Discussions were held with the individual on the Access Control team who created the
folder and assigned the restricted permissions.
3. This individual confirmed that the permissions were validated by the requester and
his line manager. The individual also confirmed that the folder permissions were
rechecked once the data had been copied and this check showed that the access control
restrictions were still valid.
4. An incident meeting took place to establish what cause the security incident. In the
meeting gaps were identified in two processes, which could result in persons gaining
access to folders to which they do not have the correct permissions.
Framework Application
The results from the application of the framework to Investigation 1 can be found in Figure
8.7. Labels have been added to the RCA table sheet to assist with the discussion below. The
problem statement for this investigation was “Inadvertent access to a restricted folder con-
taining sensitive information”. The first “Why?” question came directly from the problem
statement, “Why was access possible on a folder which was supposed to be restricted?”. One
answer (ANS 1) was identified from this question: “Folder permissions were modified from
‘Restricted All’ to ‘Full Control All’ for the Authenticated Users group”. The answer was
provided by the Primary Incident Handler (PIH) through their investigation of the folder’s
permissions, as well as through discussions with the Access Control team.
The next “Why?” question focused on the answer from ANS 1 and the question was: “Why
were the folder permissions changed so that the authenticated users group had full control?”.
This resulted in two answers (ANS 2.1 and ANS 2.2). The answer for ANS 2.1 identified that
“The folder had been deleted from the network file share and then restored from a backup,
sometime later”. The answer for ANS 2.2 revealed that “When a folder is restored at the
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Figure 8.7: Framework Worksheet Results for Investigation 1
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parent folder-level, the Authenticated Users group is added by default to the restored/newly
created folder”. Both of these answers came from the PIH, through their investigation and
interviews with the Windows Server team, who had examined the logs on the file server
concerned with the investigation.
The next “Why” questions were derived from ANS 2.1 and ANS 2.2. The first “Why?”
question in the third iteration focused on ANS 2.1 and was: “Why was the folder deleted?”.
One answer (ANS 3.1) was derived from this question, “The folder was deleted because of
human error, but there is no evidence to suggest that this was done maliciously”. At this
point, no further “Why?” questions were asked with regards to the answer labelled ANS
3.1 and this was identified as a root cause. The second “Why?” question in this iteration
focused on ANS 2.2: “Why were the incorrect permissions and groups applied to the folder
upon restoration?”. Two answers (ANS 3.2 and ANS 3.3) were identified in response to
this question. ANS 3.2 focused on the folder restoration procedure within the organisation:
“The current restoration procedures do not take into consideration that folder permissions
may have changed from the default”. This means that when folders are restored the access
control permissions need to be reconfigured for the specific folder. ANS 3.3 continued with
the theme of the folder restoration: “No logging or auditing functionality or tool currently
exists to track permission changes to LAN folders”. This means that the team, which restores
the folders to the parent-level, needs to manually determine what permissions are required
and then apply them. All three answers (ANS 3.1 - ANS 3.3) were provided by the PIH, who
interviewed the Windows Server team as part of their investigation.
The next “Why?” questions focused on the two answers (ANS 3.2 and ANS 3.3) from the
previous iteration, where the root cause had not yet been established. The first “Why?”
question in this iteration focused on ANS 3.2 and asked: “Why do the current restoration
procedures not take into consideration that folder permissions may have changed from the
default?”. One answer (ANS 4.1) was identified in response to this question, “Changes to
processes are required which include manual permission checks before data is restored and
after data is restored, particularly focusing on folder permissions”. This answer was identi-
fied as a root cause and no further “Why?” questions were asked with regards to the answer
labelled ANS 4.1. The second “Why?” question in this iteration focused on ANS 3.3 and the
“Why?” question asked was: “Why is no logging or auditing undertaken to track permission
changes on LAN share folders?”. The answer (ANS 4.2) to this question identified another
root cause: “A business decision was made that this would be too expensive to automate and
is therefore done manually on a need-to-basis.” Both answers to the questions were provided
by the PIH through their interviews with the Windows Server team.
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8.4.2 Investigation 2
This security incident involved investigating auto-forward rules within the organisation’s Lo-
tus Notes email client system. An audit was undertaken to review email auto-forward rules,
which were detected by the organisation’s Data Loss Prevention (DLP) software. Auto-
forward rules can be used to automatically forward or redirect email messages sent from one
email account to another email account [252]. The following is a narrative summary derived
from the actual investigation record of the events leading to the incident:
1. The Information Security unit initiated an audit review of the email auto-forward rules
that had been detected by the DLP software in the past year.
2. Over 20,000 potential cases were identified from the initial review and an in-depth
analysis focused on these cases to determine if any breach of organisation’s informa-
tion security policy had occurred.
3. The results from the analysis showed that 59 cases were identified where a potential
breach of policy had occurred and a separate investigation was initiated for each case.
A master investigation record was used by the incident handlers to document the actions
undertaken during the 59 security investigations. The following is a narrative summary of
the actual investigation record which highlights the actions taken during the investigation as
documented in the in the relevant investigation record:
1. The two incident handlers who were assigned to the investigation, contacted all those
affected by the auto-forward cases with the instruction that unless the auto-forward
had been approved for a policy exception, all the rules must be deleted.
2. The investigation continued by contacting Email Support asking them for assistance
so that all non-exempt auto-forwards can be deleted by the team, as soon as possible.
3. Technical solutions were then discussed to block all auto-forwards.
Framework Application
The results from the application of the framework for Investigation 2 can be found in Figure
8.8. The problem statement derived for this investigation was: “Data Loss Prevention (DLP)
software identified approximately 22,000 cases of emails being auto-forwarded to external
email addresses”. The first “Why?” question came directly from the problem statement,
“Why were auto-forward emails being detected by the DLP software?”. One answer (ANS
1) was identified from this question, “Employees created the auto-forward rules within their
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Lotus Notes email clients”. The answer to this why question was provided by one of the
Primary Incident Handlers (PIHs) involved in the investigation, through their analysis of the
DLP logs.
The next “Why” question was derived from ANS 1, “Why were employees creating auto-
forward rules?”. Three answers (ANS 2.1 - 2.3) were identified in response to this “Why?”
question. ANS 2.1 identified that “Employees used their organisation email accounts for
personal activities”. ANS 2.2 identified that “Lotus Notes was not configured (i.e. ‘locked
down’) to prevent the creation of auto-forward rules on the client”. ANS 2.3 identified that
“Contractors travel between different sites and want to access their organisational email on
their personal devices and therefore set-up auto-forward rules to forward emails to their
personal email accounts”. All three answers were identified by the PIHs using a variety
of methods. ANS 2.1 was identified during the analysis of logs from the DLP software,
ANS 2.2 was identified from observations that there is a lack of documentation within the
organisation and ANS 2.3 was identified through interviews by the PIHs with the contractors
involved in the investigation.
The next “Why?” questions focused on the three answers (ANS 2.1 - 2.3) from the previous
iteration. The first “Why?” question in this iteration focused on ANS 2.1 and was used
to ask: “Why are employees using their organisational email address for personal usage?”.
Two answers (ANS 3.1 and ANS 3.2) were identified from this question. The first answer
(ANS 3.1) was “Convenience”. This is because employees attend various external vendor
training events and use their organisational email address at these events for registration.
This answer suggests that there is a lack of awareness surrounding potential data leakage
from personal email addresses. At this point, no further “Why?” questions were asked with
regards to the answer labelled ANS 3.1 and this was identified as a root cause. ANS 3.1 was
identified by the PIHs through their interviews with the affected individuals. The second
answer (ANS 3.2) was that “Local Information Security policies allow limited personal use
of organisational communication resources, but organisation-issued email accounts are not
specifically mentioned”. ANS 3.2 was identified by the PIHs during their investigation,
as well as through their observation of relevant information security policies. The second
“Why?” question in this iteration focused on ANS 2.2. The “Why?” question asked was
“Why is there no Lotus Notes lock-down standard?”. One answer (ANS 3.3) was identified
from this question,“It is not considered practical to have a lock-down standard for Lotus
Notes clients because there are frequent version changes and if problems arise, technical
solutions are often better suited to prevent a reoccurrence of a problem”. This answer was
provided by a Compliance Officer in the organisation, who was interviewed by the PIH.
The result from this “Why?” question provided another root cause, “Lack of lock-down
standard for Lotus Notes clients, which could have prevented auto-forward rules from being
created”. No further queries were submitted with regards to the lock-down standard. The
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Figure 8.8: Framework Worksheet Results for Investigation 2
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third “Why?” question in this iteration focused on ANS 2.3. The “Why?” question asked
was “Why are contractors sending organisational email to their personal devices?”. One
answer (ANS 3.4) was identified from this question, “This is because contractors are not
issued with organisation-owned mobile phones.” The answer was provided by one of the
PIHs who interviewed contractors affected by the investigation.
The next “Why?” questions focused on the answers (ANS 3.2 and 3.4) from the previous
iteration, where a root cause had not yet been identified. The first “Why?” question in this
iteration focused on ANS 3.2 and asked: “Why are organisation-issued email accounts not
explicitly excluded from the Local Information Security policies?”. One answer (ANS 4.1)
was identified, “The organisation’s Group Information Security Policy, supersedes the Local
Information Security Policy, and this explicitly prohibits users from auto-forwarding group
information to personal accounts as well as using group accounts for non-group activities”.
In this context, ‘Group’ refers to the parent company, which owns the studied organisation.
Therefore, the root cause identified from this query was that there is a “Lack of aware-
ness surrounding information security policies which prohibit personal usage of organisa-
tional resources”. No further inquiries were made in reference to ANS 4.1. The answer was
identified through interviews with one of the organisation’s information security managers,
as well as through an analysis of the organisation’s relevant documentation. The second
“Why?” question in this iteration focused on ANS 3.4 and asked: “Why were contractors
not issued with organisation-owned mobile phones?”. Two answers (ANS 4.2 and ANS 4.3)
were identified from this question. The first answer (ANS 4.2) was that “Issuing contractors
with organisation-owned mobile phones was not considered cost effective”. This answer
was provided through interviews with an information security manager and confirmed by
the contractor’s line manager. This answer provided another root cause, “A business deci-
sion was made not to issue contractors with organisation-owned mobile phones because of
financial costs”. No further enquires were made regarding this question. The second answer
(ANS 4.3), identified was that “Convenience, contractors did not want to have two mobile
devices”. This too was identified as a root cause and suggested a “Lack of education and
awareness surrounding potential data leakage from personally-owned mobile devices”. No
further questions were asked regarding why contractors auto-forwarded emails to their per-
sonal mobile devices. Both answers were identified by the PIHs through interviews with
affected contractors and with an information security manager.
8.4.3 Investigation 3
A security incident was raised in relation to a vulnerability being identified in a number of
Lotus Notes databases within the organisation. The vulnerability allows any authenticated
user to access administrative ‘views’ of the databases and read potentially confidential data
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of varying classification. The following is a narrative summary derived from the actual
investigation record of the events leading to the incident:
1. A report was made via the Helpdesk to the Information Technology Service Incident
Response (ITSIR) team about a potential vulnerability in three Lotus Notes databases.
2. The ITSIR team initiated the ITSIR process and held an incident meeting where it was
decided that this was an information security issue and not an IT service issue.
3. ITSIR team manager notified an information security analyst of a potential vulnerabil-
ity in the Lotus Notes databases.
4. The information security analyst in turn notified the security incident response team
who started the investigation.
The following is a narrative summary of the actions taken during the investigation as docu-
mented in the in the actual investigation record:
1. The security incident response team notified information security management of the
potential vulnerability and then initiated the security incident response process and a
primary incident handler was assigned to the investigation.
2. An incident meeting was held with the primary incident handler, the Lotus Notes De-
velopment team and various information security analysts involved within the Access
Control team.
3. The vulnerability was demonstrated at the incident meeting, which bypassed imple-
mented access controls and allowed employees to access administrative pages, where
confidential information could be viewed.
4. A fix was agreed between the primary incident handler and the Lotus Notes Develop-
ment team.
Framework Application
The results from the application of the framework for this investigation can be found in
Figure 8.9. The problem statement for this investigation was “Unauthorised access to ad-
ministrative areas within Lotus Notes Databases”. The first “Why?” question came directly
from the problem statement, “Why was unauthorised access possible within the Lotus Notes
Databases?”. One answer (ANS 1) was identified from this question: “Implemented access
controls for the administrative areas of the databases were bypassed by employees”. The
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Figure 8.9: Framework Worksheet Results for Investigation 3
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answer was provided by the Primary Incident Handler (PIH) through their own analysis of
logs files from the affected Lotus Notes databases.
The next “Why?” question focused on the answer (ANS 1) from the previous iteration,
“Why did the access controls fail?”. This resulted in one answer (ANS 2) being identified,
“A vulnerability was identified within the Lotus Notes databases which involved changing
the ‘set-view’ of an open database and this bypassed the access controls and provided access
to confidential information”. The evidence for this answer came from the PIH’s investiga-
tion and interviews with the Lotus Notes Development team, who examined the vulnerable
databases.
The next “Why” question focused on the existence of the vulnerability as identified in ANS
2 and therefore, the “Why?” question asked was “Why did the vulnerability exist within
the databases?”. Two answers (ANS 3.1 and ANS 3.2) were identified from this query. The
first answer (ANS 3.1) focused on the design of the databases themselves, “The vulnera-
bility was introduced during the design stage of the database interfaces several years ago”.
This answer was reported by Lotus Notes Development team who examined the historical
interface designs affected by the incident. The second answer (ANS 3.2) focused on the lack
of penetration testing looking for potential security weaknesses, “Penetration testing for the
Lotus Notes databases has not been undertaken for a long period (undefined) of time”. This
answer was identified through an interview with one of the information security managers
who was assigned to assist with the investigation.
The next “Why?” questions focused on the answers (ANS 3.1 and 3.2) from the previous
iteration. The first “Why?” question in this iteration focused on ANS 3.1 and asked “Why
did the vulnerability exist within the interface?”. This resulted in one answer (ANS 4.1)
being identified, “When the Lotus Notes database interfaces were designed and implemented,
security checks were not undertaken to check for the vulnerability”. This answer resulted in
the identification of a root cause, “Lack of security checks undertaken at the design stage
during the development of the databases several years ago”. The answer was reported by the
Lotus Notes Development team who examined the historical interface designs affected by the
incident. The second “Why?” question in this iteration focused on ANS 3.2 and asked “Why
had penetration testing not been undertaken on the database for a long period of time?”.
The answer (ANS 4.2) to this question was that “The Secure Applications process was not
followed, which dictates that penetration testing for applications and databases should be
undertaken regularly”. This answer resulted in the identification of another root cause. This
answer was identified through an interview with one of the information security managers
who was assigned to assist with the investigation.
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8.5 Framework Evolution using Semi-Structured In-
terviews
A series of follow-up interviews were undertaken within the organisation which were used
to assess practitioner perception of the framework. The interview questions focused on indi-
vidual’s usage of the framework during ‘live’ investigations, factors which contributed to the
successful or unsuccessful use the framework, perceived strengths and weaknesses of this
approach, the impact of the framework on security incident response, as well as additions to
the framework to improve overall root cause analysis.
8.5.1 Individuals Participation
Individuals were asked if they had participated in an investigation where the framework was
used to perform a root cause analysis. Three out of the seven individuals indicated that
they had participated in an investigation where the framework was used and four individuals
answered that they did not participate in an investigation where the framework was used.
8.5.2 Perceived Strengths and Weaknesses of the Framework
All seven individuals agreed that the framework provided a consistent and methodical way
of undertaking a root cause analysis, which improves both on approaches used in the organ-
isation and those highlighted in the best-practices. Three out of the seven individuals added
that the standardised framework also helps with repeatability and provides guidance to the
security incident response team about when to undertake a root cause analysis.
However, three individuals suggested that a variety of potential weaknesses could exist
within the framework. Two individuals argued that incident handlers “might become lazy
because a root cause analysis also requires analytical problem solving skills and the struc-
tured framework could mean that if pieces do not fall into place, will the incident handler(s)
know what to do when they need to deviate or will they just follow the process?”. The issue
raised by these interviewees is that incident handlers who use the framework might just fol-
low the process and not apply analytical thinking, when a deviation is required. As a result,
these incident handlers could just stop and note that a root cause cannot be found using the
framework. This is a valid concern, and while the framework provides a structured approach
to help guide a root cause analysis, some analytical skills are still required, especially if a
deviation from framework is required.
Another problem identified by one individual is that not every ‘fix’ in a root cause analysis
will prevent reoccurrence and in fact not all problems can be solved, therefore some incidents
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could still occur regardless of the root cause found. When asked to provide an example, the
individual stated that any security problem caused by ‘human error’ would likely result in a
root cause that cannot be fixed. This answer suggests that there may be some inconsistency
in the understanding of the term ‘root cause’. This is because according to the definition
in this work, the identification of a root cause implies the availability of fixes to prevent
reoccurrence.
8.5.3 Impact of the Framework on Security Incident Response
Five out of the seven individuals indicated that the framework provides some form of benefit
to the overall security incident response process. These five individuals suggested that the
framework, when integrated into a security incident response process, helps guide when a
root cause analysis is required, outlines how to determine one or more root causes and then
provides justification as to when the analysis should be concluded. Four out of the five indi-
viduals noted that one of the most important parts of the framework was the justification of
when to stop the root cause analysis. This is because security incident handlers could inter-
pret when to stop differently and the standardised decision-making process in the framework
removes any ambiguity surrounding this issue.
Two out of the seven individuals suggested that the framework both assists and hinders the
overall security incident response process. The individuals argued that because the frame-
work involves more work, it could slow down a security incident response process. However,
the individuals added that the framework could also help derive one or more root causes
which may not be identified using a ‘normal’ incident response process. One of the two
individuals added that the framework can also help security incident handlers who are un-
sure of how and when to do a root cause analysis, which means a more enhanced security
investigation and ‘deeper’ lessons learned.
8.5.4 Improving the Framework
Four out of the seven survey participants said they would not change the current framework
and could not think of anything that would improve it at the present time. The remaining
three participants proposed various modifications to the designed framework. Two individ-
uals suggested that the framework might need to be modified with regards to inserting a
‘break’ in the loop surrounding “If the current diagnosis was fixed would the security prob-
lem reoccur?’. This was raised as a concern because the individuals argued that the ‘fix’
is likely to be applied by other teams within the information security unit and the incident
handlers are unlikely to complete the process waiting for other teams to implement changes.
While this is a valid suggestion, the purpose of the framework is to help identify what fix
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could be applied to prevent re-occurrence and not to ensure that a fix is actually applied.
Applying fixes to security problems would vary between organisations and the framework
does not require that a fix is applied, merely that a fix is identified.
The third individual suggested that the framework should be modified so that a relationship
manager is interacting with a third-party provider and not the security incident response
team. This is an interesting suggestion that supports previous observations and findings
[27, 212] that security incident response is becoming a multidisciplinary affair, that involves
the integration of technical security professionals, information technology specialists and
relevant managers. Within the specific organisation, this suggestion has been made because
policies mandate that only relationship managers should be interacting with third-parties
who have contract obligations with the organisation.
8.5.5 Other Factors
Further interview questions attempted to determine what factors the respondents perceived
as contributing to the successful or unsuccessful use the framework for root cause analysis
within the security incident response team. Four individuals provided ‘do not know’ answers
because they were not involved in any root cause analysis using the framework.
Three individuals answered that time and access to data were important factors which need
to be taken into consideration when attempting to undertake a root cause analysis. Two out of
the three individuals argued that time is important because a root cause analysis can take time
to complete and the security incident response team cannot stop eradication and recovery
tasks to undertake a full analysis. Time was also discussed from the perspective that the
security incident response team’s workload can become very large and as a result, incident
handlers quickly move on to the next incident and may not find the time to undertake a root
cause analysis. The interviewee’s comments shows that the root cause analysis is viewed
as an after-event to the actual investigation process. This is not necessarily true because the
framework was designed to run in parallel to a security investigation being undertaken by an
incident handler. In fact, the framework can actually be used to guide an investigation being
undertaken and not just executed at the end of an investigation.
The comments from the three individuals have also highlighted a potential management cul-
ture issue, particularly with regards to leadership [253]. The implementation of a root cause
analysis in the organisation implies that management supports and encourages the process so
that new understandings into incident causes can be identified [254]. However, the individ-
ual’s comments indicate that further leadership from management is required to encourage
incident handlers to undertake a root cause analysis. Encouraging and leading incident han-
dlers to undertake a root cause analysis will also provide managers with information on
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problems that they can change and improve [255]. One out of the three individuals added
that access to data is important for a root cause analysis, in the sense that data needs to be
both consistent and available to the team undertaking a root cause analysis.
8.6 Discussion
The significance of the results from the ‘live’ security investigations using the framework
are discussed from four perspectives: selection of security incidents for root cause analy-
sis, learning without undertaking a root cause analysis, root cause analysis ‘buy-in’ and the
development of organisational culture towards root cause analysis.
8.6.1 Selection of Security Incidents for Root Cause Analysis
While the framework defines that a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is only undertaken when
there has been a breach in the confidentiality, integrity and/or availability (CIA) of an in-
formation asset, an observation from the application of the framework was that security
incident handlers disagreed on this proposed criteria. These incident handlers suggested that
even though a security incident has resulted in a breach of CIA, it must be ‘severe’ enough
to do a full RCA. During the application of the framework to ‘live’ security incidents, there
were several investigations where it was clear that there had been a breach of CIA. How-
ever, incident handlers who were approached to undertaken an analysis using the framework
considered that these investigations were not ‘serious enough’ to undertaken a full RCA. As
a result, the number of security incidents that were available to apply the complete frame-
work were reduced. Hence, only three ‘severe’ incidents were analysed using the complete
framework.
While the organisation’s information security incident response process dictates that a ‘root
cause’ is established for all security incidents, the term ‘root cause’ is not defined in the
process. Informal discussions with security incident handlers confirmed that the security
incident response team has not defined the term. A definition of the term ‘root cause’, as
well as when to undertake a root cause analysis within the organisation’s security in incident
response process could have helped to remove any ambiguity within the security incident
response team.
8.6.2 Learning Without a Full Root Cause Analysis
While the discussion above proposes that organisations should define when to undertake a
RCA, there is still the potential to learn from security incidents without a full RCA being un-
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dertaken. Recall Cooke’s definition of incident learning as “the collection of organisational
capabilities that enable the organisation to extract useful information from incidents of all
kinds and to use this information to improve organisational performance over time” [120].
Based on this definition, “useful information” and “improve organisational performance”
suggests that learning from security incidents can be as simple as calculating metrics as de-
scribed in Sections 4.3.3 and 6.4.9 and improving security incident response performance.
During the experiment, an observation was made that security incident handlers received
requests from information security managers for various information about the security in-
cident response landscape. This information included the number of security incidents of
particular types, the sources of specific incidents and which business units were affected the
most by incidents over a period of time.
These observations, when coupled with the practitioner’s concerns about the RCA frame-
work suggest that it is still possible to learn about a security incident without undertaking
a full RCA. Although underlying root causes will not be identified, analysing previous se-
curity incidents can still provide an organisation with information about its security threat
landscape, which it can then use to improve its wider security posture.
8.6.3 Root Cause Analysis ‘Buy-In’
The recommendation to conduct an experiment involving the framework was approved by
the organisation’s Head of Information Security. However, observations and informal dis-
cussions during the experiment showed that not all the security incident handlers and infor-
mation security managers had completely ‘bought-in’ to the idea of undertaking a root cause
analysis for particular incidents. The results from Investigation 2, as described in Section
8.4.2, were requested at the conclusion of the experiment and included as an appendix in the
actual investigation record. However, informal discussions with security incident handlers, in
the months that followed the investigation, revealed that none of the improvements identified
from the root cause analysis were actually implemented. Several reasons were established
including disagreements over the proposed improvements, as well as a lack of champion to
promote improvement implementation. From the perspective of time and resources required,
a root cause analysis can become an expensive activity for an organisation. Therefore, if an
organisation is going to undertake a root cause analysis, security incident response teams
and information security managers need to be convinced of the benefits of spending time
and resources to do so. A challenge here is that implementing proposed improvements (and
accepting associated costs) may be the only way of determining if the proposed fixes are
effective.
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8.6.4 Culture Shift for Root Cause Analysis
One of the individuals in the follow-up interviews stated that if a security problem is caused
by human error, the likely outcome would be a root cause that cannot be fixed. The basis of
this comment suggests that there are potential culture conflicts when it comes to conducting
a root cause analysis in the organisation, particularly with regards to fixing human issues
which have caused an incident. Several researchers [253–255] have argued that there is a
strong correlation between undertaking an effective root cause analysis in an organisation,
and the development of an organisation’s culture to ensure that the outcomes of the analysis
result in change. In order for a root cause analysis to be a success, it requires a culture of
openness, honesty, transparency, accountability, as well as a willingness to embrace the fact
that humans can make mistakes, which we need to learn from in order to avoid repeating
them in the future [253].
The answer from the individual that if an incident is caused by human error it cannot be fixed,
suggests the presence of a culture of blame in the organisation [191, 195]. By transferring
blame from the security team to the human element, the incident response team can avoid
blaming colleagues and potential allies in the Information Security unit. The presence of a
blame culture could also point to managerial culture issues, who could be quick to blame
employees for even the smallest of errors, which lead to security incidents. In turn, incident
handlers are likely to shift the blame to the human outside of the security process to avoid
being blamed for the security incident themselves.
One solution to this problem could be a culture shift towards a ‘just culture’ [253]. The
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation define a ‘just culture’ as a “culture
in which front-line operators and others are not punished for actions, omissions or decisions
taken by them which are commensurate with their experience and training, but where gross
negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts are not tolerated” [256]. To translate this
into security incident response, a ‘just culture’ would mean that employees are not punished
for actions, omissions or decisions which are identified using a root cause analysis. However,
if incidents are a result of gross negligence, wilful violations or destructive acts, then em-
ployees could face disciplinary matters. The shift towards a ‘just culture’ would mean that
security incident handlers would not be afraid of examining ‘human error’ as a root cause, as
only very serious ‘human error’ incidents would result in repercussions. In turn, employees
could also be more inclined to report less serious incidents, which can result in identifying
and fixing a correctable failure by management [256].
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8.7 Summary
This chapter described an experiment to evaluate a root cause analysis framework as a
method for conducting a root cause analysis of information security incidents. The frame-
work was applied to historical security investigation records in a Fortune 500 Organisation
with the purpose of investigating if the information documented within the records assist in
conducting a root cause analysis using the framework. The results from the study identified
numerous challenges with regards to undertaking a root cause analysis using the organisa-
tion’s security investigation records. These challenges included poor data quality for in-depth
analysis, a need to document more information describing why security incidents have hap-
pened rather than what has happened, as well as the impact of third-parties in the root cause
analysis process. The principle finding from the historical study was the quality of data in the
security investigation records could be improved if detailed data about the security incidents
was documented during the initial investigations.
In order to demonstrate the value of documenting more detailed data during a security in-
vestigation, the framework was then applied to three ‘live’ security investigations. The re-
sults from this analysis showed that several underlying causes of security incidents could
be identified using the framework. In addition, the application of the framework to these
investigations help produce enhanced data from the respective security investigations.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Work
This thesis proposed that the quality of data generated during a security incident investigation
can be enhanced through the application of specific lightweight measures. After analysing
the results from an exploratory case study of a Fortune 500 Organisation, four experiments
presented in Chapters 5 - 8, were used to evaluate if specific lightweight measures can help
improve the quality of data generated during security investigations within the specific or-
ganisation. These lightweight measures focused on enhancing data quality transparency,
capturing data that has been missed during an investigation, generating higher quality data
using root cause analysis and focusing investigation efforts on data that will provide value to
a security incident response team. The next three sections of this chapter address the research
questions that were presented in Chapter one. Section 9.4 discusses the extended research
contributions. Section 9.5 discusses the interconnection of the experiments presented in the
thesis and how the implemented lightweight measures collectively assist with improving the
quality of data in a security incident response investigation. Section 9.6 examines the scope
and validity of the research conducted, while Section 9.7 presents an overview of an ideal
security incident learning system in the studied organisation. Section 9.8 presents areas for
future work and Section 9.9 concludes the chapter.
9.1 Thesis Research Question 1
The answer to the first research question “What data is generated by a real-world security
incident response team?” can be derived from the exploratory case study presented in Chap-
ter 4. The data generated by a security incident response team was determined through an
analysis of the organisation’s security incident response database, relevant documentation
and interviews conducted in the Fortune 500 Organisation. The analysis of the relevant se-
curity incident response documentation and the security incident response database showed
9.2. Thesis Research Question 2 217
that the organisation’s security incident response team generates various data during a secu-
rity investigation. This data can include the date and time a security incident was reported
to the team, contact details of security incident handlers, the physical location of a secu-
rity incident, investigative notes, calculations regarding financial costs of incidents and data
describing any lessons learned.
The interviews undertaken within the exploratory case study revealed that the data generated
and collected by the security incident response team is usually tailored to specific investiga-
tions. The individuals added that in addition to the above data, the security incident response
team also collects data with regards to incident meeting minutes, email trails and data de-
scribing actions for remediation. The results from the interviews also identified that forensic
data is collected from various sources. This forensic data can include logs, emails, hard disk
drive images and physical memory dumps. This type of data can then be used as evidence in
legal proceedings, if the need arises.
9.2 Thesis Research Question 2
The answer to the second research question “What challenges and problems do a security
incident response team face when attempting to learn from information security incidents?”
can be derived from Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 4, the results from the exploratory case
study of the Fortune 500 Organisation identified several challenges to security incident learn-
ing within the organisation. Practitioners within the organisation indicated that limited phys-
ical access to security data, short data retention times, logs not containing enough detailed
information and limited support from third-parties involved in security investigations could
all impact security incident learning. Within Chapter 4, practitioners also argued that security
incident response teams could benefit from additional support and clarity surrounding tools
and techniques for incident learning. Individuals within the organisation have also called
for improved methods, such as root cause analysis, to assist in the development of lessons
learns.
The results from the experiment presented in Chapter 5 also revealed an additional incident
learning challenge for a security incident response team. This challenge focuses on the prob-
lem of data quality in the wider organisation. The results from the analysis of the information
documented in the security investigation record template, showed that the fields pertaining
to the ‘Reporting and Contact Information’ section were missing information. When queried
about this in the follow-up interviews, security incident handlers indicated that this missing
information was because of a data quality problem with the organisation’s electronic address
book. The security incident response team use this address book to complete the ‘Reporting
and Contact Information’ section of the investigation record. However, the address book
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itself has data consistency issues. As a result, information is often missing for particular
employees. This finding shows that security incident learning can be affected by data qual-
ity issues involving other organisational processes and data cycles that a security incident
response team may have little or no control over.
9.3 Thesis Research Question 3
The answer to the third research question, “What effect did the application of the described
measures have on the data generated by the security incident response process?” can be
derived from the experimental evaluations presented in Chapters 5 through 8. In Chapter
5, the analysis of the security investigation records in the organisation showed that all 324
(100%) records, examined as part of the experiment, now contained both a category and sub-
category to describe the particular investigation. When compared to investigation records
from the exploratory case study where all the records were classified as a ‘security incident’
and no formal taxonomy was available, means that all the records in the organisation now
have a category and sub-category to describe the particular investigation. Chapter 5 also
discussed how a revised security investigation record template was used to enhance data
capture with regards to information, which provides value to a security incident response
team. In the exploratory case study in Chapter 4, only 1 out of the 188 analysed security
investigation records were found to have been complete from the perspective of all 22 fields
within the record template. This means that within 187 investigation records, one or more
fields within the record template were missing information. However, after the evaluation of
the revised record template (as presented in Chapter 5), the results have shown that 11 out
of the 26 fields within the revised record template were completed in all 324 investigation
records. Furthermore, four fields were completed in over 99% of the investigation records.
Retrospectives were evaluated in Chapter 6 as a method for validating information that has
been collected during a security investigation and enhancing information may have been
missed. The results have shown that retrospectives provide an additional avenue for security
incident handlers to identify and document information, which may not have been possible
to document in the initial investigation. 148 out of the 324 retrospectives undertaken in the
organisation were used to capture more data when compared to the initial investigation. This
data has included the identification of additional information assets involved in an investiga-
tion, individuals and groups within the organisation whose assistance was required during an
investigation, as well as enhanced security controls and improvements to various security-
related processes within the organisation. Chapter 7 described an experiment to evaluate how
a security incident response dashboard can be used to identify where data quality needs to
be improved within investigation records and enhance data quality transparency. The results
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from this experiment showed that 61 investigation records were corrected and completed by
security incident handlers during the experiment. If historical trends had continued from the
exploratory case study, then these 61 records may not have been corrected without the dash-
board application. Chapter 8 described the evaluation of a root cause analysis framework as
a method for generating higher quality data for subsequent lessons learned. The results of the
evaluation showed that underlying root causes of security incidents can be identified using
the framework. In addition, the framework has also helped to enhance the quality of data
produced from the application of the framework to the three ‘live’ security investigations.
9.4 Contributions
The main objective of this research was to examine if the quality of data generated dur-
ing a security incident investigation can be enhanced through the application of specific
lightweight measures. These lightweight measures focused on enhancing data capture that
was missed during an investigation, generating higher quality data using root cause analysis
and focusing investigation efforts on data that will provide value to a security incident re-
sponse team. The remainder of this section discusses the contributions and conclusions of
this thesis. The main contributions of this thesis are as follows:
In Chapter 4, a exploratory case study of a security incident response team in Fortune 500
financial services organisation was presented, which was used to validate the thesis state-
ment. Security incident response documentation and investigation records were examined
and interviews were conducted in the studied organisation. The objective was to establish
the challenges a security incident response team face with regards to lessons learned develop-
ment. The organisation’s security investigation records were examined from the perspective
of Ballou and Pazer’s [144] data quality dimensions of accuracy, completeness and con-
sistency and data quality issues were identified in the investigation records. Furthermore,
several other initial challenges were also identified from the case study, which helped to
guide the reminder of the work presented in this thesis. These initial challenges included no
consistent security incident taxonomy, problems with access to enriched security data, ab-
sence of organisational learning from security investigations, and a lack of tools and methods
for deeper incident learning. At a high-level, these challenges suggested that improving the
quality of data generated from the organisations security response investigations needs to be
addressed.
Chapter 5 described an experiment that attempted to address two of the data quality chal-
lenges identified in the exploratory case study through the introduction of a well-defined
security incident categorisation taxonomy (Section 5.2.1) and a revised security investiga-
tion record template (Section 5.2.2). The objective of the experiment was twofold. First, the
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experiment was used to evaluate the efficacy of the taxonomy with the purpose of remov-
ing ambiguity surrounding incident type identification. Second, the experiment was used
to examine if the investigation record assists with the enhancement of data collection that
provides value to the organisation’s security incident response team. The above mechanisms
were then implemented within the organisation and evaluated to determine their effect on the
quality of data in the organisation’s security incident response process.
The analysis of organisation’s security investigation records (Section 5.4.2) revealed that
all 324 (100%) of the examined investigation records contained both a category and sub-
category classification. However, when a more in-depth analysis of the investigation records
was undertaken, it was identified that 25 of the records were incorrectly classified, according
to the taxonomy. Interviews with individuals in the organisation revealed two main con-
tributing factors which could explain the incorrect classifications: a lack of agreement on
the definition of a ‘security event’ and a ‘security incident’ within the organisation, and in-
cident handlers underestimating the impact of specific security problems. Moreover, the
interviews also identified a potential managerial culture issue, which could also explain the
incorrect classifications. The taxonomy, described in Section 5.2.1, was developed together
with one of the organisation’s information security managers who had requested the use of
mutually exclusive sub-categories. However, interviews with the incident handlers showed
that they would have preferred to select multiple categories during their investigation, in-
stead of mutually exclusive sub-categories. What this finding suggested was that incident
handlers were either not consulted or were over-ruled by managers with regards to their de-
mands for non-exclusive sub-categories. Effectively, management undertook a decision to
use mutually-exclusive sub-categories, which did not reflect the demands of the incident han-
dlers in the organisation. In this sense, the manager has decided what information has value
to the security incident response team, which provides an indication of a means-orientated
culture by management responsible for the security incident response team.
The experiment also evaluated a revised security investigation record. The results show that
the addition of the revised investigation record template has enhanced the overall investiga-
tion process and incident handlers are now documenting more detailed information about a
security investigation. However, several observations were made from the analysis of the
results from the experiment. The first of these observations is that the culture within an or-
ganisation can impact on the quality of data in security investigation records. In the specific
organisation, it was identified that there is a potential ‘blame culture’ in the organisation.
This was evident in the experiment when incident handlers stated that the reason they did
not capture information requested by management was because it was ‘someone else’s job’
(i.e. individuals who implement security controls). In this case, individuals attempted to pro-
tect themselves by shifting blame on why certain information was not capture and therefore,
hindered continuous improvement.
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A second observation from the experiment was the impact that a highly regulated environ-
ment can have on the quality of data documented by incident handlers. In the experiment, it
was identified that incident handlers documented more information for a security ‘incident’
investigation when compared to a security ‘event’ investigation. One explanation for this is
that the financial services industry is highly regulated and the reporting of security incidents
is likely to be a priority of the organisation. However, this does not mean that the organisation
itself should refrain from attempting to learn from security events. There have been sugges-
tions in the literature that an organisation can learn just as much from low-level security
events than high-level security incidents and therefore should focus on learning regardless of
the level of severity.
A third observation that was made during the experiment is related to the amount of informa-
tion captured and the quality of this information. Section 5.4.7 discussed how even though
security incident handlers were now collecting more information in the organisation’s inves-
tigation records, a lot of this information would potentially be of little use towards incident
learning. A lesson that can be learnt from this experiment is that in order to enhance informa-
tion capture towards incident learning, an organisation must first establish what objectives
it will want to achieve when it attempts to learn about a security event or incident. Only
then can the organisation decide what information it should attempt to capture during inves-
tigations. In this experiment, management decided on which information may be useful for
incident learning. However, it can be argued that some of the fields (e.g. how many hours
working on the investigation) were less important when it comes to learning from an incident
and wider organisational learning, but more suited to providing metrics about resolution and
recovery.
A final observation that was made during the experiment was the need for consolidated data
quality improvement initiatives when attempting to improve security incident response data
quality. The results from the experiment revealed that incident handlers often found that
other organisational processes and data sources impacted the security incident response team.
As a result, the data recorded in the investigation records was incomplete because it was
missing in other business processes. Therefore, a suggestion that arises from this thesis is
that organisation should look to address data quality issues in all processes, which input
data into a security incident response process, and not just those which are used by the team
during their investigations.
In Chapter 6, an experiment was undertaken in the Fortune 500 organisation which in-
volved integrating retrospectives into the organisation’s security incident response process.
The purpose of the experiment was to evaluate if a retrospective can assist with validating in-
formation collected from an investigation. Furthermore, the experiment also evaluated if the
retrospective can also be used to collect additional information that may have been missed
during an investigation, without requiring substantial extra resources. The results from the
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experiment suggest that the completion of a security investigation and the closure of its
corresponding investigation record does not necessarily mean that an incident handler has
documented all the information about a specific investigation. In particular, the results show
that 148 (46%) out of the 324 retrospectives contained more information about an investi-
gation, when compared with the information documented in the corresponding record. 151
(47%) out of the 324 retrospectives identified the same information about an investigation
as the information documented in the relevant record. Finally, 25 (7%) investigation records
contained more information than what was actually identified using the retrospectives.
However, the results from the experiment also revealed challenges with process and man-
agement demands. This was particularly evident with the data collected from questions two
and four from the retrospectives, which identified the presence of a ‘process culture’ in the
organisation. In this case, the experiment identified a problem with the organisation’s secu-
rity incident response process, which does not take into consideration that incident handlers
may not have access to some assets or individuals required for their investigations. Incident
handlers are required to follow the process, but it does not take into consideration adaptabil-
ity and changes to the process for security incident response. Ultimately, this can mean that
assets are not investigated and root causes of incidents may not be found. The results from
the experiment also suggest that retrospectives could be one way an organisation receives
feedback on how its security incident response process works, which is often discussed as
another problem with a ‘process culture’ in the literature.
While the results from the experiments suggest that additional information can be captured
using retrospectives, observations and interviews within the organisation indicate that the
information captured is more likely to be useful to management rather than the security
incident team. While one could argue that some form of learning was taking place by man-
agement who were using the information to learn if the process was working, this same
information could also have been used to learn about security incidents or how to prevent
them. However, observations suggested that minimal support was given to the security inci-
dent response team in order for them to learn about incidents using the collected information.
This is a typical problem, which can arise in an organisation in which a process culture is
present and where internal politics, bureaucracy and problems with processes can hinder
improvements and feedback.
In Chapter 7, a security incident response dashboard was implemented in the Fortune 500
organisation in order to enhance the transparency of data quality issues and to assist the secu-
rity incident response team to identify and correct incomplete security investigation records.
During the design of the dashboard, input was obtained from the one of the organisation’s
information security managers regarding the identification of fields that would result in an
‘incomplete’ investigation record in the organisation. The choice of fields from the manager
shows that particular metric information regarding the time to eradicate and recover from a
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security event or incident have been favoured over information to assist with organisational
learning. The recommendations made also indicated that it is managers and not the security
incident response team who decide what information has value in this context.
Nonetheless, the dashboard application was deployed in the organisation and was made avail-
able to the security incident response team in order to identify and correct ‘incomplete’
investigation records. The results from this experiment have shown that 61 security investi-
gation records which were identified as incomplete were corrected by the security incident
handlers. The 61 records were missing information from one or more fields designated by
the information security manager at the design of the dashboard. While the data collected
from the investigation records suggests that the dashboard has improved the completeness
of the 61 records, it can be difficult to isolate if the dashboard was the primary reason for
this change. An alternative view is that the dashboard has assisted with improving group
and investigation record awareness so that security incident handlers are now more aware of
who they are working with, what is being worked on and how their actions affect others in
the security incident response team. Evidence to support this argument can be seen in the
interviews with participants who indicated that the dashboard allowed the team to identify
which investigation records need more information, what each incident handler was working
on and the progress of specific investigations.
Chapter 8, presents a root cause analysis framework for the analysis of security incidents
within the organisation. The approach is an extension of the 5-Whys root cause technique
that includes two components: the framework (Section 8.2.1) and the worksheet (Section
8.2.2), which used to document the outcomes from the root cause analysis. The framework
was first applied to a historical set of investigation records within the organisation. The
results from the historical analysis highlighted that if more information was documented
during investigations, then enhanced underlying causes could have been identified from the
investigations. In addition, numerous challenges with regards to undertaking a root cause
analysis using the organisations security investigation records were identified. These chal-
lenges included poor data quality for in-depth analysis, a need to document more information
describing why security incidents have happened rather than what has happened, as well as
the impact of third parties in the root cause analysis process.
The framework was then applied to three ‘live’ security investigations, where a parallel in-
vestigation to that being conducted by the security incident handlers was undertaken. The
results of this analysis showed that several underlying causes of security incidents can identi-
fied using the framework. However, follow-up interviews undertaken within the organisation
which were used to assess practitioner perception of the framework revealed interesting per-
spectives on the use of framework in security incident response. In particular, individuals in
the follow-up interviews stated that if a security problem is caused by human error, the likely
outcome would be a root cause that cannot be fixed. This answer suggests the presence of
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a blame culture in the organisation. By transferring the blame from the security team to the
human element, the incident response team can avoid blaming colleagues and potential allies
in the Information Security unit. The presence of a blame culture could also point to man-
agerial culture issues, who appear to quickly blame employees for even the smallest of errors
that lead to security incidents and not security processes or failures in security controls. An
alternative could be installation of a ‘just culture’, so that only more serious incidents re-
sult in employees facing disciplinary matters. This will mean that security incident handlers
would not be afraid of examining ‘human error’ as a root cause, as only very serious ‘human
error’ incidents would result in repercussions.
A further observation from the application of the framework to the live investigation was
that incident handlers who were approached to undertaken an analysis using the framework
indicated that some investigations were not ‘serious enough’ to undertaken a full root cause
analysis. When incident handlers were asked about this in the follow-up interviews, the
answers provided suggested that not everyone had completely ‘bought-in’ to the idea of un-
dertaking a root cause analysis for particular incidents. Furthermore, in the months which
followed the experiment, revealed that none of the improvements identified from the root
cause analysis were actually implemented. The comments made during the interviews, cou-
pled with these observations suggested a management culture issue, particularly with regards
to leadership. The implementation of a root cause analysis implies that management sup-
ports and encourages the process in order to develop new understandings by drilling down
precisely and narrowly into the causes of an incident. One recommendation is that man-
agement encourage incident handlers to undertake a root cause analysis because the results
from this analysis will provide managers with practical guidance on problems that they can
change and improve within the organisation.
9.5 Interconnection of Experiments
The four experiments presented in Chapter 5-8 have demonstrated how various lightweight
measures can be used to improve the quality of data within different stages of a security
incident response process. However, there are also interconnections between the experiments
and the results have shown that collectively, the lightweight measures can be used to improve
the quality of data throughout a security incident investigation. These interconnections mean
that each implemented lightweight measure can complement other lightweight measures in
a variety of ways, although a risk is that this can complicate the evaluation process. These
interconnections are discussed here.
The taxonomy and security investigation record template evaluated in Chapter 5, provide a
security incident response team with an environment to focus investigation efforts on data
9.6. Scope and Validity 225
that will provide value both at the start and throughout the investigation lifecycle. The tax-
onomy helps with defining the security incident type at the start of the investigation, while
the record template ensures that the data collected throughout the investigation will provide
value to the security incident response team.
The root cause analysis framework evaluated in Chapter 8 can be used to guide a security
investigation so that higher quality data is generated for lessons learned. This is achieved
through a root cause analysis method based on the 5-Whys technique. The method prompts
security incident handlers to ask “Why?” during a security investigation and in the process,
enhances the quality of data captured during an actual investigation. Difficulties in eliciting
answers during a root cause analysis are potential opportunities for process improvement
that can be identified during a subsequent retrospective.
The security incident investigation dashboard, as presented in Chapter 7, can be used through-
out a security investigation to enhance data quality transparency. The dashboard can also be
used to assist a security incident response team to identify where the quality of data within
security investigation records needs to be improved. The results from the evaluation of the
dashboard have shown that the security incident response team corrected a number of ‘in-
complete’ investigation records with more information.
Finally, the retrospectives as evaluated in Chapter 6, provided security incident handlers with
a method to confirm the data documented during an investigation. The retrospectives have
also provided a ‘safety net’ to capture additional information, which may have been missed
during the initial investigation.
9.6 Scope and Validity
Scope and validity issues associated with the research need to be specifically acknowledged
at this point. The first point of discussion is the ability to generalise from the Fortune 500
Organisation case study, which can be considered a ‘single case’ study. The view that one
cannot generalise on the basis of a single case study is an issue that has been well discussed in
the literature [36, 39, 257]. As noted in Section 2.3, the Fortune 500 Organisation case study
can be considered a ‘special case’ in that a unique chance arose to study security incident
learning in a large organisation [30]. In this sense, the Fortune 500 Organisation is considered
to representative of other organizations in the financial services category in terms of interest
in security incident response, regulatory obligations towards security incident reporting, size,
bureaucracy and resource constraints. This makes the organisation ideal in which to study
security incident response learning challenges.
Furthermore, Walsham suggests that four main types of generalisations are possible from
case studies: concepts, theory, implications and rich insight [258]. The results from the
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Fortune 500 Organisation case study can be generalised from the rich insight perspective. In
particular, the case study can provide a rich insight into a variety of topics including using
specific practices to improve the quality of data in security incident response, managerial and
cultural issues related to security incident learning, and the need for more thoughtful security
incident data gathering.
It should be acknowledged that the lightweight practices were implemented in the same or-
ganisation, where the exploratory case study was undertaken to determine if the quality of
data was a potential problem within security incident response. While this is not negative,
it does raise the question of whether the lightweight practices are applicable in other organ-
isations. The practices, which were implemented in the Fortune 500 Organisation, can be
generalised from the perspective that they can be used in similar organisations, which have
a similar interest in security incident response. More specifically, the security incident re-
sponse taxonomy and enhanced investigation can be customised for the specific organisation
in which they will be used. As a result, the information that is collected by incident handlers
will provide value to that specific organisation. The retrospectives and the dashboard can also
be customised to suit the requirements of the organisation in which they will be used. The
questions from the retrospectives can be customised to capture specific information, which
should be validated, while the dashboard can also be customised to highlight specific infor-
mation, which has been missed in initial investigations. In both cases, the customisations
will be specific to the implementing organisation, but the practices themselves can remain
the same. Similarly, while the foundational components of the root cause analysis frame-
work are transferable to other organisations, the questions being asked during the framework
can be customised to the specific organisation.
The case study presented in this thesis has also presented a rich insight into the culture issues
related to improving the quality of data in security incident response. While many of the
culture challenges identified during the experiments would likely be also found in similar
financial services-type organisations, some of these culture challenges could be specific to
the studied organisation. These are likely to be the specific culture challenges related to
management within the organisation and their impact on the security incident response team.
It should also be acknowledged that the author worked visibly within the Fortune 500 Organ-
isation to undertake the exploratory case study and to implement the lightweight measures.
This raises the question of the author’s impact on the results of the work conducted. In em-
pirical studies such as the one documented in this thesis, it can become difficult to know
how much influence the author has had over the success of an experiment. The fact that the
author was integrated into the organisation’s security incident response team and the pres-
ence of the author in the team and asking questions about the quality of data within security
investigations, needs to be acknowledged in reference to potentially impacting the study. Fi-
nally, it should also be noted that the results from the experiments to evaluate the lightweight
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measures, implemented within the organisation, could impact each other. For example, the
experiment to evaluate the dashboard application could have influenced the results from the
revised security incident investigation record template experiment. While specific fields were
used to identify an ‘incomplete’ record in the dashboard experiment, the notification of these
fields to security incident handlers could have prompted the completion of other fields in the
record. This in turn could have influenced the results from the investigation record template
experiment.
9.7 Successful Security Incident Learning
It should be stressed that the work in thesis should be treated as a proof-of-concept. Hence,
the insights and challenges identified in the thesis need to be investigated further in order
to understand the implications of the practices and culture challenges in other organisations.
However for the sake of completion, this section will provide some suggestions based on the
results of this thesis in order to overcome some of the barriers to security incident learning
identified during the research. In this sense, the suggestions are based on what successful
security incident learning would look like in the Fortune 500 Organisation. As the results
from Chapters 5 and 6 have shown, the building blocks of security incident learning should
start with collecting and validating the right information during a security investigation.
In this sense, information captured should include data that will provide the opportunity
for an organisation to learn from a security incident, and increase its chances to prevent a
reoccurrence. For this to be a success, managers need to work closely with security incident
handlers and individuals responsible for securing the organisation in order to identify what
information would be need to initiate improvement changes. Furthermore, the organisation
should not only look at its data quality in security and incident response-related processes,
but extend this to any process which provides data to security-related investigations. As
discussed in Section 5.5.3, the Fortune 500 Organisation’s security incident response team
could not improve the quality of data in its investigation records because it relied on the data
from another process outside of its control.
Once the right information has been captured, in order for the security incident response team
to maximise their incident learning capabilities, the organisation should look to incorporate
double-loop learning. Double-loop learning would involve the team questioning and chal-
lenging the underlying rules, principles and knowledge of the organisation. In other words,
double-loop learning would question the culture and processes within the organisation itself.
It is then important to implement corrective actions and follow-up any recommendations
made by the security incident response team. This is particularly true for actions to eliminate
causes of incidents which could span many parts of the organisation and which could involve
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various different processes. As discussed in Chapter 6, the retrospectives can be one way of
evaluating if outstanding recommendations have been corrected in the organisation. Finally,
the work of the security incident response team will be completed when it documents its
detailed recommendations and findings either in the Information Security Incident Response
database or through the issuance of an incident report.
While the above process adjustments would help enhance security incident learning in the
organisation, specific culture issues also need to be addressed. One of these culture con-
cerns is the management culture issue identified at various stages in the thesis. For example,
managers selected what information provides value to the security incident response team
through their choice of fields in the investigation record template and their choice of mutu-
ally exclusive sub-categories in the implemented taxonomy. In order for the security incident
response team to be accountable for their actions, they need to be trusted to select which in-
formation they demand is needed in order to learn from a particular security incident. How-
ever, at this point it is worth stating that in a process-based culture, such as the Fortune 500
Organisation which is highly-regulated, changing and removing the process culture could be
a difficult task. This is because these types of organisations grow in terms of knowledge,
scale of operations and efficiency irrespective of the contribution of its members. Therefore,
changing the management culture could actually have little or no impact on the underlying
organisational culture.
Another culture issue, which would be important to address is the ‘blame culture’ which
appears to exist in the organisation. The results from the experiments suggest that a blame
culture in the organisation appears to result in individuals protecting themselves by shifting
blame and more importantly, hindering continuous improvement. In an effort to correct this
culture of blame, management need to accept that individuals can make mistakes, and that
sometimes it is better to learn from these mistakes rather than punish individuals through
disciplinary affairs. The installation of a strong culture of transparency and accountability
would help focus the security incident response team’s efforts in not only eradicating and
recovering from security incidents, but also learning from underlying issues which have
caused the incident to occur.
9.8 Future Work
The research reported in this thesis has identified several areas for future work. In the short
term, there is a need for further work to examine the quality of data within security incident
response in other organisations, in a variety of industrial domains. The exploratory case study
presented and discussed in Chapter 4 can be repeated in other organisations to strengthen or
dispute the theoretical argument presented in the thesis. That is the quality of data in security
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incident response needs to be enhanced to improve the generation of lessons learned. This
future work can also be used to evaluate the lightweight measures presented in the thesis
in other organisations in order to enhance and refine their application as methods and tools
to enhance the quality of data within security investigations. Experience reports and results
from the evaluation of the lightweight measures would help alleviate some of the issues
associated with undertaking a single-case research project as discussed in Section 9.5.
While the implementation of these lightweight measures in other organisations will help
enhance the use of these measures, there is a need to further explore the business perspective
for improving the quality of data within security incident response. As highlighted in earlier
chapters, there was some resistance to implementing the lightweight measures that would be
used to improve the quality of data within security investigations. Therefore, future work
should look to explore the actual and/or perceived Return on Investment (ROI) on improving
the quality of data within security investigations. The result of this analysis can be examined
in several different types of organisations. The purpose of this work would be to investigate
which organisations would be more willing to undertake the investment of improving the
quality of data and which would struggle to justify the time and costs associated with such
an improvement initiative. The results can then be used to assist adopters examine ROI from
the measures within their specific industry domain.
Previous chapters in the thesis discussed how the security incident response team within
the Fortune 500 Organisation indicated that data quality issues involving the organisation’s
electronic address book had implications on data quality within security incident response.
This finding shows that there is a clear need to research the impact of improving the quality of
data within other business processes that input data into a security incident response process.
This future work can be extended to explore the possibility of applying some or all of the
lightweight measures described in this research in other teams, apart from security, within
an organisation. This future work can also examine the legislative perspective with regards
to enhancing the quality of data in other business process, with a particular emphasis on the
privacy and data retention legislative requirements that are being imposed on organisations.
In the future, research needs to be conducted into the barriers and aids that third-parties
introduce into an organisation’s security incident response process. The results from the
implementation of the lightweight measures, particularly the root cause analysis framework,
highlighted the impact of third-parties on a security incident response team’s investigation.
Therefore, research to examine the reduction and/or elimination of barriers presented by
third-parties to security investigations could provide valuable information to organisations.
In the longer term, future research needs to examine the restructuring of security incident
response teams. The results from the experiments presented in this thesis have shown that
the success of some security investigations often depends on the team’s relationship with
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other business units and teams within an organisation. This is also true for investigations that
involve third-parties. Therefore, future work needs to examine if the structure and practices
of interaction between security incident response teams and these entities needs to be recon-
sidered. Effectively, this could result in multidisciplinary security incident response teams,
which would require the integration of technical security professionals, information technol-
ogy specialists, relevant asset stakeholders, third-party contractors, along with individuals
from an organisation’s legal department.
9.9 Summary
The research presented in this thesis examined how specific lightweight measures can be
used to enhance the quality of data produced during security incident response investigations.
The lightweight measures were implemented in an industrial case study and their impact was
examined with regards to improving the quality of data in various phases of a security inves-
tigation. The high-level finding from these evaluations showed that the lightweight measures
have had a positive affect on the quality of data generated during and after security investiga-
tions. The experience and knowledge gained throughout the research provides foundational
work to generalise the use of this approach in other organisations and in a variety of indus-
tries.
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Appendix A
Exploratory Case Study Interview
Questions
Thank you, for participating in this interview survey. The aim of this exercise is to obtain
a more in-depth understanding of the security incident response process within the organi-
sation and to investigate the perception of organisational learning and knowledge gathering
from within this process. This is not a test and you are not being examined. Hence, there are
no right or wrong answers; it is your opinion that is being sought. Please be assured that this
interview survey will be conducted with your anonymity ensured and that I will not record
or disclose any personal information.
I ask you to please not discuss the interview survey with anyone else in the organisation as
this may invalidate the results.
1. What is your current job title/role?
2. How many years have you worked in IT?
3. Briefly describe the key areas of your job function/role?
4. From your perspective, what is meant by the term ‘security incident’?
5. Does the organisation have a security incident response team? YES/NO/Don’t Know
(DNK)
(a) If YES, what are the overall goals of the security incident response team?
(b) If NO, are there plans to develop one in the future? YES/NO/DNK
(i) If YES, what is the projected time frame?
(ii) If NO, is there a reason for not developing a security incident response team?
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6. Does the organisation have a documented security incident response process? YES/NO/
DNK
(a) If YES, can you briefly describe this documented process and the activities involved
in the process? In the event participant cannot recall the exact process, he/she will
be asked to recall to the best of their ability any phases of the process to stimulate
discussion.
(b) If YES, in your opinion, does this documented process ensure that the goals of the
security incident response team are met?
(c) If YES, in your opinion what are the good points in this documented process?
(d) If YES, in your opinion what are the bad points in this documented process?
(e) If YES, have you ever found it necessary to deviate from this documented incident
response process? YES/NO/DNK
(i) If YES, why?
(f) If NO, are there plans to develop one in the future? YES/NO/DNK
(i) If YES, what is your projected time frame?
(ii) If NO, is there a reason for not developing such a documented process in the
organisation?
7. Is there an individual in the organisation who is accountable for the documented security
incident response process not being followed? YES/NO/DNK
(a) If YES, what is his/her title? Is this person accountable for legislative compliance as
well? YES/NO/DNK
(i) If NO, who in the organisation is accountable for legislative compliance?
(b) If NO, why not?
8. In your opinion, what are an individual’s responsibilities for each the following categories
in the security incident response lifecycle?
(a) Preparation
(b) Identification
(c) Containment
(d) Eradication
(e) Investigation
(f) Recovery
(g) Follow-up (Post-incident)
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9. Are you involved in any of the above categories of the security incident response lifecy-
cle? YES/NO
(a) If YES, which categories?
10. In your opinion, do you think that the documented security incident response process
could be improved? YES/NO/DNK
(a) If YES, how and why?
(b) If NO, why not?
11. Does the organisation have a documented procedure outlining how security incidents are
reported within the organisation? YES/NO/DNK
(a) If YES, what is this procedure?
(b) If YES, in your opinion, is this security incident reporting procedure effective? YES/NO/
SOMETIMES/DNK
(i) If YES, why?
(ii) If NO, why not?
(iii) If SOMETIMES, when is it effective?
(iv) If SOMETIMES, when is it not effective?
(c) If NO, how are security incidents reported?
(d) Are employees within the organisation educated on how to report security incidents?
YES/NO/DNK
12. Does the organisation record and store information related to security incidents? YES/NO/DNK
(a) If YES, can you briefly describe this practice and what information is recorded for
security incidents?
(b) If YES, in your opinion, is the practice used for recording information related to
security incidents effective? YES/NO/SOMETIMES/DNK
(i) If NO, why not?
(ii) If SOMETIMES, when is it effective?
(iii) If SOMETIMES, when is it not effective?
(c) If YES, where are these incidents recorded?
(d) If YES, who has access to these incident reports (groups and departments)?
(e) If YES, is this procedure used to document and recorded all types of security inci-
dents? YES/NO/DNK
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(i) If NO, which incidents types are not recorded using this procedure?
(ii) If NO, where are these incidents recorded?
(f) If NO, why not?
13. Is there a documented process for collecting ‘forensic data’ related to security incidents
such as (forensic images, logs etc.)? YES/NO/DNK
(a) If YES, can you briefly describe this process?
(b) If YES, does this process include a ‘chain of custody’ document or is an audit trail
maintained? YES/NO/DNK
(i) If YES, can you briefly discuss this process?
(ii) If NO, why not?
(c) If NO, are there plans to develop one in the future? YES/NO/DNK
(i) If YES, what is your projected time frame?
(ii) If NO, is there a reason for not developing such a documented process in the
organisation?
14. In your experience, do situations occur where an incident handler does not have access
to all the information he/she requires (forensic images, logs etc.), when investigating
security incidents? YES/NO/DNK
(a) If YES, what types of situations?
(b) If YES, what information was required?
(c) If NO, do you for see this as a problem in the future? YES/NO/DNK
(i) If YES, in what way?
(ii) If NO, why do you think this will not be a problem in the future?
15. In your experience, do conflicts arise between different stakeholders within the organisa-
tion when investigating a security incident? YES/NO/DNK
(a) If YES, what are these conflicts?
(b) If YES, how are these conflicts resolved?
16. In your experience, what constitutes the closure of an information security incident within
the organisation?
(a) Can you recall an instance(s) where an incident has not been closed? YES/NO/DNK
(i) If YES, why was the incident not closed?
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(b) Can you recall an instance(s) where an incident has been reopened? YES/NO/DNK
(i) If YES, why was the incident reopened?
17. From your experience, does the organisation perform any ‘post-incident’ activities after a
security incident has been closed? YES/NO/DNK
In the event participant answers NO or DNK, they will be asked questions 17a-d seeking
their opinions on what these activities should involve, the idea is to promote discussion
around the topic of post-incident activities.
(a) If YES, what activities take place ‘post-incident’?
(b) If YES, in your opinion do you think these activities are sufficient? YES/NO/DNK
(i) If NO, what ‘post-incident’ activities do you think should occur?
(c) If YES, do these activities include a root cause analysis? YES/NO/DNK
(i) If NO, why not?
(d) If YES, do these activities include a risk analysis based on the incident? YES/NO/DNK
(i) If NO, why not?
(e) If NO, why not?
18. Does the organisation distribute any ‘post-incident’ information to any group(s) or de-
partment(s) within the organisation? YES/NO/DNK
(a) If YES, is there a formal process for disseminating this ‘post-incident’ knowledge?
YES/NO/DNK
(i) If YES, can you briefly describe this process?
(ii) If NO, why not?
(b) If YES, is there an individual in the organisation who is responsible for disseminating
‘post-incident’ knowledge within the organisation?
(i) If YES, what is his/her title?
(ii) If NO, why not?
(c) If YES, to which groups or departments?
(d) If YES, what type of information is circulated?
(e) If NO, why not?
19. Does the organisation distribute any ‘post-incident’ information or incident notifications
outside of the organisation, for example to regulatory bodies? YES/NO/DNK
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(a) If YES, is there a formal process for disseminating this ‘post-incident’ knowledge?
YES/NO/DNK
(i) If YES, can you briefly describe this process?
(ii) If NO, why not?
(b) If YES, is there an individual in the organisation who is responsible for disseminating
‘post-incident’ knowledge outside the organisation?
(i) If YES, what is his/her title?
(ii) If NO, why not?
(c) If YES, where is this information circulated?
(d) If YES, what type of information is circulated?
(e) If NO, why not?
20. Are you aware of any individual in the organisation who is responsible for analysing
previous security incidents to identity trends, anomalies, and patterns? YES/NO/DNK
(a) IF YES, what is his/her title?
(b) If NO, how are trends, anomalies, and patterns identified from security incidents?
21. Does the organisation consult or contract any individuals/ contractors/businesses to help
detect, investigate, eradicate or recover from a security incident? (i.e. forensic analysis
work) YES/NO/DNK
(a) If YES, can you briefly describe an instance where an individual/contractor/ business
has been included in the handling of an incident?
(b) If YES, do individuals/contractors/businesses follow the same security incident re-
sponse process as employees? YES/NO/DNK
(c) If NO, do you think this will occur in the future?
22. Does the organisation have a documented secure development process (SDLC) or policies
around the secure development of systems and applications? YES/NO/DNK
In the event participant answers DNK, they will be asked question 22d to promote dis-
cussion around the idea or integrating lessons learned into the application development
environment.
(a) If YES, can you briefly describe the organisations secure development process?
(b) If YES, in your opinion what are the good points in this documented process?
(c) If YES, in your opinion what are the bad points in this documented process?
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(d) If YES, in your opinion, do you think that lessons learned from previous security
incidents should play a role in the secure development process? YES/NO/DNK
(i) If YES, why so?
(ii) If NO, why not?
(e) If NO, why not?
23. Does the organisation have an information security education program? YES/NO/DNK
(a) If YES, can you briefly highlight the purpose of the program?
(b) If YES, do you know if any information from previous security incidents is included
in the security education program? YES/NO/DNK
(i) If YES, can you briefly highlight what this information contains?
(ii) If NO, are there plans to include such information in the future? YES/NO/DNK
(c) If NO, are there plans to develop one in the future? YES/NO/DNK
(i) If YES, what is your projected time frame?
(ii) If NO, is there a reason for not developing an information security education
program in the organisation?
24. Were any of the survey questions vague or difficult to follow?
25. Do you have any additional information you would like to add? Is there anyone else you
suggest I talk to regarding any information in this survey?
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Appendix B
Retrospectives Follow-up Interview
Questions
Thank you, for participating in this follow-up interview survey. The purpose of this exercise
is to obtain a more in-depth understanding of the affect and impact of the agile retrospectives
on the security incident response process within the organisation. This is not a test and you
are not being examined. Hence, there are no right or wrong answers; it is your opinion that
is being sought. Please be assured that this interview survey will be conducted with your
anonymity ensured and that I will not record or disclose any personal information.
I ask you to please not discuss the interview survey with anyone else in the organisation as
this may invalidate the results.
1. What is your job title?
2. Briefly describe your role within the security incident response team?
3. Have you ever been involved in any security post-investigation activities within the or-
ganisation? YES/NO
(a) If YES, what activities have you been involved in?
(b) If NO, why not?
4. Did you participate in the briefing about the retrospectives? YES/NO
(a) If YES, in your opinion what is the advantage of conducting the briefing?
(b) If YES, in your opinion what is the disadvantage of conducting the briefing?
(c) If NO, why not?
5. In your opinion, what is the advantage of using the retrospectives to identify ‘what worked
well’ (i.e. assets investigated and individuals communicated with during an event/incident)?
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6. In your opinion, what is the disadvantage of using the retrospectives to identify ‘what
worked well’ (i.e. assets investigated and individuals communicated with during an
event/incident)?
7. Overall, what influence did the retrospectives have on the identification of assets investi-
gated and individuals communicated with during an event/incident?
8. In your opinion, what is the advantage of using the retrospectives to identify ‘what did
not work well’ (i.e. assets which you could not investigate and individuals you could not
communicate with during an event/incident)?
9. In your opinion, what is the disadvantage of using the retrospectives to identify ‘what did
not work well’ (i.e. assets which you could not investigate and individuals you could not
communicate with during an event/incident)?
10. Overall, what influence did the retrospectives have on the identification of assets not in-
vestigated and individuals that could not be communicated with during an event/incident?
11. In your opinion, what is the advantage of using the retrospectives to identify security
controls that can be improved after a security event/incident?
12. In your opinion, what is the disadvantage of using the retrospectives to identify security
controls that can be improved after a security event/incident?
13. Overall, what influence did the retrospectives have on the identification of security con-
trols that can be improved after a security event/incident?
14. In your opinion, what is the advantage of using the retrospectives to identify incident
response- related process enhancements that be improved after a security event/incident?
15. In your opinion, what is the disadvantage of using the retrospectives to identify incident
response- related process enhancements that be improved after a security event/incident?
16. Overall, what influence did the retrospectives have on the identification of incident response-
related process enhancements?
17. In your opinion, what other factor contributed to the successful or unsuccessful attempt
to identify security control and incident response-related process enhancements using the
retrospectives?
18. Were any survey questions difficult to follow? Are there any additional comments that
you would like to make about the questions?
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Appendix C
Follow-up Interview Questions
Thank you, for participating in this follow-up interview survey. The purpose of this exercise
is to obtain a more in-depth understanding of the affect and impact of the agile retrospectives
on the security incident response process within the organisation. This is not a test and you
are not being examined. Hence, there are no right or wrong answers; it is your opinion that
is being sought. Please be assured that this interview survey will be conducted with your
anonymity ensured and that I will not record or disclose any personal information.
I ask you to please not discuss the interview survey with anyone else in the organisation as
this may invalidate the results.
1. What is your current job title/role and briefly describe your role within the security inci-
dent response team?
2. How many years experience do you have within an information security role?
3. In your experience, what is the role of security incident response within the general In-
formation Security team?
4. Have you observed any changes in the way security events and incidents are documented
and recorded within the organisation in the past year? YES/NO
(a) If YES, what differences?
(b) If NO, why not?
5. Did you encounter any problems with categorising and/or classifying a security occur-
rence using the definition classification and categories in the documented security incident
response process? YES/NO
(a) If YES, please elaborate on these problems
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(b) If NO, what problems do you foresee in using the definition classification and cate-
gories?
6. Did you encounter any benefits with categorising and/or classifying a security occurrence
using the definition classification and categories in the documented security incident re-
sponse process? YES/NO
(a) If YES, what benefits
(b) If NO, why not?
7. Did the addition of the definition classification and categories to the security incident
response process assist or hinder the overall investigation process? Please explain why.
The interviewees were shown five examples of security investigation records, which
were completed by incident handlers over the duration of the case study since the data
generation improvement imitative was implemented. Each investigation record shown
will according to the definitions in documented process, either be considered a misclas-
sified or a miscategorised record. Interviewees will then be asked Q8 and 9 for event of
the five records.
8. In your opinion, does record XZY have the correct classification based on the definition
criteria in the documented process? YES/NO
(a) If YES, why?
(b) If NO, why not?
9. In your opinion, does record XYZ have the correct category type based on the category
criteria in the documented process? YES/NO
(a) If YES, why?
(b) If NO, why not?
10. In your opinion, does the current security incident record template capture all relevant
information about a security event? YES/NO
(a) If NO, what additional information needs to be captured?
11. In your opinion, does the current security incident record template capture all relevant
information about a security incident? YES/NO
(a) If NO, what additional information needs to be captured?
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12. In your opinion, are there any fields within the security investigation record template
which are difficult to complete? YES/NO
(a) If YES, which fields and why?
13. Did you encounter any benefits with the completion of the current security investigation
record template? YES/NO
(a) If YES, what benefits?
(b) If NO, why not?
14. Did the introduction of the new security investigation record template assist or hinder the
overall investigation process? Please explain why?
15. Did the addition of the Dashboard assist or hinder the overall investigation process?
Please explain why?
16. From your experience, did you encounter any benefits in using the dashboard? YES/NO
(a) If YES, what?
(b) If NO, why not?
17. From your experience, did you encounter any problems in using the dashboard? YES/NO
(a) If YES, what problems?
(b) If NO, what problems do you foresee in using the dashboard within the team?
18. Which feature(s) of the dashboard did you use most? Why?
19. Which feature(s) of the dashboard did you use the least? Why?
20. Did the dashboard have an impact on collaboration opportunities with fellow incident
response handlers? YES/NO
(a) If YES, how?
(b) If No, could you elaborate why not?
21. From your experience, did you feel discouraged, stressed or annoyed when attempting to
identify incomplete records using the dashboard? YES/NO/SOMETIMES
(a) If YES, in what way?
(b) If NO, why not?
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(c) If SOMETIMES, in what case(s)?
22. From your experience, do you feel that you were successful in using the dashboard to
identify incomplete records YES/NO/SOMETIMES
(a) If YES, in what way?
(b) If NO, why not?
(c) If SOMETIMES, in what case(s)?
23. From your experience, did you have to work hard to identify incomplete records using
the dashboard? YES/NO/SOMETIMES
(a) If YES, in what way?
(b) If NO, why not?
(c) If SOMETIMES, in what case(s)?
24. Did you participate in any of the 5-whys root cause analysis exercises? YES/NO
(a) If YES to Q24, go to Q25 15, if NO, go to Q26
25. What factors contributed to the successful or unsuccessful use the 5-whys method for root
cause analysis within the security incident response team?
A Root Cause Analysis (RCA) approach was designed as shown below (see next page).
The purpose of the approach is to support security incident response teams with regards
to identifying when to undertake a RCA, how to start a RCA and how to end a RCA.
(The respondents will have the approach explained step-by-step).
26. What do you see as the perceived strength of using this approach to evaluate how to start,
perform and end a root cause analysis?
27. What do you see as the perceived weakness of using this approach to evaluate how to
start, perform and end a root cause analysis?
28. Would the addition of the proposed RCA approach will assist or hinder the overall inves-
tigation process? Please explain why.
29. Would you change anything with regards to the designed approach? YES/NO
(a) If YES, what?
(b) If NO, why not?
30. Were any of the survey questions vague or difficult to follow? Are there any additional
comments that you would like to make about the questions?
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Appendix D
Description of Proposed
Investigation Record Template Fields
Field Name Description
Subject Subject line provided by incident handlers which describes inves-
tigation record
Category Security occurrence classification and category as assigned by the
incident handler
Date Reported The date the security occurrence was reported to the security in-
cident response team
Time Reported The time the security occurrence was reported to the security in-
cident response team
Reported To: The name of the individual to whom the security occurrence was
reported to within the security incident response team
Reported By: The name of the individual who has reported the security occur-
rence to the security incident response team
Date Discovered The date the security occurrence was discovered within the organ-
isation
Contact Name The name of the individual who is the point of contact for the
security occurrence and provide further information if required
Job Title The job title of the individual named above
Telephone The telephone number of the individual named above
Department The name of the department of the individual named above
Business Unit The name of the business unit of the individual named above
Line Manager The name of the line manager for individual named above
Continued on next page
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– table continued from previous page
Field Name Description
Incident Handler The name of the incident handler who is accountable for the par-
ticular investigation record
Status Status of the investigation record (Open/Closed)
Date Opened The date the security investigation record was opened by the se-
curity incident response team
Time Opened The time the security investigation record was opened by the se-
curity incident response team
Location The name of the location of where the occurrence has happened,
either within or out-with the organisation
Investigation Record Information about the investigation is recorded in this section
Date Closed The date the security investigation record was closed by the secu-
rity incident response team
Time Closed The time the security investigation record was closed by the secu-
rity incident response team
Actions to be Taken Description of any actions that need to be taken by either the in-
cident response team or the information unit in relation to the in-
vestigated occurrence
Lessons Learned Four questions are asked in an attempt to produce lessons learned
from the incident handler: what caused the incident? who caused
the incident? how many records (if any) were involved? what
present controls should have prevented the occurrence? what ad-
ditional controls could have prevented the occurrence?
Working Hours The number of working hours that have consumed on a particular
security occurrence
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Appendix E
Retrospectives Data
Please note, that the names of specific assets, individuals, documents and security processes
identified in the retrospectives have been altered to protect the information security interests
of the Fortune 500 Organisation.
Question 1: Which assets did you need to investigate in this security event/
incident?
Asset Name Number of Occurrences
Active Directory server 2
Organisation-specific asset 1 1
Intranet web page 3
Telephone records 1
Building access card logs 1
CD containing data 1
Data Loss Prevention software 146
Desktop, personal and laptop computers 6
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server logs 1
Email journals, restores and logs 10
Email messages and memos 100
Organisation-specific asset 2 1
Organisation-specific database 1 1
Organisation-specific asset 3 1
Organisation-specific asset 4 1
Organisation-specific asset 5 1
Live email account 37
Continued on next page
247
– table continued from previous page
Asset Name Number of Occurrences
Lotus Notes email server and mail files 132
Organisation-specific asset 5 1
Organisation-specific asset 6 2
Organisation-specific asset 7 1
Network file servers and file shares 5
Organisation-specific asset 8 3
Organisation-specific asset 9 3
SharePoint server 3
Secure Remote Access Service (SRAS) registry 4
Secure Remote Access Service (SRAS) token 3
Third-party assets and logs 9
Organisation-specific asset 10 1
Universal Serial Bus (USB) storage device 1
Various data pieces 9
Virtual machines and logs 1
Voice recordings 6
Web gateway logs 2
Organisation-specific asset 11 1
WiFi logs 1
Total 502
Question 3: Who did you need to communicate with during this security event/
incident?
Individual/Organisational Team Identified Number of Occurrences
Access control team 3
Application development team 1
Application engineering team 5
Application and software projects Team 3
Audit team 3
Branch Managers 1
Building and physical security team 4
Continued on next page
248
– table continued from previous page
Asset Name Number of Occurrences
Contractors 1
Customer-specific business unit 1 1
Customer-specific business unit 2 2
Customer-specific business unit 3 1
Customer-specific business unit 4 1
Customer-specific business unit 5 4
Customer-specific business unit 6 1
Customer-specific business unit 7 2
Customer-specific business unit 8 3
Customer-specific business unit 9 5
Customer-specific business unit 10 1
Data storage team 3
Desktop Support Services 5
Direct banking manager 1
District managers 2
ECM designer and change development team 1
Enterprise communications 1
External legal firms 3
Fraud unit 24
Group incident response team 3
Head of organisational compliance 1
Head of collections 1
Human resources 102
Individuals affects by events and incidents 144
IM Team 1
IT strategy team 1
Information security management 8
Information security team 136
Intranet support team 1
Laptop owners 2
Legal Services 16
Line managers 32
Lotus notes email team 106
Management services team 2
Continued on next page
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– table continued from previous page
Asset Name Number of Occurrences
Parent Organisation individuals 1
Organisational risk and compliance team 8
People Leaders 37
Regulatory risk team 3
Service provision team 2
Service restoration team 1
Systems support 1
Technology Services 1
Third-party desktop support team 1
Third-party WiFi support team 1
Third-party relationship managers 32
Third-parties who provide services to the organisation 7
Windows 7 support team 1
Windows Server support team 3
Total 737
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